Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Second Meeting of the Preparatory Committee
for the 6th Review Conference

Negative Security Assurances

Australian Views

Geneva, 6 May 1998

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Thank you, Mr Chairman

Australia considers that, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons consistent with Article VI of the NPT, negative security assurances are a central reinforcing element underpinning the basic non-proliferation bargain which the NPT represents. NSAs are also an important inducement for the few states still outside the treaty to accede.

Australia appreciates the statements made by each of the nuclear weapons States on 6 April 1995, in which they gave security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons States that are Parties to the Treaty. We have further welcomed Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995, adopted by consensus, which for the first time notes the security assurances given by the nuclear weapon States and elaborates measures which will be taken to provide assistance to non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty victim of an act, or object of a threat, of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Australia has endorsed the view of the Security Council that this constitutes a step in the direction of further appropriate measures to safeguard the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons.

Australia acknowledges also that there have been calls in the past for additional appropriate measures, including those specified in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, to provide protection for non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty from nuclear threats that emanate from States non-parties to the Treaty which possess significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities that might allow for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability.

Mr Chairman,

The possibility of further enhancing negative security assurances is a valid question for reflection and debate in this forum. We also take note of the fact that the Conference of Disarmament recently agreed to reconvene an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. We look forward to working with others in the Conference of Disarmament to try and find a common approach on the goal of enhancing negative security assurances, due primacy being given - consistent with our opening observation - to the particular claims and interests of NPT states parties in this regard.

As Australia noted in its earlier statements, at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 a useful paper on negative security assurances was negotiated by Australia's then Ambassador for Disarmament, Richard Starr, as friend of the chair of Main Committee I on security assurances. It is worthwhile reflecting on the ideas contained in that paper as we deliberate further on this matter.

The paper developed by the working group found new common ground, including recognition that non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty in full compliance with their obligations had a legitimate claim to credible, comprehensive and effective security assurances. It acknowledged also the importance of further measures to build upon Security Council Resolution 984; offered a full agenda of proposals in this regard and called for all NPT States Parties to pursue ways and means of considering these proposals.

In this regard, one option that was identified in the paper was the possibility of negotiating a legally-binding instrument, perhaps in the form of a Protocol to the NPT. For its part Australia does not rule out this option. It is, however, the most ambitious proposal on the table. If it proves not to be achievable, we would hope that States Panties could agree nevertheless to consider and pursue more modest but worthwhile, practical and achievable outcomes.

Mr Chairman,

One method for extending legally-binding negative security assurances which has attracted universal endorsement is the concept of nuclear weapon free zones.

In return for a binding commitment in relation to the absence of nuclear weapons from their territories, States Parties to nuclear weapon free zone treaties ask the nuclear weapons states to make a legally binding commitment not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against them. For its part, Australia highly values the legally-binding negative security assurance that it receives as a Party to the Treaty of Rarotonga.