ACRONYM NPT Update No. 18

A service during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the ACRONYM Consortium and Disarmament Times

Programme of Action, But
Where Are the Objectives?

10 May 1995

The Presidential Consultations among over 20 key states finally agreed the 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' based on the South African proposal for enhancing the future review process. An Indonesian proposal to focus the review process on specific objectives failed late in the day, although the term objectives was added to the title of the principles. With many NAM States, including Middle Eastern countries refusing to vote for indefinite extension, the Conference President, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, is seeking consensus instead on a resolution accepting that the Treaty shall 'continue in force indefinitely' because a majority of States had backed this option. Dhanapala's proposal also links the extension decision with the principles and intersessional review meetings by referring to them in its preamble. According to Ambassador Dhanapala, this would effectively make the package politically binding. However, some states have raised concerns that the principles and strengthened review proposals would only be adopted after the extension decision and have no legal standing. Fourteen Arab countries have circulated a resolution calling on Israel to accede to the NPT, which they want agreed before the Conference decides on extending the Treaty.

In the midst of speculation that the vote could be deferred until Thursday or even Friday, Dhanapala insisted that the decision would be taken on Wednesday May 10, during a plenary session scheduled to begin at 3.00 pm. He also discounted the suggestion that failure to agree on a written ballot might force the Conference to apply the UN rules of procedure in which resolutions are voted on in the order of their submission and passed by a simple majority.

Indonesian proposal to include review objectives

Indonesia, on behalf of the 11 non-aligned sponsors of the proposal for a rolling extension of 25 year fixed periods (L.3), had proposed adding specific objectives to the practically agreed text on strengthening the review process. According to the President's draft, the review process would be enhanced by holding Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in each of the three years prior to a Review Conference, which would take place every 5 years. At least three PrepComs would address substantive issues and make recommendations, with provision for a fourth PrepCom if necessary, to decide on procedures and planning for the Review Conference. Keeping the present structure of three Main Committees, with the possibility of subsidiary bodies to focus on specific issues, the purpose of constant review would be to 'look forward as well as back' and to evaluate implementation and universality and identify areas for further progress. The Indonesian proposal sought to firm up the focus of the review by including as objectives: 'a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a legally binding international instrument to provide comprehensive assurances to the non nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a cut-off in the production and the elimination of stockpiling of fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapons purposes, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, establishment of nuclear weapon free zone[s], the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes'. The clear implication is that acceptance of the objectives would win over support for the President's 'package'. In the end only the proposal to extend the PrepComs from one week to ten working days was agreed. Refusing to accept a more targeted link between objectives and the review process, the Consultations instead agreed that the principles would include Indonesia's substantive points. It is not yet clear whether this will satisfy the concerns of the 11 co-sponsors.

The Agreed Principles

The finalised principles mention the elimination of nuclear weapons as an ultimate goal, call for universal adherence as an urgent priority, and support nuclear weapon free zones (without mentioning any countries by name). Instead of being invoked as the 'sole responsible body', as Iran had wanted, the IAEA is identified as the 'competent authority' for assuring compliance under Article III.1, with a later reference to the promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls. Full scope safeguards are recommended as a 'precondition' for new supply arrangements regarding fissionable material or associated equipment. A much weakened paragraph calls for fissile material transferred from military to non-military uses to be placed under IAEA safeguards 'as soon as practicable...in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements' of the nuclear-weapon states. The text also reiterates the importance of nuclear safety in relation to waste management, transport and the dangers of attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities. Following intensive debate, the principles call for undertakings on nuclear disarmament to be 'fulfilled with determination', encompassing a 'programme of action', including a CTBT 'no later than 1996', a fissile cut-off which skirts the stockpile question by referring to the CD statement on agreeing its mandate, and 'the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States, of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'

Review Document

The Chair of the Drafting Committee, Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak of Poland, has started from scratch on Article VI on disarmament rather than attempting to negotiate through the heavily bracketed paragraphs from Main Committee I on disarmament. The present draft text skirts around the substantial differences of opinion on whether the arms race has ended and what measures would constitute 'negotiations in good faith' on nuclear disarmament, instead reaffirming commitment to the general undertakings already in the Treaty, welcoming reductions, urging early ratification of START II and calling on China, France and the UK 'to join Russia and the United States in negotiating further steps toward nuclear disarmament as soon as that is feasible'. Its strongest exhortation echoes the the principles in calling for a CTBT no later than 1996, and 'encourages the nuclear weapon states not to conduct any nuclear weapon tests until a [CTBT] is in force.' Iran and Finnish Ambassador Pasi Patokallio have been painstakingly covering ground on Articles I and II, seeking an agreed form of words on whether the prohibition on transfers has been honoured or not.

This update was written by Rebecca Johnson with thanks to roving reporters Stephen Young, Daniel Plesch, and Nicola Calvert.

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