STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARKKU REIMAA

ON CLUSTER I (NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION,
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT)
ISSUES AT THE SECOND SESSION OF
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR
THE YEAR 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

GENEVA, 29 APRIL 1998

Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament

This decade has witnessed a remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament. Besides nuclear arms reductions per se, a series of important measures have been taken to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

After the end of the nuclear arms race, there is a case to debate whether the pace of reductions is sufficient or not. It is important that the good pace that has continued since the conclusion of the INF Treaty is maintained. Perhaps even move important is that the direction is clear and the process towards nuclear disarmament becomes irreversible.

This cluster debate offers us a possibility to consider what kind of contribution each one of us could do to promote nuclear disarmament. The NPT review process offers a broad framework to further nuclear disarmament, among other key objectives of the process. In response to the 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives as well as on the strengthened review process, we find it important to include meaningful language on nuclear disarmament into the draft recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference.

As to the Conference on Disarmament, there has been a lot of discussion about the role of the CD in support of nuclear disarmament. While the CD serves as a useful forum for dialogue on nuclear disarmament, its main task is to negotiate disarmament treaties. The CD negotiated successfully the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty - it deserves the strong support of the international community. The next practical step available for negotiations at the CD in this field is the fissile material cut-off, as agreed in the ~995 decision on Principles and Objectives. These negotiations would, undoubtedly, serve both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

So far, nuclear arms reductions have been carried forward through unilateral measures or through bilateral negotiations. The NPT Review and Extension Conference underlined the responsibility of the nuclear weapon states in nuclear disarmament. We have carefully listened to the statements made by the nuclear weapon states on the actions they are taking unilaterally or bilaterally in nuclear disarmament, and on their determination to continue along this road. We appreciate this openness.

At this point, the START process continues to be the centerpiece around which next endeavours are likely to be taken. We share the hopes expressed by many delegations here that the Russian duma would soon ratify the START 2 Treaty. This would allow the immediate commencement of the START 3 negotiations as outlined by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit in March 1997.

The Helsinki outline suggests that the START 3 would represent a new step forward not only in quantity but also in quality. We welcome the expressed intention of the parties to address, under the START 3, measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.

What has been left in the shadow of the achievements in strategic nuclear weapons are the so called tactical nuclear weapons. The unilateral announcements that were made in 1991 in regard to short-range nuclear weapons were of great importance. But one can ask: is that enough in the current international situation where confrontation is replaced by co-operation? Follow-up would be welcome. In this context, Finland has noted with satisfaction the announcement by the two countries that they intend to explore in the START 3 context possible transparency measures relating to tactical nuclear systems. In short term, increased transparency may be the way forward. In longer term, the objective should be, in our view, to bring tactical nuclear weapons under a regime of contractual nuclear disarmament obligations.

Yet, there is another angle to transparency. The NPT states parties have a legitimate interest to know how nuclear disarmament processes are progressing. In the First PrepCom session, Finland called on the nuclear weapon states to provide information through the NPT review process on actions that they have taken or are going to take on unilateral basis to withdraw short-range nuclear weapons from operational use and, subsequently, to eliminate them. Such an increased transparency would match well with the established practices whereby the nuclear weapon states are reporting on actions they are taking in the context of Article VI of the Treaty.

Finland introduced a proposal on increased transparency in the chairman's paper of the first PrepCom session (page 19 of the PrepCom report). In the light of several encouraging developments since then and the comments received, we consider it appropriate to revise our proposal with a slightly broader text whereby the states parties would:

• underline the vital importance of the announcements by the United States and the Russian Federation that they would unilaterally implement reductions in their non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the follow-on to these announcements, which contributes to positive international climate and increased security of all states parties,
• welcome, in this context, the joint statement on parameters on future reductions in nuclear forces issued in Helsinki on 21 March 1997,
• recognize the value of increased openness achieved through the information provided by the nuclear weapon states in the course of the NPT review process on steps they have taken or are taking in nuclear disarmament,
• support the objective of increased transparency regarding withdrawal from operational use and dismantlement of short-range nuclear weapons in the context of the PrepCom recommendations on nuclear weapons.