Lors De La Comite Preparatoire De La Conference Des Etats Parties Charges De L'examen du Traite Sur La Non-proliferation Des Arms Nucleaires Qui Se Tiendra En L' an 2000
At this early stage of the work of this three-year Preparatory Committee process, Canada wishes to express its views as to how we might all work together most effectively to advance the "Strengthened Review Process" to which we all committed ourselves in 1995. Let me make it clear from the outset that - for Canada - this Process must be qualitatively different from the earlier review processes with which we are all familiar.
In approaching this question it is immediately apparent that there are endless procedural and substantive grounds upon which the Strengthened Process could be tied up in perpetual wrangles; one primary concern we have is that allowing this to happen will not only frustrate the process and the participants therein but will damage the authority and integrity of the NPT itself: no substance can indefinitely withstand the application of powerful corrosives.
So where to start? We will first address "mindset" and then "accountability"; we will of course also deal with substance. And we will then deal briefly with the mechanics of the Process.
In approaching this Strengthened Process it is essential to determine whether our "mindset" is sufficiently common in nature to enable progress to be made; the conduct and outcome of this First PrepCom will be key in that regard.
So what is (or, perhaps appropriately, should be} our collective "mindset"?; several points can be made in that regard.
First, the 1995 resolution of extension decided that the NPT "shall continue in force indefinitely"; this represented or captured the consensus of NPT States Parties that a world with an assured NPT would be a much more secure environment than one without; in our view it is essential to keep this clearly in mind as we proceed.
Second, the authority and integrity of any Treaty is dependent on the fidelity and vigour of its States Parties in meeting their obligations and commitments; this leads directly to the Canadian phrase used in the 1995 Review and Extension Process, that is, "permanence with accountability"; this fundamental concept was emphasized by Ambassador Dhanapala. President of the 1995 Conference, in his closing statement to that Conference; Ambassador Dhanapala returned to this theme last fall when he stated:
"The three carefully interwoven Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted without a vote at the Conclusion of the 1995 Conference had a far-reaching impact beyond the indefinite extension of the NPT. ...At a more specific level it ushered in a new era of stringent accountability by the NPT States of their performance in meeting their Treaty obligations and the benchmarks set out in the Declaration of Principles of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament."
So, two primary considerations are therefore set out as usefully establishing the "mindset" of States Parties as they approach the 1997-2000 Review Process, i.e. "permanence" and "accountability"; and, if it need be said, accountability by all States Parties, not just some.
This, then, brings us to more detailed reflections on that second consideration of "accountability".
The natural question is, accordingly, "accountability" for what? and, how?
Canada's starting point in that regard is paragraph one of the "Strengthening" document from the 1995 NPTREC; it states "States Parties agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized"; this element of the 1995 decision package is thus unequivocal - it is the operation and realization of the Treaty which are to be reviewed.
We believe this concentration of attention will be of critical importance as we proceed; while other documents, decisions and studies may [be] of interest - indeed great interest - concentration of attention on the Treaty itself will be central to any accountability exercise.
But what then of the 1995 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"? Are they irrelevant? meaningless? negligible?
Certainly not. Again referring to the "Strengthening" document it was agreed in 1995 that "the purpose of the PrepCom meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference"; as the focus is clear. i.e. "to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, so also the task of the PrepComs is equally clear.
In fact the function of the 1995 "Principles and Objectives" themselves is evident; they are designed promote the full implementation of the Treaty; as such they are a means to an end, not an end in themselves; and, dare we add, they comprise the first step in an ongoing review process which should envisage each Review Conference producing further "Principles and Objectives" for successive phases in the life of an indefinite NPT.
Accountability is not a one shot exercise; it is continuous and continuing; this conclusion is fully endorsed in paragraph 7 of the 1995 "Strengthening" document which establishes the future role of the Review Conferences themselves.
So, we have a clear focus for our attention {i.e. full implementation of the Treaty) and well-articulated "Principles and Objectives" so guide that attention.
This reinforces an absolutely critical point in sum, what we are initiating now in April 1997, on the basis of the 1995 decision, is a qualitatively different process than any earlier NPT review process.
We are no longer to be focused on a "review of implementation or a "backward-looking examination" only; we are to look forward, to "address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality".
This brings us to be far the most complex dimension of our future work: "how will we exercise accountability?"
Four key elements should establish the framework for this qualitatively different exercise:
On this basis it is Canada's view that the PrepCom and Reviewprocess must both evaluate developments to date and identify possibilities for further progress in the full implementation and realization of the NPT.
There are several "process" type questions which will need to be addressed as the Strengthened Review Process gets Underway. Canada considers that these can be dealt with in a straightforward manner. For example Canada did attach considerable importance to ensuring that the proposed agenda for the 1997-1999 PrepComs fully reflects the new focus which emerged from the 1995 NPTREC; thus we welcomed the consensus reached on the description of item 4 of our agenda.
Further dimensions to be addressed will be the need to ensure that the Strengthened Review Process is "product-oriented" for in other words, is designed to generate dynamic and progressive, while pragmatic, recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference as well as structured to facilitate the attainment of that objective.
It is evident that each PrepCom session will be severely limited by time constraints: ten days per year means that a highly disciplined approach will be necessary. We therefore will need to establish a rigorous schedule for each PrepCom session to ensure each session addresses the substantial implementation of the Treaty - not just one dimension of the Treaty but all dimensions. In our view while particular sessions might concentrate more effort on one or more dimensions no dimension should be "off the table" at any session.
Each session should be able to consider whether sub-groups would facilitate the work required; the same should hold for possible intercessional work, particularly as we get closer to the 2000 Review Conference.
Each session should be directed to producing a distilled compilation of proposals, not a consensus document, as a means of advancing accountability, of promoting continuity between PrepComs, and of facilitating the preparation over the next three years of recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. There are various formats for doing so and agreement should be readily achievable. This does not preclude our establishing some short term expectations as well, if possible.
With these brief comments Canada has outlined its thinking as to the necessary "mindset" for a successful Strengthened Review Process. "Permanence with accountability" have been set out as two primary considerations to govern our work; and, the what? and how? aspects of accountability have been quickly surveyed.
We have deliberately not entered into detailed substantive specification of particular ways to assure that the purposes of the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
This is so for two specific reasons: one is our view that if we do not start in the bestway and in the right direction we will likely not find our way to our destination, regardless of detail; the second is that the "areas and means" for future progress are exactly what our review process over the next three years should address.
But Canada has in fact already begun its deliberations in that regard; on that basis we are making available today, attached to this statement, an initial outline of those views as such it attempts to suggest how the framing of a "rolling document" might be developed during the Review Process by the PrepComs over the next three years. This will eventually establish the basis for the finalization of our Recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. We also consider that lengthy drafting exercises at this state will not be particularly productive; after all there will be many developments during the coming three years which will define the context for and the finalization of our Recommendations.
We look forward to the further discussions as we all pursue our common objective -"the full realization and effective implementation of the provision of the Treaty".
In conclusion, therefore, we look forward to our further deliberations as we all pursue our common objective - to promote "the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty". We suggest certain key concepts might usefully guide us in all in that regard:
Thank you.
The basis for this working paper is contained in the Canadian statement of the same date in the First Preparatory Committee meeting of the Strengthened Process. Essentially it recognizes that the 1997-1999 Preparatory Committee meetings are "to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference" (in 2000). Canada considers that the Strengthened Review Process should focus on the NPT itself, guided by the conclusions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. As the eventual recommendations will have to reflect an ongoing evaluation as well as developments over the next three years, Canada also consider it premature to initiate actual consensus drafting at this stage. Rather we recommend the establishment of a "rolling document" intended to capture views, evaluations and proposals - an inventory thereof - as an evolving basis for eventual negotiations on recommendations to go forward to the 2000 Review Conference. Using the structure of the NPT, the following initial compilation of ideas as set out as a possible starting point for such an exercise:
8 April 1997