ACRONYM NPT Update No. 8

A service during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the ACRONYM Consortium and Disarmament Times

European Special

25 April 1995

NPT Renewal has been actively pursued by the 15 nations of the European Union (EU) as a joint action under their Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP). The EU has worked hard, and with some success, to encourage more nations to join the Treaty, and also encouraged support for indefinite and unconditional extension. Until the Review Conference the EU by and large presented a united front, but this facade is now cracking. The 1990 Review Conference saw the then-European Community divided between its nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states and unable to agree a common policy. This division has clearly re-emerged in 1995. While France (currently holding the EU Presidency) made a speech agreed by all 15 member states (and 6 associated central and eastern European nations), each of the states also made individual speeches which mostly go beyond the EU consensus. Diplomatic sources had previously indicated these speeches should be accorded much more weight than the joint declaration read by France. The U.K. and France are clearly unready at present to offer concessions, while the other EU members have made proposals and are offering support to others in an attempt to build a stable and durable non-proliferation regime. Many of the ideas put forward at the Conference by EU members are found in the European Parliament's Wiersma Report on the NPT. This achieved cross-party support from 80% of parliamentarians in proposing a menu of options to strengthen the NPT and further non-proliferation. The French Presidency, supported by the European Commission, tried hard to block this report, stating privately a belief that it would encourage Non-Aligned Movement nations to seek further disarmament concessions at the Review Conference.

Extension

The extension issue should be one where the EU is united, since they committed themselves last year to ".. help build consensus on the aim of indefinite and unconditional extension of the [NPT] .." [Council Decision of 25 July 1994, (94/509/CFSP) from Official Journal L 205/1, 8.8.94] Despite this three nations, Italy, Sweden and Denmark called only for indefinite extension without mentioning the word unconditional. Italy for example appealed ".. to all countries to accept the indefinite extension of the NPT." EU diplomatic sources have said that almost half the EU members do not support unconditional extension, and that several of those who use the phrase interpret it only as ruling out formal amendment of the NPT. These differences are crucial, as to obtain indefinite extension by a large majority, substantial progress in the Review process will almost certainly be necessary.

The NPT Review Process

There are also striking differences between EU States in the substance of the Review debate. There is obvious division between the nuclear and non-nuclear states in the EU, proposals from some of the latter revealing traditional support for disarmament policies.

The two EU nuclear weapon states (NWS), the UK and France, made very thin speeches. France was constrained since it spoke on behalf of the entire EU and its speech contained nothing new. UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd announced that "the United Kingdom has ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes." This was added to the reiteration of the UK decision not to replace the WE-177 nuclear free-fall bombs when they are withdrawn in 1998. More negatively he ruled out any further disarmament, or even participation in multilateral talks until the position was reached where ".. US and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundreds .." This, in effect rules out UK participation in any disarmament process for 20 or 30 years at least.

This lack of proposals for strengthening the non-proliferation regime contrasts strongly with a range of positive initiatives and ideas put forward by the non-nuclear weapon states of the EU. Several EU states have clearly recognized that to obtain indefinite extension of the NPT a rigorous review process will be necessary, and this was reflected in the speeches of countries such as Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands and Sweden. The obligations of the nuclear states under Article VI featured heavily in these proposals, as did calls for stronger safeguards on nuclear materials. Several states mirrored the Danish call for ".. the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons..", a Treaty objective absent from the French and British speeches.

Other proposals included: A timetable for nuclear disarmament: Sweden asked "Why should we accept that these weapons of mass destruction remain ..Sweden expects further disarmament negotiations in which all nuclear-weapon states take part. These states should also establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of their disarmament measures." The Netherlands while not requesting a timetable, stated that ".. all five nuclear weapons states can and should actively engage in further arms control and disarmament ..".

A speedy comprehensive test ban:
All the countries mentioned this, with several, such as Sweden and Finland wanting a CTBT concluded"..before the end of this year .."

Withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons:

Finland asked for the ".. withdrawal from operational service ... and subsequent elimination .." of all tactical nuclear weapons. This call found an echo in the later debate in Main Committee I when many countries questioned NATO tactical weapons deployments in Europe. The UK announcement on WE-177 withdrawal follows this line, but France has no current plans to withdraw its tactical or pre-strategic nuclear weapons from service.

Stronger fissile materials safeguards:

While the UK and France called for stronger safeguards they had no new ideas to put forward for achieving this aim. Austria wished the IAEA to be given responsibility for monitoring ".. fissile material derived from nuclear disarmament." Sweden called for the IAEA to receive "... resources necessary to fulfill its verification role ..". Germany said that ".. fissionable materials from dismantled weaponry must not be used to build new weapons .. " and repeated a call for "..an international plutonium regime." The Netherlands called for the application of full-scope safeguards ".. without discrimination.." in nuclear and non- nuclear weapon states alike. Ireland believed that ".. a more intrusive inspection system .." is necessary, and called on states to abstain from stockpiling ".. plutonium in excess of normal operational requirements for peaceful nuclear programmes." They also reiterated the importance of transparency in this area.

This update was written by Martin Butcher, Centre for European Security and Disarmament.


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