Australian Statement on FMCT

Statement delivered by H.E. Mr John B. Campbell

Head of the Australian Delegation to the
Second Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review
Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Geneva, 30 April 1998

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Mr Chairman

Three years ago States Parties to this Treaty agreed that the undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty should be filled with determination.

In this context, the Nuclear Weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

In this context also, we agreed that three measures would be particularly important for the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI.

the completion by Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996;
the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and
the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States - and by all States - of the objectives set out in Article VI of the Treaty.

We have certainly achieved the first of these objectives which we set for ourselves in 1995: in two years time, the Review Conference will be able to welcome the completion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the adoption of the Treaty and the signature and ratification by a large number of States, including, we expect, all the Nuclear Weapon States, and, building on what we hope will be progress towards our goal of universalising the NPT, universalisation and entry into force of the CTBT.

However, while we will be able to claim some credit for this and other nuclear disarmament achievements at the Review Conference, this will certainly not be the ease for the second of the three measures to which we attached so much importance in 1995: the fissile material cut-off treaty.

To be candid, Mr Chairman, in the three years since we agreed that we should strive for the achievement of an "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of a fissile material cut-off treaty, we have achieved nothing.

The Conference on Disarmament has had a mandate since 1995 to negotiate a cut-off treaty. Formal proposals have been made to establish an ad hoc committee to undertake the negotiations. Despite the fact that all States Party to this Treaty - in other words, all but five members of the Conference on Disarmament have agreed to the immediate commencement of negotiations on this proposed treaty, nothing has happened.

It seems that the clear sense that we shared in 1995 of the importance of this essential, and inevitable, step along the way to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament has been lost: our sense of purpose has become muddied.

We have heard it argued that, because at least four of the five nuclear-weapon States have declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, a treaty would be redundant: that it would simply codify the status quo. An extension of this logic - and contrary to judgement of Parties to the NPT three years ago - is the argument sometimes heard that a cut-off treaty would not represent a significant advance for the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Australia does not subscribe to this view. Rather, we subscribe to the view of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons which regarded a cut-off treaty as an essential reinforcing step towards the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. The Canberra Commission affirmed that a cut-off convention would contribute to nuclear disarmament by capping the amount of nuclear material available for nuclear weapons use and by extending safeguards coverage over currently unsafeguarded sensitive nuclear facilities

From Australia's perspective as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to this Treaty, we consider that a fissile material cut-off treaty would contribute materially to enhancing global security by:

building on the achievements of the CTBT and its contribution to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons;
bringing all nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons in all states, including the states recognised by under the NPT as nuclear-weapon States, under legally binding international safeguards
- thereby serving to redress what has often been regarded as an imbalance of rights and obligations between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States in the NPT
reinforcing the international norm against the possession, acquisition and use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons which is already embodied in the NPT and reinforced by the CTBT;
creating a security climate which, in the words of the Canberra commission, is more conducive to further steps towards the dismantling of their nuclear arsenals by the nuclear-weapon States and towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons by creating greater transparency and confidence about the capabilities as well as the intentions of other countries with fissile material production facilities;
establishing a central and indispensable element in any verification regime for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Australia therefore regards a fissile material cut-off treaty as an essential and unavoidable step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and the realisation of the nuclear disarmament objective established by Article VI of the NPT.

Moreover, we believe that the circumstances which have brought most of the nuclear-weapon states to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, and for all of them to support the negotiations of a treaty, may not last. The reversibility of declaratory moratoria was recognised by the negotiators of the CTBT: they recognised that the conditions which permitted a moratorium on nuclear testing were potentially fragile and ephemeral, and that the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to stop testing had to be locked in and fixed in a legally-binding multilateral agreement as a matter of urgency. The same urgency applies to the current willingness of the nuclear-weapon states to bind themselves to a multilateral, verifiable agreement to ban the production of fissile material. We should not run the risk of this willingness dissipating before it can be fixed irreversibly in a legally-binding agreement.

In addition to ensuring that fissile material production in the Nuclear Weapon States is brought to an end by the treaty, it is essential that the fissile material production facilities in those states which are not parties to the NPT and which operate facilities outside safeguards are part of the treaty.

The fact is, unless these states become part of the FMCT, its potential to contribute significantly to the elimination of nuclear weapons will be greatly diminished, indeed, an FMCT which did not include these states would have little or no chance of succeeding. While these states have not seen it in their national security interests to accede to the NPT, we believe that a cut-off treaty would have a positive influence on the security environments of these states thereby helping to create the conditions in which they could join the rest of the international community in our efforts, through the NPT, to pursue the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. We consider that a cut-off treaty has the potential to play an important security and confidence-building role in regions of tension, most particularly in South Asia and the Middle East. Adherence to an FMCT by all states in these regions, particularly those which, because of their regional security concerns, have not acceded to the NPT, would provide a degree of assurance to their neighbours about their intentions and their commitment to international efforts to enhance regional and global security.

However, Mr Chairman, we need to be realistic about what can be achieved with a cut-off treaty. We also need to be realistic about how we set about achieving our objectives. This means that we have to recognise and take account of the national security imperatives, and the regional security dynamics, which underlie the different positions that the non-NPT states have adopted on the proposal for a cut-off treaty. If our approaches to a cut-off treaty are to succeed, they need to be developed with the security situations of these states arid the regions in which they are situated in mind. We also have to be imaginative, creative and flexible in our approach if we are to craft an instrument which is truly non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable.

One such approach is to conceive of the fissile material cut-off treaty not as a stand-alone instrument - like the CTBT - which seeks to address fissile material issues in one fell swoop, but rather as a framework instrument which evolves into a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling and disposition of fissile material. If a fissile material cut-off treaty is to be a genuine disarmament measure - as Parties the NPT agreed that it should be in 1995 - then it will have to be capable of evolving in tandem with other disarmament measures. This was the approach which the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, suggested in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in February this year In our view, a first step in the development of such a regime would be a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. This is a step which can - and should - be taken now, to ensure that the nuclear-weapon states' current willingness to cease production of fissile material cannot be reversed.

However, as Mr Downer also stated, it is difficult to envisage significant further progress towards nuclear disarmament which does not include, sooner or later, multilateral verification of both fissile material production facilities and fissile material stockpiles. For this reason, Australia has proposed that the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons should be followed by a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control. We believe that this too should be an evolving instrument which tracks other nuclear disarmament measures and progressively brings direct-use fissile material into the scope of a fissile material regime. An important objective of this progressive approach will be to make disarmament measures irreversible by ensuring that fissile material no longer needed for defence purposes is not available for military use again. We also believe that the verification arrangements for this fissile material regime will require an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral, plurilateral and appropriate international - and possibly regional - arrangements for nuclear material made excess to military requirements.

Mr Chairman

Australia believes that a cut-off treaty would serve its own national security interests, but we also believe that it would be ill the interests of all states - non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states alike. We also believe that a fissile material cut-off treaty would be in the interests of those few states which have not yet joined the NPT. This is why we continue strongly to adhere to the conclusions we, together with other Parties to this Treaty, reached in 1995 about the importance of a cut-off treaty to the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT. We believe that a cut-off treaty is an essential and unavoidable step towards the objective enshrined in that Article. We also believe that a fissile material cut-off treaty would bring immediate benefits for regional and global peace and security, and would serve immediately to reinforce the international norm against the acquisition, possession and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons which has been built up progressively since the NPT entered into force.

Mr Chairman,

Finally, let me reiterate Australia's view that the strong support that has been expressed by almost all delegations to this PrepCom for an early commencement to negotiations for a cut-off treaty should not be allowed to evaporate. In particular, I would like to reiterate my delegation's appreciation of the strong statement of support by the Non-Aligned Movement for an early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Let us use the strong support which has been voiced in this PrepCom as a catalyst for renewing and redoubling the efforts of all NPT Parties in the Conference on Disarmament to secure an agreement which would allow these negotiations to commence.