NUCLEAR AND WMD

UK Government Brief on Missile Defence

14 August 2001

[Note: Last week, UK Labour parliamentarians received the following briefing paper from the office of Britain's foreign affairs minister, Jack Straw. The paper reveals the Blair government's highly sympathetic view toward US development of missile defences. The particularly strong support shown for the US plans was not expressed previously in public by government officials.

BASIC has included analysis of main components of this briefing paper. Click on the "BASIC'S ANALYSIS" link that appears after key issues.]

Additional analysis can be found in:
British Backing for US Missile Defence Ill-Advised (BASIC Note,
20 August 2001)

From the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Rt. Hon Jack Straw

1 August 2001

1. Defence against missile attack is not a new problem. During the Second World War Britain became the first country in the world to suffer missile attack when it was the target in 1944-5 of the Nazi V1 (flying bomb) and V2 rocket. Against the V2 in particular there was no defence. It has often been noted that it was fortunate for the Allies that these advanced German weapons were deployed so late in the war.

2. With the end of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union developed significant strategic air defences consisting of ground radar sites, fighter aircraft and surface to air missiles. In the 1950s and early 1960s the principal threat was perceived to come from intercontinental bombers against which it was possible to develop a range of defensive mechanisms. No one questioned the value of such defences in the circumstances of the time.

3. With the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile threat in the mid 1960s, and the enormous difficulty and cost of defending against them, the rationale for significant strategic air defences was eroded. Neither of the two superpowers saw it in their interest to develop missile defences of dubious efficacy and potentially enormous cost. It was against this background that Republican President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev concluded the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The ABMT was a bilateral treaty between the two countries and not multilateral.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

4. It is important to remember that the ABMT did not completely ban missile defence. Research, development and testing of such a system was acceptable within the constraints of the ABMT. Indeed, each side was allowed to develop one ABM system. Initially, the US intended to develop a missile defence system to protect ballistic rocket sites in North Dakota, but never proceeded with it. At the present moment Russia is the only country to have a functioning strategic ABM system - around Moscow.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

5. In addition to this both the US and Russia have deployed Theatre Missile Defence (defined as countering missiles with a range of less than 3500 km). These are explicitly permitted by the ABM Treaty, which was amended by a US-Russia protocol in 1997. They are designed mainly to protect deployed forces, although in theory they would be able to protect whole countries (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, much of Southern Europe) from nearby threats. No one has suggested that TMD will not work or that it will cause further proliferation or an arms race. Missile defence has existed for many years in this form.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

6. Russia accepts that there is a missile threat and that missile defence has a role to play in defending against it. It is for this reason that it has deployed theatre missile defences. It has also engaged in discussions with NATO about possible areas of co-operation with regard to theatre missile defence.

The growing missile threat

7. During the 1980s missile technology became more readily available. In 1982 during the Falklands War British forces faced attack from Argentinean Exocet missiles. In the 1991 Gulf war Allied forces were subject to attack from Iraqi Scud rockets and Saddam Hussein launched a number of missile attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Without the deployment of US Patriot defensive missiles the Iraqi Scuds would have inflicted far worse damage and greater casualties.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

8. Over the past two decades missile proliferation has become a grim reality. In the 1980s during the Iran/Iraq war both sides made use of short-range ballistic missiles to attack each other’s civilian populations, the so-called ‘war of the cities’. The alarming development and spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems has been well documented by bodies such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the NGO Saferworld. For almost half a century after the Second World War missile technology largely remained the preserve of the five permanent members of the Security Council. That monopoly broke down completely in the 1990s as new missile producers, above all North Korea, came on the scene and some of the existing producers such as Russia and China began significantly to increase their exports of missile technology.

9. Since then a substantial number of other states have acquired missiles including India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya. Whereas in the past the main threat appeared to be from short or medium range ballistic missiles, several of these countries are moving towards acquiring intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is difficult to see for what purpose these countries would want an intercontinental missile capability other than to threaten and deter the United States. US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in Congressional testimony on July 12 argued that 12 countries now had nuclear weapons programmes and 28 ballistic missiles – up from 5 and nine respectively in 1972 – a striking indication of the world changes in the past thirty years.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

Dealing with ‘Rogue States’

10. Aside from India, none of the countries that have acquired substantive missile capability in recent years are democracies. Indeed, many of them are amongst the most oppressive regimes in the world with appalling human rights records. Most of these countries, for example, have consistently refused access to impartial monitors of human rights such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Amnesty International.

11. Nor are they party to all international instruments that might give cause for less concern about their behaviour. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the only existing multilateral arrangement covering the transfer of missiles and related equipment and technology relevant to WMD delivery. China has said that it abides by the MTCR but will not become a binding party to it. In practice it has not always lived up to that commitment.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

12. Efforts to prevent North Korea, the largest proliferator, passing on this deadly technology have failed. The Clinton Administration offered substantial incentives for North Korean compliance with restraint on weapons of mass destruction but Pyongyang’s response has been half hearted at best, notwithstanding the fact that North Korea is the main recipient of US aid in Asia, whether in the form of heavy fuel oil as a substitute for the abandoned nuclear power or as straight humanitarian aid. The Bush Administration has recently confirmed its willingness to continue the agreement with North Korea reached by President Clinton. There are indications that some recipients of North Korean technology, such as Pakistan, have in turn, passed it on to others. North Korea’s unwillingness to observe commitments it has already made indicate the limitations of relying solely on powers of persuasion.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

A suitcase bomb?

13. Missile Defence would not work against the terrorist suitcase or car bomb. It is not designed to. The US already counters this threat – they spent about $11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice that spent on missile defence. The point is that missiles pose a much more visible and effective threat than a suitcase bomb.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

Clinton and Bush Administration plans

14. Missile Defence is just one part of a US strategy aimed at dissuading countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD/) ballistic missile capabilities in the first place; to discourage those who have already acquired such capabilities from investing further; and to deter them from the use of such capabilities. It is not a substitute for nuclear deterrence, but part of a strategy of "layered deterrence", including a mix of capabilities, both offensive and defensive. It is aimed at supplementing not supplanting non-proliferation efforts.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

15. The Bush administration, like the Clinton Administration before it has seen Missile Defence as just one element in the new US deterrence framework including diplomacy, arms control, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation. As a senior Bush Administration official Paul Wolfowitz has noted,

It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield around the US. This is not Star Wars. We have a much more limited objective to deploy effective defences against limited missile attack

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

16. Under Clinton, US plans for missile defence were limited to one design. The Clinton Administration designed their missile defence architecture (research, development and testing of a fixed ground-based system designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course of their flight) to be as Treaty-compliant as possible. Research, development and testing of such a system was acceptable within the constraints of the ABMT (though deployment of a system of territorial defence would not have been). The Clinton Administration accepted the need to negotiate changes to the Treaty before any deployment.

17. The Bush Administration has taken a fresh look at missile defence plans. Like the Clinton Administration, they are committed to a system designed to defend against limited missile attack only. But they have declared their intention to develop and deploy layered missile defences to intercept missiles of any range at every stage of flight – boost (take-off), mid-course, and terminal (descent). They are looking at all options including fixed and mobile ground-based, sea-based, air-based and space-based operations, based on feasibility and effectiveness. They are looking to build incrementally, evaluating technologies as they go, deploying capabilities as soon as the technology is ready and adding to these as technological advances are made.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

18. President Bush has made clear that US plans on missile defence will be combined with substantial reductions in the American nuclear arsenal. He has also placed far greater emphasis than his predecessor, President Clinton, on the need for a wide-ranging series of international consultations that have so far involved not only NATO allies but also Russia, China and India.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

19. The Administration has emphasised that the missile defences they propose will be no threat to Russia. President Bush has repeatedly said that the United States no longer considers Russia an enemy. With more than 6,000 nuclear warheads Russia can easily overwhelm any missile shield the United States might conceivably construct. The proposed US missile defences are designed to protect against limited missile attacks from an increasing number of possible sources – but not against the thousands of missiles in Russia’s arsenal.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

20. The Administration has emphasised their intention to reach an understanding with Russia on a new co-operative strategic framework. During their first summit in Slovenia in June Presidents Bush and Putin had extensive discussions on the issue of missile defence. For its part Russia has shown clear signs of a strong interest in either amending the ABMT of 1972 or in developing a new strategic framework with the US. President Putin confirmed this at a press conference in Moscow on July 18.

21. At their bilateral meeting in Genoa on July 22 Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that their two countries would start talks soon on offensive and defensive missile systems. They also said they were looking at substantial cuts in their strategic arsenals. Their joint statement noted

"We agreed that najor [sic] changes in the world require concrete discussions of offensive and defensive systems. We already have strong and tangible points of agreement".

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

22. The UK has been actively encouraging both countries to expedite their discussions on these important matters. We have also emphasised to the Bush Administration the need for wide ranging discussions with NATO allies and other key international players such as China.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

23. As the most progressive of all the nuclear weapons states the British government is examining new initiatives to stem the tide of proliferation. Possibilities might include looking at ways in which the MTCR can be turned from a voluntary supplier’s regime into a universal, legally binding treaty. We have also been in the forefront of international discussions to secure a Missile Code of Conduct.

24. At the same time the UK attaches great importance to its long-standing relationship with the United States. It is in Britain and Europe’s interest that our two countries work closely together internationally. Without active American involvement it would have been unimaginable that President Milosevic would have been forced out oft Kosovo or that Saddam Hussein would have left Kuwait. The United States is far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels safe from attack from missiles.

BASIC'S ANALYSIS

Key points

Missile defence is not new. It exists already – Moscow, for example – is protected by an anti missile defence system allowed by the 1972 ABMT.

Russia and the United States have already amended the 1972 ABMT Treaty by an additional protocol in 1997 which allows both countries to develop and deploy theatre missile defences.

The threat of proliferation is real. Many states have acquired a missile capability over the past two decades. More worrying still is that a small but growing band of states - almost all of them non-democratic – have acquired long-range ballistic missiles. All of these states are also developing weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological.

Missile Defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort, but part of it. Proliferators are not irrational. All our non-proliferation instruments – the multilateral Treaties, national and international export controls, interception/disruption operations etc are ultimately aimed at affecting the cost/benefit calculation that all proliferators must make, however crudely. Effective Missile Defence can do the same, by reducing the likely benefit of developing WMD-armed missiles (or by raising the cost, through the need to build more, or more sophisticated, systems). It therefore complements, not replaces, the other tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.

We are actively promoting a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) which comprises principles, commitments and confidence building measures on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This would be the first international norm on ballistic missiles. The EU committed itself at Gothenburg to seeking to launch the ICOC formally in the course of 2002.

We are also very active in addressing the drivers of most missile proliferation: i.e. regional insecurity and tension. To that extent, all the UK’s efforts to address India/Pakistan problems, to support the Middle East Peace Process, and to encourage rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula are part of our wider counter-proliferation work.

Following their meeting in Genoa on July 22 Presidents Bush and Putin are engaged in a wide-ranging series of discussions, which will extend into the autumn covering both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both leaders have already said that they are looking forward to substantial cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals.

At the end of July the US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing for wide ranging talks with the Chinese leadership. China agreed to hold a dialogue of experts on Chinese missile technology exports which have been a major source of concern. Following the talks Secretary Powell stressed that he wanted to convey President Bush’s desire " to develop constructive, forward-looking relations with the People’s Republic of China".

For further information contact Dr Michael C. Williams, Special Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, tel. 0207 270 2112, fax 0207 270 2336.

BASIC's Analysis of Key Issues in Briefing Paper

#3: This is a misleading assessment of the background to the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972. Agreements on limiting the development of missile defences correlated directly with the signing of the SALT I Treaty in the same year, and later the SALT II and START I Treaties. As the preamble to START I acknowledges, without the ABM Treaty these agreements could not have been reached.

#4: The system the Russians deployed around Moscow consisted of 64 GALOSH nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles and was initially deployed in the late 1960s. With the advent of MIRVed nuclear warheads the GALOSH system was deemed to be of little significance by Western military planners. Reliable information is hard to come by, but it is highly doubtful that the system is still operational.

Read more about the GALOSH system

In addition, the briefing contains a factual error: the United States did, in fact, deploy an ABM system in North Dakota. The Safeguard system was operational in 1975 to protect the missile silos there.

The UK upgrade of Polaris to the Chevaline warhead, and then the decision to buy the Trident submarine system, were heavily influenced by the deployment of the GALOSH system, as London felt it had to retain the ability to destroy Moscow.

#5: While the 1972 ABM Treaty and protocols, tied to the START II Treaty, were approved independently by US and Russian lawmakers, they have not yet entered into force. Final approval must be given by the US Senate since the Russian Duma made slight changes when it ratified the package in April 2000. Thus, the modifications to the ABM Treaty in 1997 referred to in this section have not entered into force.

The potential deployment of advanced TMD systems by Taiwan is possibly the most worrying aspect of the entire missile defence debate, and has proliferation implications. China has repeatedly stated that the sale of equipment such as the Aegis radar equipped ships or PAC-3 interceptors to Taiwan would amount to a declaration of independence from mainland China.

#7: After initially claiming a 100% success rate for the Patriot missile, the US government has since dramatically downgraded its estimates. A US General Accounting Office study suggested that the Patriot's success rate may have been no better than nine percent. The Congressional Research Service said there was conclusive proof of only one destroyed Scud warhead. Israeli analysts reached similar conclusions. In January 2001, then-Secretary of Defence William Cohen admitted, ''The Patriot didn't work.'' (“The Patriot Gulf Missile 'Didn't Work'”, Boston Globe, 13 January 2001)

#9: A number of these countries are seeking to acquire longer-range missiles, but they are motivated primarily by regional concerns. With the exception of North Korea, all of the missile systems being developed by the countries mentioned have ranges below 3,500 km, well short of the continental United States.

#11: China and other states (all except Cuba India, Israel, and Pakistan) have signed on to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. While concerns have been raised about compliance with this treaty, participation in the NPT regime should demonstrate their commitment to eventual nuclear disarmament. China also has championed the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty in the UN Conference on Disarmament; while that body has seen little forward movement in the past few years, China has remained committed to preventing space weaponisation.

#12: The United States has placed a number of conditions on the continuation of the agreement with North Korea. Recent comment from the United States indicates that the Bush Administration has little serious intent with regards to normalising relations with North Korea, creating a vacuum into which the EU and Russia have stepped with some success.

Read more about the North Korea-US agreement: “Painting Pyongyang Into a Corner”, New York Times, August 2, 2001

#13: Missiles may be a more visible threat, but it is hard to assert that they are a more effective threat. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings in 1998 and attack on the New York World Trade Center in 1993 both demonstrate that enemies of the US may prefer to make use of weapons that carry no return address.

Missile defence system effectiveness is unproven: the technology is not developed and successfully tested yet; and the command and control structure behind its use is undetermined (the short decision time to counter an attack should cause great concern).

#14: The fact that the US is actively shifting its defence posture to one of increased reliance upon first strike is not something to celebrate. The possible development of low-yield, ‘bunker busting’ nuclear warheads and the weaponisation of space give a clear indication of the direction that the US is heading. It is pursuing an increased ability to strike anywhere, without fear of retaliation, possibly through the use of 'usable' nuclear weapons.

#15: The US is actively pursuing a policy of dissembling the network of arms control agreements currently in place in an attempt to free its military’s hand in all areas, both conventional and nuclear. This policy was laid out in detail in the National Institute for Public Policy’s (NIPP) January 2001 report Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control. Commander in Chief of United States Strategic Command, Richard W. Mies recently labeled the report “a good blueprint to adopt.”

Read the NIPP Report

#17: The enforced, sped-up timeline for testing comes with an expectation of success – something will be deployed by 2004 (the next election date) whether it works or not.

Read about the accelerated testing schedule

#18: US Secretary of State Colin Powell revealed the value of the ongoing consultation process in a candid statement in May:

Consultations can't be a substitute for action. So we will take the necessary time to get the views of all who have an interest in this matter and factor those views into our consideration," he said. "At the time when we think there has been enough consultation and we've reached agreements with others, then we will act on those agreements or act on what we believe are our best interests at that time." (“Bush, Putin To Meet June 16: Missile Defense, Nuclear Arms Top Agenda for Slovenia Summit,” Washington Post, 19 May 2001).

The Bush administration is listening to its allies, but when the time comes to act it will do so in what it perceives to be its own best interests and no one else’s.

Unilateral cuts are being made specifically so that missile defence can be sold to the public as a valid measure that will not disrupt international stability – if the arsenal numbers are lowered, we will need a defense to compensate. Not only does it inspire further proliferation (which is exactly why the United States and Soviet Union had to agree an ABM Treaty while undertaking the first strategic reductions), but it opens the door for acceptance of mini-nuke development: a reduced arsenal can be optimized with better, precision-targeting nuclear weapons.

In addition, Bush and the US Congress will have to do battle over the ability to legally allow unilateral nuclear force reductions. Currently, a “floor” is in place for nuclear weapons cuts, and Congress will not allow the President to proceed with cuts deeper than those agreed under START I without removing this legislative barrier first. Some congressional Republicans have become champions for leaving the floor in place, worried that the rumoured arsenal cuts would be too severe.

A recent report by the Natural Resources Defense Council on the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) has shown the limitations on the value of the proposed reductions. If Washington and Moscow go to 2,500 strategic warheads each, there will no change in the SIOP as currently configured. If the limit is 1,300, the SIOP can continue although with a reduced target set. If fewer strategic warheads are deployed, the SIOP becomes inoperable. This is important as the war planning process currently drives arms control possibilities, or lack thereof. True policy change becomes possible at the time when the SIOP is abandoned.