ADDRESS TO THE THIRD NPT PREPCOM (NEW YORK 10 - 21 MAY)

CLUSTER DEBATE ON DISARMAMENT

In my speech last year to the Second Preparatory Committee, I set out what we in the UK saw as the main elements in the task ahead for the NPT Review Process.

With the exception of the welcome accession to the NPT of Brazil last September, forward movement towards our common objective of a world free from nuclear weapons has been painfully slow.

INDIA/PAKISTAN

For many, the most serious challenge to the NPT regime was posed by the nuclear tests undertaken almost exactly a year ago by India and Pakistan. My Government's reaction to these tests was clear and needs no elaboration. We fully supported UNSCR 1172 and UNGA Resolution 53/77G. In contacts with India and Pakistan, we continue to urge both countries to adhere to the international non-proliferation regime, to take the steps called for in UNSCR 1172 and to make progress in their bilateral dialogue.

There are signs that the measured response of the international community is beginning to bear fruit. We were encouraged by the positive indications from both India and Pakistan that they will sign the CTBT this summer and in particular by recent reports that the Indian Prime Minister will consult opposition parties to try to reach consensus on CTBT signature. We also welcomed their commitment to continue to observe their moratoria on nuclear testing. Sadly, the more recent missile tests by both countries stand out as retrograde steps. We urge both to resume efforts to improve bilateral relations and improve regional security.

CTBT

While the actions of India and Pakistan were considered to be an external threat to the NPT regime, over the past year it may also have been said to have been damaged by a lack of action on the part of those within the regime. Two instances spring to mind, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. It is a matter of regret that while 152 states have signed the CTBT, only 32 have thus far ratified it. We call upon all States, especially those of the 44 States whose ratification is needed for the treaty to enter into force, to take action as soon as possible.

FMCT

At least there is a CTBT. To our minds, it is more frustrating that no progress has been achieved towards the internationally-agreed goal of an FIVICT. It beggars belief that some five months into the year, the CD has yet to agree a programme of work as we argue over an agenda. Despite the programme of action adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference which called for "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Co-ordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein". Despite the subsequent UNSCR and General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/53/77 (1) and A/RES/53/79 which encouraged the CD to re-establish the AHC at the beginning of this session, there is a real risk that we will go to the 2000 Review Conference with nothing to show for five years work but two brief meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Nuclear Weapons States are regularly accused of putting obstacles in the path of progress on nuclear disarmament. But, in this case, the obstacles are plainly not of our making. Is-this inability to put our words into deeds the legacy that we wish to bequeath? What a sad reflection on the international community's commitment to meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament.

In case there are any who still doubt it, let me re-affirm HMG's commitment to the early start to FMCT negotiations. We urge all states at the CD to break the current deadlock in agreeing the programme of work. We are prepared to give serious consideration to any proposal which will bring this about provided it commands consensus. But, we must stop holding cut-off negotiations -which we agreed in 1995 were a priority and which are universally recognised to offer the prospect of substantial, meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament - hostage to other agendas.

SDR

Having touched on negative aspects of the past year, I will now turn to what we regard as the positive, beginning with an account of the steps which my own Government have taken.

Last year, I made it clear that while all five NWS party to the NPT have a key role to play in the movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it is obvious that there is a big distinction between the two largest nuclear weapons states and the three smaller NWS. I also set out some thoughts on how the smaller NWS could contribute to the process.

Since then, the UK has made such a contribution through the Strategic Defence Review, the results of which were announced in the middle of last year. This review included a vigorous reassessment by HMG of our defence requirements, including our nuclear deterrent. As a result we were able to announce significant further reductions in our nuclear forces. You will already be aware of these steps from the briefing pack which we circulated on Monday. But we believe that they are significant and I make no apology for repeating them now:

In addition to these steps, we are reducing our holdings of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons. We have also made a commitment to greater transparency on nuclear issues, including the size of our holdings of nuclear material. In fulfilment of this commitment, at the time of the SDR, we declared that the UK held the following stocks outside safeguards:

As a consequence of this review, HMG concluded that substantial quantities of this material, which have previously been held outside international safeguards, were no longer required for national security reasons. 4.4 tonnes of plutonium was found to be surplus to national security requirements - 4.1 tonnes of this has already been placed under EURATOM safeguards, and made liable to inspection by the IAEA; the remainder will become subject to the same safeguards regime soon. In addition, over 9,000 tonnes of depleted, natural and low enriched uranium was declared surplus to national security requirements and has been placed under EURATOM safeguards and made liable to inspection by the IAEA.

Furthermore, last year, the UK also announced that all future enrichment and reprocessing in the country would be subject to international oversight.

As a result of these steps, we now have fewer nuclear warheads with less explosive power than when we signed the NPT. This is a real and positive example of my Government's commitment to nuclear disarmament.

The UK was not, of course, alone in taking steps to reduce the size of the nuclear stockpile. We also welcomed the agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the down blending and purchase of a substantial quantity of highly enriched uranium in the Russian Federation, declared surplus to defence requirements. We look forward to further progress in the disposition of surplus weapons grade material through such initiatives as the Trilateral Initiative with the IAEA.

CONCLUSION

I hope that what I have said today demonstrates that despite the groundless allegations which some people chose to peddle in order to distract attention to their own shortcomings, Her Majesty's Government takes its obligations under the NPT seriously. Let me conclude by emphasising what I said last year. We have a clear view of our goal. It is simple. We want to see the global elimination of nuclear weapons. And, as I made clear last year, we also know how we want to get there. It is through the path of incremental progress agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. We have demonstrated that we are playing to the full our part in that progress. I can assure you that we shall continue to do so.