8 April 1998

Dear Ambassador,

A successful Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is vital to maintaining the international non-proliferation regime. To achieve that goal, the PrepCom must not only take on substantive issues, it must achieve concrete results. If the PrepCom fails to live up to the expectations created at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole will suffer.

The success of the PrepCom depends on the willingness of each state to seek and agree specific points and recommendations for action. The purpose of the PrepCom, as agreed in 1995, is "to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference".

Toward this end, where possible, each PrepCom should agree precise goals in a consensus final document. Within the context of the NPT, the basis of these goals should be the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, as agreed in 1995.

For example, agreement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a key goal set in 1995, was reached when the Treaty opened for signature in 1996. Thus, the 1998 PrepCom should agree a statement that

1. welcomes the progress to date;
2. congratulates those states that have deposited their instruments of ratification, in particular the French and British as nuclear-weapon states; and
3. calls on all states to promptly sign and ratify the Treaty, in particular those states required for entry-into-force.

This should happen before the 2000 Review Conference because, as stipulated in the CTBT, a conference to encourage the Treaty’s entry-into-force seems extremely likely in 1999.

A similar consensus statement should be reached on efforts to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the Shannon statement and the mandate contained therein. These consensus statements should be given as much weight as possible, and given appropriate titles, such as "Final Declaration of the 1998 PrepCom".

For other substantive issues, the PrepComs should seek to create a rolling text that can be handed down each year. As happened in 1997, some areas of agreement will quickly emerge. and those passages should be tentatively approved as recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. More time could then be left for other issues.

Several contentious issues will be likely be raised in 1998. For example, at the 1997 PrepCom, several states expressed concern about plans to expand NATO and, implicitly, the Alliance’s nuclear guarantee. This issue is even more significant given the Alliance’s plan to update its Strategic Concept. NATO plans to release the new version of the Concept at the Alliance’s 1999 Summit in Washington. Statements from NATO countries indicate that there are no plans to change the key nuclear aspects of the Alliance’s policy: nuclear sharing arrangements and the first use policy. If so, NATO’s strategy will not reflect the on-going changes in Europe, nor the commitments made at the 1995 NPT Conference. In particular, the increase in the number of countries clinging to nuclear weapons for their security is antithetical to the commitment to pursue "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons" as agreed in 1995 in the Principles and Objectives.

On other substantive issues, the Prepcom should call on:

1. All nuclear-weapon states to develop and articulate a "program of action" that describes the aforementioned "systematic and progressive efforts" to reduce nuclear arsenals. These programs should be submitted to each PrepCom, highlighting both recent actions taken and, more importantly, what future steps each nuclear-weapon state plans to reach the goal of elimination.
2. Russia to ratify START II and the United States to approve the protocols for START II and the ABM Treaty, and the United States and Russia to promptly commence negotiation on and to agree to START III strategic nuclear arms reductions to 2,000 or below on each side, with verified dismantlement of reduced weapons and the transfer of their fissile material to monitored storage:
3. All states to support the proposal at the Conference on Disarmament for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, with a mandate to deliberate on ways to eliminate nuclear weapons and identify if and when one or more steps should be the subject of negotiations in the conference;
4. All states to support the negotiation of legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear members of the NPT;
5. The nuclear-weapon states to adopt as national policy the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons;
6. All nuclear-weapon states to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons systems, a measure that would simultaneously reduce the dangers associated with "launch-on-warning postures" and increase confidence in security assurances and no-first use policies.

Finally, strenuous efforts must be made to maximize the openness and transparency of the process, including significantly expanding the range of meetings at the PrepCom non-governmental organizations can attend. As stated by many delegations, non-governmental organizations have much to offer this process.

I enclose three additional items for your consideration. The first is a report that highlights the potential for conflict between NATO and the NPT, as discussed above. The other two items are stories that highlight the continuing U.S. reliance on its nuclear arsenal. I recommend them to you.

Yours truly,

Daniel Plesch
Director