STATEMENT BY

H. E. Mrs. JOELLE BOURGOIS,
AMBASSADOR,

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT,

HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE SECOND PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
0F THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SECURITY ASSURANCES

6 MAY 1998

GENEVA

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Mr. Chairman,

The importance of the commitments assumed by nuclear-weapon States to protect non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of these weapons has been stressed on several occasions. The Extension Conference of 1995 agreed that further provisions in this respect could be considered, and, in 1997, the Preparatory Committee was of the opinion that time should be reserved for the review of this subject during the present session.

Last year, like this year, my delegation noted that the subject was once again attracting international attention, probably owing to the considerable progress that had been achieved concerning it. After having re-examined the question, the French delegation would therefore like to make the following observations.

As things now stand, security assurances are an instrument for protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear armament. Significant progress has been achieved. More can be accomplished, providing a pragmatic approach is adopted and lessons are learnt from past or current experience.

Security assurances exist in two forms, negative and positive, and on two planes, regional (I) and global (II).

Mr Chairman,

I) The regional dimensions of non-proliferation and its contribution to the secunty of all have, in fill accordance with Article VII of the NPT, never ceased asserting themselves, through the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, The regions where all the States contained in them have decided, by seeking support and cooperation from all nuclear-weapon States, to set themselves up as a zone devoid of such weapons, are now four in number: Latin America since 1967, the South Pacific since 1985, South-East Asia since 1995 and Africa since 1996.

Where the States members of these zones are concerned, the assurances exchanged among themselves by the tact of their renunciation of nuclear weapons are supplemented by the commitments of the nuclear weapon States to respect the zones' status and not use nuclear weapons against the States that compose the zones.

To date, a hundred or so States benefit from negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States under the protocols annexed to the treaties establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Vis-A-vis these States, the nuclear-weapon States have renewed, in the form of international treaties totally binding as from their entry into force, the commitments set out in Resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council.

The continuation of this regional approach, involving contractualization of negative security assurances, seems to me by far the most realistic and fruitful path to follow. The process of ratifying existing zone treaties has not yet been completed. Once it has been, about t'v'o-thirds of the States parties to the NPT will have received legally binding negative security assurances. As you know, my country has for its part already ratified the protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. It is furthermore pleased to note the constructiveness of the exchanges under way with the member countries of the zone defined under the Bangkok Treaty, on the terms which would enable the nuclear-weapon States to support this zone and provide its member countries with legally binding negative security assurances.

What is the position of those States which for the moment remain outside this regional approach? Five States in Central Asia - as they themselves remind us - have been engaged for a year now in creating a new nuclear weapon-flee zone. We attended the conference held in September 1997 in Tashkent in order to recount, along with the other nuclear-weapon States and several non-nuclear-weapon States, our experience in this field We are awaiting further information as to the intentions of the five States and hope they will continue to consult us as their project advances.

In the Middle East and South Asia, projects for nuclear weapon- or weapons of mass destruction-free zones have long existed. Their realization, however, depends on States which have chosen to stay out of the NPT. There is nothing to be gained, I feel, from attempting to deal with the question of security assurances while failing to consider developments in these States. They, after all, are the only ones in the world not to have made any commitment in the matter and so remain the main source of potential nuclear threat to their neighbours.

That leaves the States of Europe and North America. It happens that four of the nuclear-weapon States recognized by the NPT and sixteen - soon to become nineteen - members of an alliance relying on nuclear weapons are located in this part of the world. By reason of the free choices of this region's States, the question of security assurances cannot be posed in the same terms.

These are complex issues and I do no more than call them to mind. We are prepared to discuss them in greater depth with the States concerned. Our commitment to everything that can strengthen peece and international stability is unambiguous. As to nuclear disarmament, we have ratified not only the protocols to the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, which I have already mentioned, but also, on 6 April last, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

II) France is aware of the concerns of those non-nuclear-weapon States which, while they would be in favour of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, find themselves in a situation where it appears unlikely that all the States in the region could reach immediate agreement on the establishment of such a zone. This is why France decided to extend to individual non-nuclear-weapon States the assurance that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. As early as 11 June 1982, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, provided assurances along these lines. These assurances were renewed and developed in the declaration of 6 April 1995 before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, taken note of by tie Security Council in Resolution 984 of II April 1995. France reiterated that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States parties to the NPT, except in the case of invasion or other attack, carried out or supported by such a State in alliance or association with a nuclear weapon State, against it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State in respect of which it had a security commitment. The recognition by the Security Council of this undertaking and those of the four other nuclear-weapon States conferred on them a particular scope and importance.

After the 1995 Conference and the indefinite extension of the NPT, and since the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, our priority is to open negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a fissile materials cut~ff treaty. Conclusion of a multilateral verifiable treaty in this area would facilitate progress towards the universal attainment of the NPT’s objectives and so create a new context for strengthening the safeguards protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and South Asia in particular.

My country has also declared that it is ready to consider discussion of other matters relating to nuclear disarmament, especially that of negative security assurances. This is a sensitive issue for us, given the principles upon which our doctrine of deterrence is based. France has nevertheless, in a spirit of flexibility, agreed to pursue discussion on the theme.

France believes that deliberations in the NPT Preparatory Committee, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament should play complementary roles, since each forum has its own agenda. The ideas developed in any one of these fora should not compete with those that may be exchanged elsewhere, but should mutually reinforce one another. As to the NPT Preparatory Committee, it can, in line with its purpose, perform a valuable complementary role in stimulating exchanges of views and preparing a rapprochement of positions. That being said, its task is sufficiently heavy for it not to be transformed into a negotiating forum. A protocol on security assurances would disturb its equilibrium without resolving the main challenges posed by the issue of pursuing consolidation of non-nuclear-weapon States' security, particularly in tension-ridden areas. The main risk in the field of security assurances today lies in the Middle East and South Asia. Meeting it requires dialogue, not only amongst ourselves but also, and possibly most of all, with States not parties to the NPT or a zone treaty.

This is the reason why we have accepted the re-establishment in the Disarmament Conference of a Special Committee on negative security assurances. The Disarmament Conference is indeed the only forum where we can usefully tackle problems those linked to weapons of mass destruction, for example and to regional security - which today limit extending the benefit of negative security assurances, in treaty form, to numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Discussion on these themes could start when work resumes in Geneva in May. The task will be to consider, following Resolution 984 and the other developments that I have just mentioned, possible further stages, perhaps in the shape of a legally binding international instrument if that is appropriate.

What can we do and what are we willing to do in this framework that dates back to the already far-off days of the first Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which had set this issue at the top of the international community's priorities? My country suggests that it would be worth thinking about an important supplementary task that might usefully be developed in two directions:

• Facilitating the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they are recommended by the UN General Assembly and, if warranted, seeking out the conditions for agreement by the States concerned.

• Facilitating the framing of negative security assurances protocols annexed to the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties to which the nuclear-weapon States might eventually be led to accede, in order to promote cooperation among zones, and the harmonious emergence of new zones, and to devise common-sense solutions responding to the specific concerns of a State that might deem itself to be in a highly peculiar situation.

Thank you Mr. Chairman