Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/9
11 April 1997
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
JAPAN
Some Possible Elements to be Taken into
Account in the Review Process
I. Basic Considerations
- It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the
crucial role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament
and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States
parties should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty
regime is essential to the maintenance of world peace and
security.
- The new NPT review process is qualitatively different
from past efforts. The decisions taken at the NPT
Extension and Review Conference in 1995 require that the
review process contribute to the promotion of full
implementation of the Treaty and its universality, and
particularly to the promotion of nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament.
- Substantive aspects of the preparatory work must be fully
considered in addition to making procedural preparations
for the Review Conference.
- The task of the Preparatory Committee is to review the
operation and implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty. But it is also important to take fully into
account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the
decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament".
- It would not be useful to aim at achieving a consensus
document at each Preparatory Committee meeting. Rather,
the most appropriate and productive procedure would be
for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee meeting to
issue a summary report, under his or her sole
responsibility, with necessary annexes.
- The final report, to be submitted to the Conference by
the Preparatory Committee, should be prepared at the last
Preparatory Committee meeting. It should include two
parts, one reviewing the Treaty, and the other
recommending measures for the future.
- A revision of the document on "Principles and
objectives" would not be desirable, since it was the
product of arduous negotiations pursued at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference and it stands on its own.
Rather, it is important to strive to agree on a new set
of objectives.
- As the matter of overlap in the discussions of issues by
the three Committees established during the past Review
Conference is noted in paragraph 5 of the decision on
"Strengthening the review process for the
Treaty", appropriate attention should be paid to
this matter by the Preparatory Committee.
II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
- The ultimate goal in nuclear disarmament is the
realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Towards
this end, it is important to accumulate steadily, one by
one, realistic and effective disarmament measures, taking
into account the realities of the international security
environment.
- The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a major step
in nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament, especially
as a means of constraining the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of
preventing the development of advanced new types of
nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States
signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT
Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to
establish the CTBT regime, including verification
systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the
early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which
have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to
do so at the earliest possible date.
- Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material
cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear
disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT
have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament.
All means should be explored to realize the early
commencement of negotiations on FMCT.
- Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the
nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally
are an important element in the full realization and
effective implementation of article VI. The commitment
made by the President of the United States of America and
the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki
summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the
START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year
2007, is most welcome.
- Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon
State are further encouraged. In light of General
Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled
"Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons", every
nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the
international community of the activities and progress in
the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would
contribute to transparency and confidence-building.
- The efforts of the international community to promote and
assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the
management and disposal of fissile materials derived from
dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.
- The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further
steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert
and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
- The importance of security assurances to
non-nuclear-weapon States of the NPT regime is fully
recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution
984(1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by
the nuclear-weapon states concerning both negative and
positive security assurances, further steps should be
considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to
the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the
"Principles and objectives".
- In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is
important to reaffirm that the establishment of
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon free zones, on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
States of the region concerned, enhances global and
regional peace and security.
- Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of
the universality of the NPT. The States parties should
unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to
the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. It would
be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building
among the countries concerned so as to improve their
regional security environment.
III. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
- It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the
second part of the "Programme 93+2" was adopted
in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the effectiveness
and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is
strongly hoped that this model protocol will be adopted
by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.
- Efforts should be strengthened to increase the
effectiveness and transparency of export control systems
through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger
Committee.
- The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of
Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to
finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation
that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to
adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.
- It is important that the transport of nuclear materials
should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in
compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), while
navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the
applicable rules of international law should not be
impaired.
IV. Some Procedural Issues
- New York should be the venue of all Preparatory Committee
meetings as well as the Review Conference itself, in
order to facilitate the participation of a large number
of States. It should also be noted that the cost of
conference services is much lower in New York than in
other cities.
- It is necessary and important to keep the costs of the
Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference
reasonably low. Thus it is recommended that the length of
each background document be limited to a specific number
of pages. The necessity of issuing summary records of the
meetings of the Preparatory Committee should be carefully
considered, and if records are issued, the number should
be limited to the minimum.
- The formula for apportioning the costs of the review
process should follow established precedent. This means
that the nuclear-weapon States, which have a special
status under the Treaty, would be responsible for 55 per
cent of the costs.