STATEMENT BY CANADA

Wednesday, May 12, 1999
Discussion on and consideration of any proposals
on the provisions in Article VI of the Treaty
and in paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament^", dealing with ^"Nuclear Disarmament".

Mr. Chairman,

Canada's policy objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As stressed in our opening statement to this session of the Preparatory Committee, Canada is resolved to ensure that the NPT, the basis for all efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, remains a "Treaty of Commitment" and not a "Treaty of Convenience".

In order to ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, the nuclear-weapon States agreed, in the adoption of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to 'The determined pursuit....of systematic and progressive. efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate objective of eliminating those weapons...". While we have recognized that for the foreseeable future the primary responsibility rests with the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, Canada and all members of the international community have a deep and abiding stake in that process and a binding obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI. In April of this year, the government of Canada renewed its pledge to press for negotiated reductions which bring the international community closer to this objective.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted a programme of action in the Principles and Objectives that should be renewed in 2000 in order to target new achievements that will contribute to the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI. Canada proposes that a new programme of action be adopted by the Review Conference which will have the support of all States party to the Treaty. Such a programme could for example include the following:

- renewal, acceleration and full implementation of the START Process, including the achievement of the reduction targets set out publicly by the Russian Federation and the USA for START II and START III;

- direct engagement of other three nuclear-weapon States in the START process in the near future;

- pursuit of additional measures such as de- alerting, transparency and confidence-building as regards nuclear weapons operations;

- negotiation and implementation of measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons, including their numbers and their deployment;

- achievement of the earliest possible entry-into-force of the CTBT, drawing upon all measures consistent with international law, and reaffirmation of the rejection of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions as established by this Treaty;

- early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (FMCT) banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as initiated within the Conference on Disarmament;

- identification and implementation of appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

- formal affirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on the production of such fissile material pending negotiation of an FMCT; and

- establishment of mechanisms both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchange of information and substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

Against this inventory let me stress one particular element of our assessment. We are increasingly concerned that our justifiable focus on the challenge of reducing strategic nuclear weapons may well be leading us to downgrade or dismiss the serious problem posed by tactical nuclear weapons. To Canada, a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon; the availability of both types and the opportunity to use one or another must be confronted with equal urgency. We urge that this dual dimension of the overall nuclear challenge be fully recognized.

Mr. Chairman,

As a supplementary comment, per our General Statement earlier this week, we remain deeply concerned by the implications of sub-paragraphs 7 and 11 of paragraph 1 in the Chairman's Working Paper (PCII/35) from the second Preparatory Committee session. In the first instance, we wish to repeat our view that document has the same status as that of any other contribution submitted to the two previous sessions of the Committee, no more and no less.

To address that concern on our part more directly, we are tabling a position paper. Our goal in doing so is not to initiate a substantive debate on this question. We merely wish to ensure that tile formal record of the preparatory process registers that differing positions on this matter of central importance to the Treaty may well exist, and that Canada's view in that regard is clear.

Finally, Mr Chairman,

As long ago as 1967, during negotiations of the NPT, Canada stated that countries forgoing their option to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons would not unreasonably wish to ensure that their act of self-denial should in turn lead the nuclear-weapon States to undertake tangible steps to reduce and eliminate their vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. And for over three decades, Canada has advocated tangible steps and measures such as the reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals, conclusion of a CTBT and an FMCT.

The 1995 Principles and Objectives decision was one concrete expression of the tangible steps envisaged by Article VI, and the adoption in 2000 of a new forward-looking document should reinforce and extend this process. It is in this spirit that Canada has proposed elements of a new programme of action that we hope can be agreed in a new Principles and Objectives document by the 2000 Review Conference.

Canada

Position Paper re Article VI

Purpose:

Canadian Position: