Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Concept Paper

29 April 1998

• A fissile material cut-off treaty should not be seen as a stand-alone instrument like the CTBT which seeks to address fissile material issues in one fell swoop, but rather as a framework instrument which evolves over time into a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling, management and disposition of fissile material.

• If a fissile material cut-off treaty is to be a genuine disarmament measure which will contribute to the fulfilment of the objectives of Article VI of the NPT - as Parties the NPT agreed that it should be in 1995 - then it will have to be capable of evolving in tandem with other disarmament measures, in a series of incremental steps.

• A first step in the development of this regime would be a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapon.

• This is a step which can - and should - be taken now, to ensure that the nuclear-weapon states' current willingness to cease production of fissile material cannot be reversed.

• It is difficult to envisage significant further progress towards nuclear disarmament which does not include, sooner or later, measures to address both fissile material production facilities and fissile material stockpiles.

• For this reason, the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons should be followed by a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control.

• This too should be an evolving instrument which tracks other nuclear disarmament measures and progressively brings direct-use fissile material into the scope of a fissile material regime.

• An important objective of this progressive approach will be to make disarmament measures irreversible by ensuring that fissile material no longer needed is not available for military use again.

• This fissile material regime will require an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international and possibly regional arrangements for nuclear material made excess to military requirements.