CANADA
The Permanent Mission of
Canada to the United Nations
New York
Le Mission Permanente du Canada
aupres des Nations
Unies New York
1997 NPT Preparatory Committee
CANADIAN CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER:
CLUSTER ONE
Proposed Language for Inclusion in Report of
NPT PrepCom I
April 9, 1997
CANADIAN CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER CLUSTER ONE
Proposed Language for Inclusion in Report of
NPT PrepCom I
UNIVERSALITY
April 9, 1997
We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty which
strengthen it and reaffirm the urgency of universal adherence. We
invite all states not yet party to the Treaty to review and revisit
their positions, especially in view of the now near universal
adherence to the Treaty.
START II. III and BEYOND
We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21 March 1997 committing to the
commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement,
immediately once START II enters into force, which would
establish, by December 31, 2007, lower aggregate levels of
2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in
tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the
irreversibility of these deep reductions. NPT state parties expect
these commitments will be realized as soon as possible.
We call upon other NWS to commit immediately to not
increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament
negotiations among the Five, in parallel with START III.
CTBT
We call on all states to make utmost efforts to promote the
earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the
Conference of State Parties to be held in 1999.
We emphasize chat Article 5 of the NPT, referring to
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, has been redefined and overtaken
under the terms of the CTBT.
we recognize the decisive role that the CTBT plays in
preventing the development of new and the modernization of
existing nuclear weapons. We look to the NWS to signal their
unequivocal support for the CTBT, pending its entry into force, by
declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions
We look to the earliest possible commencement of
negotiations in the CD towards a Fissile Material Cut-off
Convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special
Coordinator of the CD and the mandate contained therein.
Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the NWS to
affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever
cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. Determined efforts should be made by
the NWS to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and
to place more of such material under IAEA safeguards.
SECURITY ASSURANCE
Further steps should be taken to assure NNWS party to the
Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We
welcome and will actively explore ideas in this respect, including
those aimed at an internationally legally-binding instrument
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CANADA
views on Cluster 1:
Mr. Chairman,
April 9, 1997
In our opening remarks we discussed the three key concepts
that might usefully guide us in our work; permanence with
accountability; a qualitatively different preparatory and review
process characterized by evaluation and forward-looking planning;
and, pragmatism and dynamism on an evolving basis. These
concepts are especially useful in organizing our thoughts on
Cluster 1 issues, i.e. non- proliferation of nuclear weapons,
disarmament and international peace and security. Canada' s
objective remains the elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and to ensure that
human ingenuity is never again turned towards their creation. We
must all commit not to pursue the development of any new types of
weapons of mass destruction.
The permanence of our Treaty was ensured with its
indefinite extension in 1995. This act, this collective decision,
permanently enshrined the values of the NPT, including for the
purpose of this cluster, non- proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
AS permanence benefits all, accountability is the responsibility of
all. But the NWS, in particular, have the obligation and are
accountable for meeting the undertaking in Article VI of the
Treaty. They have the obligation to "pursue in good faith and to
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects under strict and effective control. " (ICJ) . This is
reinforced by the agreed commitment of the NWS in the P and 0
document to "the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate aim
of eliminating nuclear weapons We acknowledge that some
important steps to limit or reduce nuclear forces have been taken.
In Helsinki in March, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued a joint
statement announcing that, once START II enters into force, the
USA and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START
III agreement which will establish lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500
strategic nuclear warheads for each. The statement
announced that the START III agreement will include "measures
relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead
inventories and the destruction of strategic warheads and any other
jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote
the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a
rapid increase in the number of warheads." we look forward to the
elaboration of these measures. The irreversibility of reductions is a
welcome, progressive concept. The implementation of START I
and the early ratification by Russia of START II as well as its full
implementation by both partners to the Treaty, are important parts
of the systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons. We also have clear expectations for START III and
beyond.
In addition to the Russian-American process, other NWS
should commit immediately to not increasing their current
inventories; that is, to freeze the status quo. Again, irreversibility
is a key concept. Moreover, the Five should immediately engage
in meaningful discussions, designed to cake advantage at the time
of the launch of START III negotiations, to commence nuclear
disarmament negotiations among the Five. The NWS should also
reduce their inventories of tactical nuclear weapons and take
further steps to curtail and eliminate their operational deployment.
Canada welcomes the conclusion of the CTBT and its
signature by more than 140 states. It is a key element in the
program of action described by the P and O. But we cannot rest
with its completion. we must work actively and jointly to ensure
its entry into force at the earliest possible moment. In this regard,
the CTBT calls for the convening, if necessary, of a Conference
of States that have already deposited their instruments of
ratification. If necessary, this Conference would take place in
1999, prior to the next NPT Review Conference. The CTBT
establishes a global norm against nuclear testing. One way to
enhance this norm, pending entry into force of the CTBT, is for
states which have tested nuclear weapons in the past to recommit
themselves politically not to test ever again. There should be no
ambiguity about this. Testing is over.
There is also another issue which relates the CTBT and the
NPT. It is Canada's view that Article V of the NPT, related to
PNE's has been overtaken and refined by Article VIII of the
CTBT. Article v of the NPT is now an historical footnote to an
old debate. We need spend no time on it during the review. The P
and O also calls for the immediate Commencement and early
conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT, in accordance with the
statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on
Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. An FMCT or
"cut- off agreement has been a Canadian priority for almost 40
years. Pending the commencement and conclusion of negotiations
in the CD, we urge the Five to affirm or reaffirm, as the case
might be, their commitment to cease the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Determined efforts should be undertaken by all Five to reduce
dramatically weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to
place more of such material permanently under IAEA safeguards.
This too is an irreversible process. All NWS should continue and
promote effective programmes to ensure the physical security of
weapons- usable fissile material. we welcome the commitment
given in Helsinki by the Presidents of the USA and Russia to
"consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials"
and look forward to more clarification.
Paragraph 8 of the P and O also notes that further steps should be
taken to assure NNWS party to the Treaty against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons. Canada would like to see positive
measures taken to reinforce both negative and positive security
assurances for NNWS party to the Treaty. We support the
observation in the P and O that these steps could take the form of
an internationally legally binding instrument. We need to explore
actively and thoroughly all prospects and mechanisms to move
forward.
Mr chairman, we have outlined a few proposals which we
consider are pragmatic and dynamic steps towards averting the
danger of nuclear war and achieving the ultimate elimination of
nuclear weapons. These steps will enhance the accountability of
our permanently enshrined values. While we have focussed on the
obligations of the NWS in our consideration of this cluster of
issues (because this is where primary responsibility for
disarmament lies) we do, however have a clear stake and interest
and remain committed to finding ways we might follow and
influence the process, including in the CD. At the same time we
recognize that we too have obligations; obligations to work to
ensure that international security conditions are such that enhanced
stability will speed up nuclear disarmament. But we do not accept
any explicit or implicit linkage, or interpretation of Article VI, that
nuclear disarmament will be achieved only when general and
complete disarmament has been achieved, or when every last bow
and arrow or Swiss Army knife is gone. To quote George Bunn, a
respected lawyer and acknowledged expert on the NPT, "The
ordinary meaning of Article VI, its negotiating history and the
parties' practice in implementing it all suggest that the
preconditions often proposed for general and complete
disarmament do not need to be satisfied to trigger an obligation to
negotiate in good faith toward zero nuclear weapons along the
''nuclear disarmament" route."
Finally, and as already alluded to, Canada believes that our
common interests are served by the broadest possible multilateral
substantive dialogue in all relevant forums, to promote the
objectives we have outlined, including in the Conference on
Disarmament. we have advocated in the CD the immediate
establishment of an Ad Hoc committee on Nuclear Disarmament
with a mandate for substantive discussion with a view towards
identifying issues which might be negotiated in that forum. we are
not proposing the multilateral negotiation in this AHC of the
reductions of the weapons of the Five but we do believe
multilateral negotiations on FMCT perhaps NSA's, and the
concluded CTBT can and do reinforce and complement NWS
negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, our list of proposals is not exhaustive and we
will be returning to it at subsequent prep coms as we move
towards the Review Conference in 2000. For the purpose of this
First Prep Comm, we are now circulating a short document which
in point form summarises the proposals on cluster I that we wish
to see carried forward from this Prep Comm to the next. we leave
it to you, Mr Chairman, how this is done.
Mr Chairman
we wish now to touch upon another suggestion. You will
recall that in Canada's general statement we emphasized that the
1995 NPTREC launch of a "Strengthened Review Process"
created a qualitatively different review process. That process is
one that reviews the operation of the Treaty, and evaluates its
implementation, and considers "principles, objectives and ways"
to promote the Treaty's full implementation. Moreover, while we
emphasized that our target is to make recommendations to the
2000 Review Conference, Canada also indicated that such a target
does not preclude us expressing some shorter term expectations as
well.
This is the theme which I wish to elaborate. In our view any
such short-term expectations should be time-relevant and subject
to straight-forward concerns. They would not pretend to be the
final word on any particular topic. And we will have to consider
how they might best be captured in the final outcome of this first
Session. But with these caveats aside we would, for our part, find
it incongruous if this strengthened Review Process - a
qualitatively different one - remained totally silent or even
bureaucratic over the next three years.
Against this background Canada would like to suggest that we
collectively give some thought to whether there might be a
limited number of important concepts that could be the subject of
a consensus opinion in 1997. Four such concepts have been themes
of speeches in the general debate. For example:
1) on universality could we not welcome the recent accessions
since 1995 and again call upon remaining non-states parties to
accede at the earliest possible date;
2) on the CTBT could we not welcome the conclusion of the
negotiations we called for in 1995 the Treaty's signature by 142
states, and then issue a strong call for the earliest possible
entry-into-force
3) on a Cut-off convention could we nor renew our call for the
immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations;
and,
4) on the 93+2 process, could we not welcome the recent
conclusion of negotiations in Vienna and express our expectation
that the IAEA's Board of Governors will endorse that outcome at
its special session in May.
These are only four possibilities - chosen in our judgement as
being both important and timely, as well as highly susceptible to
quick consensus. Other delegations may wish to suggest other
possibilities "e would welcome the reactions of other delegations
and, should there be interest, would be prepared to develop some
specific formulations. As stated earlier, how these might be
captured subsequently would remain to be decided in other
consultations.