Thank you Mr Chairman,

For Australia, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Australia is committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament as one of the core objectives of the Treaty. We consider that continued steady progress on nuclear disarmament is central to preserving the political strength and vitality of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Only a decade ago it seemed improbable, if not impossible, that the nuclear arms race could be successfully checked and nuclear reductions implemented. But the circumstances that created and sustained the nuclear arms race of the Cold War have disappeared. Today, through the Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaty (START) process and other instruments, the Russian Federation and the United States have halted and are moving towards a reversal of the nuclear accumulations of the Cold War by eliminating nuclear weapons on a significant scale.

The United States has reduced its total nuclear warheads from a peak of 32,193 in 1966 to less than 12,000 today. The Russian Federation has reduced its total warheads from a peak of 45,000 in 1986 to below 23,000 today. Furthermore under START 11 both states are scheduled to reduce their nuclear arsenals to below 3,500 deployed strategic warheads by 2007.

The implementation of START I has moved the two largest nuc4ear weapons states along a path of sharp nuclear reductions. Moreover, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and support by all NPT state parties for negotiations on ending fissile-material production for weapons purposes embody a clear commitment by the nuclear weapons states to cap their ability to produce and deploy additional or more advanced nuclear weapons.

I would like to take the opportunity also to welcome the efforts the United States and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are making through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to accelerate the destruction and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and their launchers, and infrastructure, and to prevent unauthorised or accidental use or diversion of nuclear weapons or fissile material. We regard this program as a vital accompanying measure to nuclear disarmament.

The Russian Federation and the United States are to be congratulated on these and other efforts to advance nuclear disarmament.

Mr Chairman,

All this represents a quantum leap forward in the nuclear disarmament process, but there is still much to be done to realise Article VI of the treaty.

The key responsibility for most of the immediate steps towards further nuclear disarmament lies with the nuclear weapons states and in particular - given the relative sizes of their arsenals - the United States and the Russian Federation. The pace at which the disarmament process will proceed will depend in large part on action they alone can take, pursuant to their obligations under Article VI.

The immediate task for the United States and the Russian Federation is to have the START 11 treaty enter into force so as to allow these reductions to get underway as well as clearing the way for the negotiation and early conclusion of a START III Treaty. In this regard, we note our disappointment that the ratification of START II has taken somewhat longer than many had hoped, and we urge the Russian Federation to do its utmost to secure the ratification of START H at the earliest opportunity.

Mr Chairman,

It would be a noble achievement if the Russian Federation and the United States could be in a position to conclude negotiations on a START III treaty in time for the 2000 Review Conference, although we recognise that the delays in the ratification of START H render this an optimistic objective.

I would also like to touch on the- issue of transparency in nuclear disarmament. The whole global community - but most particularly the states which have submitted themselves to the obligations of the NPT - have a direct and fundamental interest in nuclear disarmament. In this context, I would like to thank the United States for the briefings it provided on the current state of nuclear disarmament to various delegations at last year's UNGA, and the UK for the comprehensive material it has provided to delegations at this meeting on its disarmament policy.

I would like to encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to share still further information with the international community on the actual and potential nuclear arms reductions of the START process and related agreements, including the various practical issues and difficulties which they are encountering in their current bilateral nuclear disarmament efforts and the implementation of their agreements. Further, Australia invites all nuclear weapons states to share information on unilateral steps they have taken or are contemplating taking to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and put in place measures designed to obviate the risk of an inadvertent or accidental nuclear strike. Advice from the nuclear weapons states as to the specific steps they are taking to eliminate potential risks posed by the Y2K issue would no doubt also prove valuable and reassuring to many states.

Mr Chairman,

The final elimination of nuclear weapons must be, of course, a global endeavour involving all states. It is our strong view, however, that until nuclear disarmament nears the elimination phase, it will be premature for the international community to address the question of a single weapons convention.

Although the nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, all states must contribute to development of, and support for, an environment favourable to nuclear weapons elimination. In this regard, we continue to support the establishment of an appropriate mechanism in the Conference on Disarmament to allow a general airing of nuclear disarmament issues. We were disappointed that the CD concluded its first session this year without agreement on a programme of work. To be successful and effective, a mechanism on nuclear disarmament must command the support of all CD members including the nuclear weapon states. Important work on other areas cannot however be held hostage to the impasse on nuclear disarmament in the interim. As the CD continues to wrestle with this issue, we would urge on all its members the importance of cooperation, quiet diplomacy and informal consultation - and the eschewal of public confrontation, point-scoring and the drawing of linkages which detract from the capacity of the CD to commence productive work, especially on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Mr Chairman,

Regarding security assurances, I would like to reiterate that Australia supports the consideration by this NPT review of possible further measures to assure non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we would wish to see the Nuclear Weapons States reiterate the terms of their 1995 declarations and Security Council Resolution 984.

In the context of security assurances, I would like to restate Australia's support, consistent with the 1995 Principles and Objectives, for efforts to establish new nuclear weapon free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among states concerned. We look forward to the ratification of the relevant protocols to existing nuclear weapon free zones by nuclear weapon states which have not yet done so. I would also like to reiterate our preparedness to offer, as we did in the case of the nascent Treaty of Pelindaba, the sponsors of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone initiative such practical assistance as may be welcome and appropriate. We welcome the progress which has been made to date on the initiative.

Mr Chairman,

Australia calls on all states not presently party to the NPT to join at the earliest possible juncture and conclude a binding safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On the issue of universality, we would note that this Prepcom is the first opportunity in the NPT context to address the issue of last year's nuclear testing in South Asia. As the NPT is the prime global mechanism for addressing nuclear non-proliferation, it is important that the Treaty parties have something collectively to say on an issue which goes fundamentally to the heart of the global non-proliferation norm. The credibility of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime therefore demands that the 2000 Review Conference address the issue of South Asian Testing. This Prepcom must prepare the ground to enable that to occur and we therefore believe that this Prepcom should agree to recommend that the Review Conference address South Asian testing in 2000.

Mr Chairman,

Four years ago states parties to this treaty agreed that the undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty should be filled with determination. At that time we agreed that three measures would be particularly important for the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI. These were the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states - and by all states - of the objectives set out in Article VI of the treaty.

We believe that the strong support that has been expressed by all NPT states parties for an early commencement to negotiations for a cut-off treaty should not be allowed to evaporate.

Last year's First Committee resolution on FMCT was an unquestionable endorsement of the need to urgently commence and conclude an FMCT. In particular, Australia welcomed the strong statement of support by the Non-Aligned Movement for an early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT expressed in the First Committee deliberations. We should use the strong support which has been voiced in this Prepcom, and previous Prepcoms, as a catalyst for renewing and redoubling the efforts of all NPT parties in the Conference on Disarmament to overcome whatever obstacles exist in that institution and secure an agreement which would allow these negotiations to commence.

Thank you Mr Chairman.