THIRD SESSION

New York, 10 May - 21 May 1999

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

BY

AMBASSADOR DR. GÜNTHER SEIBERT

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

NEW YORK

12 May 1999

Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Iceland, EFTA country member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

2. We have already made clear in our statement at the opening session that we are strongly committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as set out in the NPT and in the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The objectives laid down in these documents reflect the desire of almost the entire international community to work for international security and stability and its commitment to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and a central foundation for the process of nuclear disarmament. It has already achieved a high degree of universality , hardly paralleled by any other international agreement. To be fully effective, however, truly universal adherence to the NPT remains essential. Brazil's accession to the Treaty in September 1998 is an important step further towards this goal, and we warmly welcome it. The European Union repeats its urgent call on those four states which have not yet done so to join the overwhelming majority of the international community and accede to the NPT without further delay.

4. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was a historical milestone in the efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The program of action agreed upon in paragraph 3 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament gives us concrete standards against which progress in the field of nuclear disarmament can and will be measured. So, where do we stand at the moment of this PrepCom?

5. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a key instrument in the achievement of the aforementioned goals, has been signed by the impressive number of 152 countries. Its early entry into force is a high priority for the EU. To date eleven member states including the two nuclear weapon states France and the United Kingdom have ratified the CTBT; all others have initiated ratification procedures. We call upon all states, especially the 44 states, including China, Russia and the United States, whose adherence is required for the treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.

6. We hoped that the CTBT, even before its entry into force, marked the definitive end, for all times, of nuclear test explosions. This hope, however, suffered a blow by the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan shortly after the Second Session of the NPT-PrepCom. These tests ran counter to the international efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and affect security and stability in the South Asian region. The EU, therefore, joins other States Parties in urging India and Pakistan to accede to the CTBT without further delay and to constructively participate in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Moreover, we appeal to both countries to actively engage in confidence building measures and refrain from any action which could jeopardise stability in South Asia.

Mr. Chairman,

7. It is crucial to maintain the momentum towards full and effective implementation of the 1995 action program. A further logical step on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda after the conclusion of the CTBT is the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Such negotiations are long overdue. In 1995, i.e. four years ago, the Conference on Disarmament agreed on a mandate for cut-off negotiations. In August 1998, after protracted discussions, the reaffirmation of the mandate and the establishment of an ad-hoc committee finally seemed to open the way to start working. Unfortunately negotiations on a FMCT have been stalled this year by the squabble over the adoption of a CID work program for 1999. This failure to address an issue which is of vital importance both to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation seriously undermines the credibility of the CD, and endangers the implementation of the 1995 NPT action program. The Union, therefore, calls on all states concerned to start FMCT negotiations at the outset of the second part of the 1999 CD session without pre-conditions.

Mr. Chairman,

8. The EU contains both non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states. We all agree that systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament as set out in the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision are essential if we are to progress towards our common goal: the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament. It is recognised that progress has been made, both unilaterally and bilaterally, towards the reduction of nuclear arsenals The agreements reached in this area must now be fully implemented and followed up with negotiations on further reductions. The EU deplores that the START II treaty which was signed in 1993 has still not entered into force. The Union calls upon Russia and the United States to take all necessary steps to bring the treaty into force without further delay. Negotiations on a START III treaty aiming at further deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals should then immediately be opened and rapidly concluded. These efforts should also be accompanied - as already envisaged at the US-Russian Helsinki Summit of 1997 - by talks on transparency of theater nuclear weapons. While the practical implementation nuclear disarmament primarily falls on those states which possess the largest arsenals of such weapons, it is also an obligation of all States Parties to further the implementation of Art. VI of the NPT.

It is indeed also a matter of legitimate interest and concern to the entire international community. Joint efforts and cooperation have always been the most promising way to reach a common goal. The EU welcomes all efforts to advance the consideration of agenda item 1 of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection it takes note of the proposal to set up an ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing within the Conference on Disarmament an exchange of information and views on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. Today, there are bilateral agreements between the two nuclear weapon states with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons, i.e. the USA and Russia. But we believe that, at an appropriate stage, they should be joined by the other nuclear-weapon states. The European Union welcomes all steps including unilateral measures taken by these States, already at this stage, to contribute to the global reduction of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the United Kingdom and France have undertaken important unilateral steps to reduce their nuclear capabilities: the number of nuclear weapons systems have been considerably reduced, land-based systems have been eliminated, alert levels have been reduced, the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been terminated, production facilities have been closed down and will be dismantled. They were the first nuclear-weapons States to ratify the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

9. With regard to promote and strengthen cooperation of all States to achieve the objectives of the NPT and the Decision on Principles and Objectives, the EU supported last year's decision of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the ad hoc committee on security assurances. We regret that, as in the case of the FMCT negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to continue its work in this field. We are determined to make every effort during the next session of the CD to break the deadlock on the programme of work.

10. In the field of security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free zones play an important role. A large and increasing number of non-nuclear-weapon States profit from negative security assurances contained in the relevant protocols to the treaties constituting such zones. The European Union believes that nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, are important complementary instruments to the NPT. As reaffirmed in the Principles and Objectives of 1995, the establishment and international recognition of such zones enhance both regional and global peace and security.* Since 1995, good progress has been made in the process of signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga and their relevant protocols. We also look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba. On the Treaty of Bangkok, a constructive dialogue has been established with the nuclear-weapon States, which should be brought to a successful conclusion. The European Union supports the efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia as well as in the Middle East. The European Union welcomes the adoption of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by this year's session of the UN Disarmament Commission. We hope that these general guidelines will prove valuable for success in current and future efforts to increase the number of such zones."