ACRONYM NPT Update No. 14A service during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the ACRONYM Consortium and Disarmament Times
Security Assurances4 May 1995 What became known as 'the
South African proposal' has emerged from the small group
'Presidential consultations' into wider discussion. This
linked indefinite extension with adoption of principles
on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and a
mechanism of committee meetings to enhance the five
yearly review process. It is understood that there is
widespread support from both non-aligned (NAM) states and
nuclear-weapon states for some form of strengthened
review incorporating intersessional meetings, but that
the Principles will be the subject of hard bargaining.
The purpose of the Principles is to articulate what is
intended (and expected) by the generalised commitments to
nuclear disarmament in the NPT, particularly Article VI.
While the NAM want a timebound framework of measures, the
nuclear-weapon states want to keep the language as
general as they can get away with, and have so far
refused to consider any kind of schedule or programme
with dates. Treading a careful line between the two,
South Africa wants the principles to be as concrete as
possible, while emphasising that these are to be a
'yardstick', not conditions as such. Security Assurances The working group on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, chaired by Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia, reported back to Main Committee I (disarmament) with a draft text, including several proposals for further negotiations to improve on the assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon- states in the recent UN Security Council resolution 984. Because the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NFZ) came up in this context, while traditionally falling under the purview of the safeguards committee (MCII), a working group devoted to NFZs has been set up to bring together all the relevant aspects. Much of the discussion on NFZs so far has focused on Middle Eastern security concerns and desire expressed by many Arab states for Israel to give up its nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT and enable a Middle Eastern NFZ to come into force. Security assurances have been raised since the NPT was first negotiated, as states which were preparing to forego the nuclear weapons option for their own security wanted to ensure that they would not be left vulnerable to attack or threat of attack by nuclear weapons. Each of the declared nuclear-weapon states had made unilateral declarations not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, as well as a conditional promise to come to the aid of NPT parties if attacked with nuclear weapons. There had long been criticism of the inadequacy of these assurances. Under pressure, as the NPT Conference neared, the P5 presented a resolution which was adopted by the UN Security Council on April 11 1995 (UNSC 984). In addition, France, Russia, UK and US had harmonised their assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The UNSC resolution 984 noted these unilateral 'negative' assurances, as well as China's reiterated assurance, which was unconditional and pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The P5 nuclear-weapon states considered that their effort to update their assurances and include all five (as noted) in the UNSC resolution represented a great step forward. They appeared to be surprised and disappointed that this advance was not more warmly appreciated. The majority of non-nuclear-weapon states, for their part, considered that in substance the updated security assurances had failed to address their main concerns. In particular, only China had pledged no first use. The NATO states and Russia continued to keep the option of first use of nuclear weapons open as part of their doctrine of deterrence. Furthermore, some objected to the conditions attached, which exempted countries in nuclear alliances at the time of an attack, and which required agreement of the UN Security Council before action against a nuclear aggressor could be taken, and so on. This formed the backdrop to negotiations in the working group. The negotiations took place behind closed doors, but the placing of brackets in the Chair's paper, dated May 2, reveal the gulf of perception between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. First comes the question of whether NPT parties have a right to receive security assurances (or only an interest), and whether the updated assurances should be welcomed, appreciated or only noted. Concerns were also raised about threats from non NPT parties with 'ambiguous' and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Three distinct proposals are reflected:
Although the CD was
referred to as one means for negotiating on security
assurances, several non-aligned states supported
Nigeria's proposal for a special conference to be held.
Since both India and Pakistan (non NPT de facto nuclear
weapon states) are members of the CD, some states argue
that a conference open only to NPT parties would be more
appropriate. In addition Egypt wanted more elaborate
security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states parties
to NFZs and a 'collective commitment by the
nuclear-weapon states to remedy the fundamental
shortcomings' of UNSC 984. Mexico also proposed that
pending agreement on a protocol, more should be done in
the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Committee shorts Main Committee I has continued to work slowly through the Chair's text, with one or more of the nuclear-weapon states persistently challenging references to the elimination of nuclear weapons or less than wholehearted endorsements of progress so far. Main Committee II has reportedly agreed a recommendation that all civilian plutonium be placed under safeguards (more on this tomorrow). Main Committee III had a lively debate - China against the rest of the world - over so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). A group of at least 32 states, spearheaded by Australia, had argued that Article V of the NPT which endorses PNEs was essentially redundant, since it has not produced any of the benefits envisaged in 1968. They then went on to underline that a ban on all nuclear explosions (including PNEs) would in no way constitute 'a detriment to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.' China has invoked both Articles IV and V of the NPT when opposing a ban on PNEs as part of the CTBT currently under negotiation in Geneva. China did not succeed in preventing this widely supported recommendation, which would effectively undermine its justification, from getting into the Chair's draft text. This update was written by Rebecca Johnson.
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