ACRONYM NPT Update No. 9A service during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the ACRONYM Consortium and Disarmament Times Building Consensus27 April 1995 The US, UK, France and Russia are expressing increasing confidence as the NPT General Debate finished on Tuesday, April 25, with another 8 pledges for indefinite extension: Albania, Tajikistan, Moldavia, Iceland, Zambia, Fiji, Ecuador and Botswana. Thailand and Kenya supported a long term rolling extension, while Uruguay, which did not state its preference on extension, supported South Africa's proposal for an intersessional mechanism to strengthen the 5 yearly reviews. Mauritius, Paraguay, Viet Nam and Nepal criticised aspects of the Treaty's implementation, but did not state a preference on extension. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the NPT Conference, reported that his consultations on the voting procedure had failed to get agreement, and that more time would be needed. Dhanapala and Antti Sierla, Chair of the Rules Committee at the fourth PrepCom, had proposed that the initial process of voting should be by secret ballot; when one proposal achieved majority the NPT Conference should then endorse this with consensus, thereby making the final outcome open and accountable. Both the Western Group and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were divided: some Western countries feared that a secret process might not deliver up the promised votes for indefinite; while some NAM were unhappy with endorsing the final decision by consensus. From the 116 speeches (out of the 178 states parties to the NPT) it is now generally accepted that there is a numerical majority for indefinite extension. Reiterating the importance of consensus, Dhanapala said that the rules of procedure would continue to operate on a provisional basis until rule 28 on voting was either resolved or rendered unnecessary. Contradictory rumours were circulating about whether or not the NAM Foreign Ministers, presently meeting in Bandung, will support a 25 year rolling extension and a secret ballot, as initially reported. Recognising that a more unified NAM position could strengthen their hand, the momentum for indefinite extension is such that many NAM countries now want to focus on the review rather than extension decision, in the hope of achieving as much commitment to future implementation as possible. To this end, an informal working group, including South Africa, Mexico and Sri Lanka have been trying to harmonise their proposals on measures and mechanisms to strengthen the review process. Elaborating on its proposal (see Update # 4), South Africa identified 8 'principles', including 'progress on' a CTBT, cut-off, reduction of nuclear arsenals etc. Mexico argued for an annex to be attached to the extension decision, undertaking a CTBT 'not later than 1996', a fissile cut-off, legally binding security assurances, and a redoubling of efforts by the nuclear weapon states 'to reduce their respective arsenals with the aim of their total elimination'. While both have chosen to advocate modest and pragmatic measures at this point, they propose mechanisms to ensure continuous review - and hence pressure - by means of a committee or similar body. While South Africa seems to envisage an evaluating and recommending role for the committee(s), Mexico's proposal for a negotiating body has also gained support. While many non-aligned representatives acknowledge that any decision other than indefinite now looks very unlikely, the mood among some Western states is also shifting. Some have refused to sign a 'resolution' on indefinite extension being circulated by Canada, afraid that it might be used corner non-aligned states or circumvent effective negotiations on strengthening review and implementation procedures. Those states which advocate indefinite but not necessarily unconditional extension, have begun to be more vocal in their demands, fearing that unless the shortcomings of the Treaty's implementation are addressed, the victory could be pyrrhic, damaging the long-term credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Main Committee I on disarmament Committee I, chaired by Ambassador Isaac Ayewah of Nigeria, first discussed Article I and II, and preambular paragraphs 1- 3. Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico accused the US, UK and several NATO states of having violated Articles I and II, which prohibit the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons or devices. Using information provided by Greenpeace and BASIC, Bosch argued that the deployment of US and UK nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states, involving training and exercises in case of war, was a de facto breach of the NPT obligations, while transfers of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices between the US and UK under the US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement violated the Article I prohibition of such transfers to any recipient whatsoever. This argument was taken up by many non-aligned states, while the US and UK, as well as Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Belgium vigorously denied any wrongdoing. Secretariat Paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.1/CRP.2 (25 April) noted 'that among States Parties there are variations in the interpretation of certain aspects of Articles I and II and that clarification is needed, especially regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States Parties among themselves, and when acting in cooperation with groups of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties under regional arrangements.' European Union split on Article VI When Committee I addressed Article VI obligations on nuclear disarmament on Wednesday, Austria, Ireland, Sweden (and maybe Italy) refused to endorse an EU statement read by French Ambassador Gerard Errera, which set out a complacent view of Article VI compliance, the 'end of the nuclear arms race' and the 'drastic reductions' in arsenals undertaken by the UK and France, as well as the US and Russia. They wanted the statement - and Britain and France - to go much further towards implementing Article VI. While several states acknowledged the progress in arms reduction over the past 5 years, Malaysia articulated the concern of many non-aligned states that unless the nuclear weapon states were 'tied down' to a schedule of measures, such progress could easily be reversed. While the non-aligned are increasingly setting 1996 as the date for ensuring a CTBT, some Western States, including New Zealand and Australia argued for a CTBT to be concluded in 1995, with 'uninterrupted observance of the moratoria'. Safeguards and Non-Military Uses Main Committees II (safeguards) and III (non-military uses), are covering much the same ground. On the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, several states raised concerns about safety. Although the IAEA has emphasised its projects in areas such as agriculture, water purification and medicine, the core debate is still on nuclear energy, the problems of dual use materials and technology, including reprocessing, and export restrictions imposed by nuclear suppliers on some countries. As expected, several states, spearheaded by Iran, argued that the guidelines practised by the 30-member Nuclear Suppliers' Group violate the Article IV 'inalienable right' to nuclear energy. While France and several other nuclear supplier countries have been keen to emphasise their wide- ranging trade in nuclear materials and technology, the US argued that Article IV did not 'require any nation to actively support the fuel cycle choices of another party.' Papers on safeguards, export controls and nuclear energy and trade have been submitted from the IAEA and several States Parties, including China and the so-called G-10 (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden). This update was written by Rebecca Johnson with thanks to roving reporters Jim Wurst, Beryl Bernay, Tiffany Edwards, and Xanthe Hall.
|