1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
9 May 1995
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
New York, 17 April-12 May 1995
PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
Draft decision proposed by the President
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of
international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States.
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with
which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and
shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process
provided for in article VIII (3) of the Treaty, the enhancement
and strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination at
nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete
disarmament-under strict and effective international control,
The conference affirms the need to continue to move with
determination towards the full realization and effective
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly
adopts the following principles and objectives:
Universality
- Universal adherence to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent
priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are
called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date,
particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all
States parties to achieve this objective.
Non-proliferation
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously
increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons has a vital role to
play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in
all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without
hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States
parties to the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the
easing of international tension and the strengthening of
trust between States which have prevailed following the
end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to
nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be
fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the
nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as
stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith
negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear
disarmament.
- The achievement of the following measures is important in
the full realization and effective implementation of
article VI, including the programme of action as
reflected below.
- The completion by the conference on Disarmament
of the negotiations on a universal and
internationally and effectively verifiable
comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later
than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the
nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost
restraint;
- The immediate commencement and early conclusion
of negotiations on a nondiscriminatory and
universally applicable convention banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in
accordance with the statement of the Special
coordinator of the conference on Disarmament and
the mandate contained therein;
- The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon
States of systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and by
all States of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones
- The conviction that the establishment of Internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the
region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and
security is reaffirmed.
- The development of nuclear-weapons-free zones, especially
in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as
well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of
mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of
priority, taking into account the specific
characteristics of each region. The establishment of
additional nuclear-weapons-free zones by the time of the
Review conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.
- The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and
their respect and support for the relevant protocols is
necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such
nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.
Security
Assurances
- Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984
(1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995,
as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States
concerning both negative and positive security
assurances, further steps should be considered to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps
could take the form of an internationally legally binding
instrument.
Safeguards
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the
competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in
accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's
safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment
of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty,
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine
the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties
that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the
safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties
should direct such concerns, along with supporting
evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider,
investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary
actions in accordance with its mandate.
- All States parties required by article III of the Treaty
to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards
agreements and which have not yet done so should do so
without delay.
- IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and
evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors
aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA
safeguards should be supported and implemented and the
IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nu&lear
activities should be increased. Also States not party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the IAEA.
- New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or
special fissionable material or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use
or production of special fissionable material to
non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary
precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards
and internationally legally binding commitments not to
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
- Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to
peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as
practicable, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the
framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place
with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be
universally applied once the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy
- Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the
exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as
well as III of the Treaty.
- Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy should be fully implemented.
- In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given
to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty,
taking the needs of developing countries particularly
into account.
- Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be
promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation
among all interested States party to the Treaty.
- All States should, through rigorous national measures and
international cooperation, maintain the highest
practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste
management, and observe standards and guidelines in
nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and
transport of nuclear materials.
- Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has
the financial and human resources necessary in order to
meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of
technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The
IAEA - should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts
aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical
assistance through predictable and assured resources.
- Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities
devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety
and raise serious concerns regarding the application of
international law on the use of force in such cases,
which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the Conference
bring this decision, the Decision on Strengthening the Review
Process of the Treaty, the Decision on the Extension of the
Treaty and the Final Declaration of the Conference to the
attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and
seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the
furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.