UK Statement on the FMCT

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES To THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SECOND SESSION

GENEVA 27 APRIL - 8 MAY 1998

STATEMENT ON A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

MS CHRISTINE FERGUSON
REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Check Against Delivery 30 April 1998

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

Introduction

1. Mr Chairman, I wish I could say that I welcome the opportunity to take the floor to discuss the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. In fact, however, like my Government, I am extremely disappointed that - almost five years since the consensus UNGA resolution in 1993 - we are still at the stage of discussing this Treaty instead of negotiating it.

Reasons for Disappointment

2. The fundamental reason for our disappointment is that we believe a Treaty of this kind can make a number of important contributions to our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. First, it seems obvious to us that this goal will not be brought any closer by continuing to allow some states the freedom to produce unsafeguarded tissue material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Currently eight states have that freedom. Some of them are already exercising their freedom to produce more unsafeguarded fissile material -or seem quite likely to do so in the near future. Others of them are unlikely to exercise this freedom in the near future, but they could if they wanted to - or if their circumstances changed. So removing this freedom from these eight states would clearly be a step in the right direction.

4. Second, as the United States Ambassador to the Conference On Disarmament said when he addressed the CD on this subject, "the FMCT would help foster the creation of a climate conducive to continued, long-term progress on reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles". Indeed, it would. And, conversely, such a climate is hardly fostered by continuing to have a situation in which there is no legal constraint on the future production of more unsafeguarded fissile material. So an FMCT would also contribute to nuclear disarmament by creating an environment friendly to further measures consistent with our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. Third, there can clearly be no final achievement of this goal without verification arrangements on all reprocessing and enrichment facilities - the key facilities that can produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. So by applying verification arrangements to all such facilities wherever they may be in the world, an FMCT will also put in place an essential foundation for the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament.

6. It seems to us that these are three excellent reasons why an FMCT could make a major contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. We are therefore somewhat baffled, Mr Chairman, by the apparent reluctance of some non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept now, as they accepted in 1995, that an FMCT negotiation should begin at once in the CD - without preconditions, and in accordance with the Channel statement and the mandate it contained.

7. It seems to us that, by setting preconditions and walking away from the Shannon statement and mandate, some non-nuclear weapon states party to this Treaty are simply: delaying the date by which the nuclear weapon state parties and the key non-parties will be bound not to do what they themselves are already bound not to do; delaying the date by which a climate conducive to further progress is achieved; and delaying the implementation of verification measures that will be an essential foundation of the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

8. It is hard to see what their reasons for adopting an approach with these effects can possibly be. But, as I understand it, there seem to be two such reasons - one is a belief that an FMCT negotiation should only proceed in the CD if there are also negotiations or discussions in the CD about "Nuclear Disarmament"; the other is a belief that the Shannon mandate is inadequate because it does not require an FMCT to address the question of tissue material produced prior to the cut-off date.

Counters to Objections

9. To those who are not content with the Shannon mandate because it does not require the proposed negotiation to cover fissile material produced prior to the cut-oft date, perhaps I could just repeat two key paragraphs in the Shannon statement.

10. The first key paragraph reads:

"During the course of my consultations, many delegations expressed concern about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the Convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would also permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material."

And the second key paragraph reads:

"Mr President, it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues."

11. I emphasise again what that last paragraph I quoted said:
"It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above issues". And "the above issues" clearly include the appropriate scope of the FMCT.

12. Mr Chairman, in drawing attention to these paragraphs I am not saying or implying that we in the United Kingdom have altered our views on the inclusion of stocks in an FMCT. We have not. But we recognise that the Shannon statement and mandate allow others to raise the issue in the negotiations. So let us get the negotiations started and debate the issues where they should be debated - in negotiations and not in pre-negotiations.

13. And to those who want to hold the start of FMCT negotiations hostage to other issues, I would simply say that, after three wasted years, the time has surely come for them to realise that this is not a productive approach. On the contrary, it is simply frustrating the progress towards nuclear disarmament which an FMCT could bring.

Suggestions for Progress

14. For all these reasons, Mr Chairman, I hope that this discussion of the FMCT as a "special issue" at this PrepCom will lead all parties represented here to draw a number of conclusions:

- first, that a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would make a number of important contributions towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament;

- second, and consequently, that no useful purpose is served by any party to this Treaty frustrating the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD to negotiate such a Treaty by setting preconditions for the re-establishment of such a Committee or walking away from the Shannon statement and mandate;

- third, that all parties to this Treaty who are also members of the CD should therefore go to the next session of the CD with a united determination to see such an Ad Hoc Committee established.

15. If they did so, we think this would greatly increase the prospects of persuading the non-parties to this Treaty that they too should accept such a negotiation and participate fully in it. We recall that both India and Pakistan accepted the Shannon statement and mandate in 1995, and it seems to us that it is as much in their interests to do so again now as it was to do it then - it not more so. And we have seen no indication that Israel would be unwilling to enter into negotiations on this basis.

16. The way forward is therefore clear. And I will add, Mr Chairman, that the Austrian delegation to the CD has already tabled the very short draft decision that the CD needs to take to move this whole subject from the level of discussion to the level of negotiation.

Conclusion

17. So, Mr Chairman, in conclusion, I come back to my original comment that the British Government feels we ought to be negotiating the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty not discussing it. And certainly I very much hope that this is the last time we will need to "discuss" the FMCT in an NPT Preparatory Committee. I would far prefer to be negotiating one in the Conference on Disarmament, so that, come our 2000 Conference, we shall be able to report its achievement, or at the very least real progress towards it. Thank you very much.