South Africa on FMCT

STATEMENT BY
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ON THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY (FMCT) ISSUE
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR
THE YEAR 2000 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
REVIEW CONFERENCE

GENEVA, 30 APRIL 1998

Mr Chairperson,

Thank you for giving me the floor.

South Africa's position on the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and our desire to have had these negotiations commence immediately following the conclusion of the CTBT, was clearly enunciated by President Nelson Mandela during 199S when he stated in a Memorandum of Understanding, signed with the then Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Hon. James Bolger, that:

"Looking ahead, we confirm that our Governments will work for the commencement next year (1997) of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons."

This statement was, inter alia, founded upon the agreement which was achieved at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference where all of the States parties to the NPT committed themselves to "(t)he immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein." This negotiation was envisaged as -- and in our view still remains -- an essential measure in the programme of action agreed to in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT.

The South Africa Government was pleased that at the 1997 session of this Preparatory Committee, the NPT States parties again reached consensus upon this important issue. We, however, believe that it is will be even more important for the States parties to translate this consensus into action by vocally and at every opportunity -- especially within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) here in Geneva -- expressing our determination for and commitment to the immediate commencement of these negotiations.

Mr Chairperson,

South Africa believes that the CD's failure to start and conclude the FMCT negotiations is a set hack for our common goal of the full realisation of the nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT. Fissile material -- such as highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium -- are the core elements of nuclear weapons without this material nuclear weapons could not exist.

For South Africa it will be essential for an FMCT not only to he limited to future production. For an FMCT to be a genuine disarmament measure, and not purely one of non-proliferation, it is necessary that the treaty should include provisions on existing stockpiles of fissile material. While we would commend the Russian Federation and the United States for the progress and accomplishments of their trilateral discussions with the IAEA, in terms of which they are seeking to reach agreement on placing surplus nuclear weapons fissile material under IAEA supervision, South Africa would also call on:

The other nuclear-weapon States (China, France, United Kingdom) to as soon as possible reach agreements with the IAEA on this issue in accordance with their undertakings under Paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives. This paragraph stipulates that "Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as possible, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved."
On all of the nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Russian Federation, united Kingdom, United States) to unequivocally commit themselves to the FMCT negotiations as a genuine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure which would as a minimum include provisions on fissile material which are not components of nuclear weapons.

Mr Chairperson,

Any steps which delay the immediate commencement of the FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should therefore be opposed. While we understand and share the disappointment and frustration of the many States parties to the NPT at the failure of nuclear-weapon States to move beyond nuclear weapons reductions and towards negotiations for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, we do not believe that our common ultimate goal will be enhanced by delaying the start of the FMCT negotiations. As South Africa has clearly stated on numerous occasions in the Conference on Disarmament it would be beneficial to our work there if we approached our discussions without relying on so-called linkages. Ever since they were raised in the CD at the end of 1994, linkages have led to a disappointing lack of progress on issues which the Conference should address. Linkages are no doubt a neat way of avoiding progress on certain subjects, or of trying to ensure progress on others, but the result has instead been mostly to block progress on all fronts.

In our deliberations at this session of the Preparatory Committee, it is the South African Government's view that we should not only again agree to our commitment for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. All of the States parties to the NPT should also commit themselves to taking active measures to promote the start of the negotiations themselves. We should also attempt to reach a common understanding of the type of FMCT we are talking about, although it is our view that the 1995 CD Special Coordinator's report (CD/1299 dated 24 March 1995) contains the necessary flexibility to cover all perspectives about the nature of the treaty to be negotiated.

Mr Chairperson, I thank you.