ISSUE AREAS:

A Long Way From Consensus:
Threat Perceptions in European NATO and the Future of Missile Defense

Presentation by Dr Ian Davis (Executive Director, BASIC) to the Conference on Transatlantic Missile Defence, sponsored by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, in cooperation with Office of Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 5-7 April 2004.

1. Introduction¹

I would like to begin by thanking the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies for the opportunity to address this conference. The British American Security Information Council - or BASIC, for short - began looking at transatlantic security issues over 16 years ago. With offices, staff, advisors, and a governing board on both sides of the Atlantic, we provide research and advocacy, and play a unique role as a transatlantic bridge for policy makers and opinion shapers on arms control, disarmament and security issues.

Missile defence became a prominent area of research for BASIC about four years ago, and since then we have been regularly disseminating materials on US developments on the issue to European government officials, the media, and the general public. We also try to bring European views into the debate in Washington.

In June 2001, for example, BASIC and a partner organisation commissioned an opinion poll of the UK public's attitude towards missile defence. The survey, completed in July that year, was the first detailed attempt to assess the opinions of the general British public on the UK's possible role in enabling US missile defence plans to proceed. Results indicated that 70% of people in Britain believed the US plans would lead to a new arms race, and 62% thought that the creation of National Missile Defence (NMD), as it was then known, would make disarmament harder to achieve. BASIC then teamed up with influential media groups in London to release the results on the eve of President Bush's visit to the United Kingdom.

In February last year we published a compendium of short articles by authors in nine different European countries. The authors were asked to comment on the level of political support for missile defence in their own countries. A recurring theme from our contributors was the general lack of public debate and a scarcity of government pronouncements on missile defence.²

And so, last month in order to try and kick-start a 'big conversation' on missile defence in the UK, we jointly organised a conference on missile defence with the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford that attracted an international panel of expert speakers and an informed and interested audience of over 130 concerned citizens. We are now planning a similar event in London in the summer. Further information about this and our other missile defence publications and activities can be found on our web site at www.basicint.org.

I have been asked to discuss the political divisions in Europe concerning the rationale for missile defence. I will certainly do that, but I also intend to highlight transatlantic divisions as well.

Five key points are essential for understanding both intra-European divisions and the different transatlantic threat perceptions of missile proliferation and the role of missile defence.

• First, as is the case in many other policy areas, and not unlike the situation in the United States itself, there is no single European view on the rationale for missile defence. Statements by European politicians, defence and foreign policy analysts, and media commentators differ greatly, even compared with the opinions of their own parliamentarians and public sentiment.
  
  
• Second, the issue is becoming as partisan in Europe as it is in the United States, with conservative and right wing political parties generally supportive and left of centre parties expressing reservations about developing the system. While centre-left political coalitions dominated politics in Europe during the late 1990s, centre-right parties are now flourishing. In turn, this could herald a more supportive climate in many European capitals for US proposals on missile defence.
  
  
• Third, while opinion in Europe is mixed, there is widespread recognition that the threat from missile proliferation is growing and could endanger large parts of Europe in the coming years. However, European policy makers and intelligence officials tend to see this so-called 'rogue-nation missile threat' as one of many threats to European and global security, and one that is less immediate and acute than others, such as terrorism and instability on the eastern and southern borders of Europe.
  
  
• Fourth, most Europeans tend to favour a limited "theatre" missile defence option, designed primarily to defend forward deployed troops, and employing a small number of land or sea based missiles. This system would join with the more traditional approach of strengthening multilateral non-proliferation regimes, diplomacy and economic sanctions.
  
  
• Finally, these transatlantic differences in perception of the extent of the threat from ballistic missile proliferation and the means with which to counter that threat have not significantly changed in the post 9/11world. Moreover, transatlantic divisions on this issue seem likely to grow even wider as a result of the new US national security strategy of 'pre-emption' or 'preventive war'.
  
  

2. The Threat from Ballistic Missiles: One Europe, Many States and Even More Voices

Differences and commonalities within Europe

Outlining the attitude to missile defence of the European NATO allies is a task easily plagued by generalities. The much vaunted European Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) is still in its infancy, and despite the development of a limited number of 'joint actions' and 'common positions' on European security issues - including the recent promising EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - national governments still make most of the running on the main strategic issues. European capitals all too often have divergent interests, and thus differing approaches.

These differences in the threat assessments and security policy responses of the European states are rooted in the different overlapping 'foreign policy shaping' elements within each country: a complex mixture of history, geography, differing defence and economic strategies, and the influence of domestic interest groups. That the United Kingdom perceived a greater threat from Iraq than did France, for example, illustrates the subjective reality of national security.

As UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, noted in his speech at the Brookings Institute in May 2002:

"There are in fact plenty of differences with our European partners in the EU - over beef and asylum seekers and energy liberalisation with France, over a properly functioning free market in financial services with Germany."³

On many of these issues, there will also be differences of opinion within individual European states, and this is certainly the case with missile defence. Moreover, just as the issue has become a cause celebre for both the political left and right in the United States, there is also a possibility that it will become a political litmus test on how to keep Europe strong and secure - whether, in broad terms, European security is better served through new weapons developments or arms control, military-build-up or diplomacy and nation-building, by unilateral initiatives or multilateral agreements. In Britain, the debate (albeit limited) is already being framed in this way.

The Conservative Party/ Political Right Position

Many prominent figures in the UK Conservative Party, including the current leader, Michael Howard, and his predecessors, Ian Duncan Smith and Margaret Thatcher, have spoken in support of US missile defence proposals. Ian Duncan Smith, for example, stated that:

"Freed from the ABM's constraints, the United States will exploit fully the complete range of missile defence technologies. The effectiveness of these defences is simply not understood in Europe...The potential of ballistic missile defence to enhance international stability has been almost entirely overlooked in a UK debate that has often been parochial and poorly informed."⁴

Similarly, according to Margaret Thatcher:

"I strongly support President Bush's plan to protect America and her allies from attack by ballistic missiles, and I trust that the British government will stop its shilly-shallying and support them too. The West is faced by an ever-increasing number of dangerous states with access to weapons of mass destruction. It is in all our interests that America should recognise and act speedily on this grave and growing threat. Britain, as America's staunchest ally, should not only make available whatever facilities we can. We should also champion the president's bold vision in every international forum."⁵

The Labour Party/ Political Left Position

Among many Labour MPs, rank and file supporters and the general public, the attitude towards missile defence is more hostile. In Parliament, for example, an Early Day Motion (EDM) tabled by Malcolm Savidge, MP, in 2002 strongly questioning the wisdom of the US plans to develop missile defence, collected 280 signatures - a vast number considering that very few EDMs collect more that 100 names.

Political opposition to US missile defence proposals can also be found outside of parliament with both trade unions and local Labour groups bringing pressure to bear. On 14 June 2001, for example, 18 trade union general secretaries wrote to London's Guardian newspaper arguing that NMD would do "immense damage to international treaties covering weapons of mass destruction" and that it would be "wholly inappropriate for our government to support this initiative and [we] strongly urge it not to do so."⁶ Likewise, at the 2001 Labour Party Conference there were 17 motions, mostly from Constituency Labour Parties, voicing concern over Prime Minister Tony Blair's support for NMD. These motions were rejected on the grounds that they were not "contemporary" prompting charges that Blair was trying to "gag" his party.⁷

The Labour Government's Middle Position

The Labour government's initial position on missile defence, and particularly the use of British bases at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill as part of the US system, was to neither rule it in or out. However, towards the end of 2002, the UK Government made significant statements which indicated a growing willingness to support the concept, if not the detail, of missile defence systems. According to Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, for example:

"What missile defence should do is give pause to those tempted down the path of proliferation even before they begin. Those who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction are not usually irrational. They must make a cost/benefit calculation before seeking to acquire such weapons or the means of delivering them. Anything that affects this calculation by raising the cost or reducing the benefit has to be worth considering.'⁸

On 12 October 2002, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of Commons that US officials had visited London, other European capitals and NATO HQ during the summer "to set out possible approaches to missile defence and to repeat US willingness to offer protection to friends and allies". He went on to state that the US Administration had not made a decision about the "precise future architecture" of a missile defence system, nor had there been a formal request for the use of Fylingdales. Such a request would be seriously considered but only if "we were satisfied that the overall security of the UK and the alliance would be enhanced".

Having spent almost all of 2002 prevaricating, Defence Secretary Hoon announced on 9 December that he was initiating a public consultation on missile defence, but did not say how long the process would last or how it was to be conducted. The following week, just before the Parliamentary recess, he informed Parliament that he had received a letter from Donald Rumsfeld formally requesting an upgrade at Fylingdales saying:

"The decision on Fylingdales upgrade is an important one, and the Government is keen for it to be informed by public and Parliamentary discussion. We shall ensure that this House has appropriate opportunities to debate the issue in the New Year."

The House of Commons Defence Committee moved quickly to instigate a further inquiry into the subject, called for written submissions to be with them by 8 January (just after the recess) and announced that Geoff Hoon would be giving oral evidence on 15 January.

Somewhat unexpectedly, the Defence Secretary then rose in the House on 15 January to make a lengthy statement in support of missile defence and the upgrade of Fylingdales:

"Based on the analysis and discussion which we have undertaken so far, I have therefore come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed."

While, at last, clearly and firmly nailing his Government's colours to the missile defence masthead, he emphasized that he had no yet formally responded to Donald Rumsfeld's request and said that the Defence Debate the following week would provide "a further opportunity for discussion in this House".

Having explained his, and the Ministry of Defence's reasoning behind the decision to be openly supportive, Geoff Hoon explained that there was no specific deadline he was working to but acknowledged that the United States would probably appreciate an early decision and again referred to the 'Defence in the World' debate the following week. Pressed on this by the Chair of the Defence Committee, Bruce George, who was concerned that a decision may be made in advance of the Committee's initial deliberations and report (which was expected to be published about a month later), the Defence Secretary indicated he would prefer not to pre-empt the report's publication, but would give no assurances.

While several dissenting questions about missile defence were put to the Defence Secretary during the Defence Debate on 22 January, and robustly rebutted, most of the passionate and longer contributions from the opposition parties and government backbenches, concentrated on the Iraqi crisis.

Perhaps mindful of suggestions that the Government might make a formal response to the US Administration before the end of the month, the Defence Committee Report on Missile Defence was published on 29 January. The report concluded that, "the UK should agree to the upgrade of a US early warning radar on British soil for use in the US missile defence system".

The Committee also largely agreed with the UK Ministry of Defence's assessment of the growing threat from ballistic missile proliferation. The report acknowledged that an upgrade to Fylingdales may draw Britain into active participation in deployed missile defence systems and hoped for UK industrial participation and benefit. However, the report also questioned whether the overall missile defence system would work. The report was also extremely critical of the Government's consultation process, stating: "The Committee strongly regret the way in which the issue has been handled by the Government". The Committee also noted that the Ministry of Defence "has shown no respect for either the views of those affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle". The Committee noted that it "will also wish to follow up those matters relating to the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales which could not be addressed fully in this report".

In a Parliamentary statement on February 5, Defence Secretary Hoon said: "I am therefore replying today to the United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, conveying the Government's agreement to the US request". However, the decision to upgrade Fylingdales does not bring the consultation to a close as this is but a small part of the wider debate on missile defence and the UK's participation in it, which is likely to continue for many years. At present the Labour Government appears content to keep to its two-pronged strategy of accommodating the US in 'soft decision' areas (i.e. those involving low political and economic costs, such as the upgrade at Fylingdales), while deferring the more important decisions on participation until the outcome of a number of national and NATO feasibility studies have been completed. This 'wait and see' strategy also reflects a deep scepticism within the British establishment about the need for a global missile defence system as proposed by the Bush administration.⁹

Reactions of other European states are likely to be influential on any UK decision, a situation complicated by the ascendancy of centre-right parties in large parts of the rest of Europe.

Rise of the Right in Europe

Left-leaning governments across Europe are suffering as voters increasingly turn to conservative, and even far-right parties, for tough economic reforms and law-and-order policies. Many see the left as out of step with ordinary people. In the first years of the new century, left-of-centre governments fell in Italy, France, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.¹⁰ This political shift would indicate a softening in opposition to US missile defence plans as the right in Europe has long steered a more pro-US course than the left.

In the case of Demark, for example, the General Election to the Danish Parliament held on 20 November 2001, resulted in a right of centre Liberal-Conservative Party coalition gaining control of the National Parliament. The result meant that the Centre Left Social Democrats Party ceased being the country's largest political party for the first time since 1924.¹¹ The shift to the right meant that Denmark's previously cautious approach to the question of allowing the US to make use of facilities in Thule, Greenland, has been dropped. According to a Liberal Party policy statement from November 2001:

"We will consider US plans concerning missile defence and possible use of the Thule radar in this context and will regularly involve the Greenland Home Rule Government in discussions of this issue." ¹²

In France, however, despite the mainstream right winning a huge victory in France's parliamentary elections in June 2002, forcing the Socialists to surrender control of the National Assembly and giving President Jacques Chirac more power than at any time in the last five years, the picture is more complex. Opinion on US missile defence plans is not so clearly divided along the left-right political axis. The Conservative President, Jacques Chirac, has maintained a healthy mistrust of Washington's plans, reflecting a historical mistrust of French nationalists for US power. In a speech in August 2001, Jacques Chirac, stated:

"There's no single response to this new threat [missile proliferation]. Political means must not be neglected. Deterrence guarantees the protection of our vital interests. And the missile defence capabilities, at the heart of the debate, whose efficacy and consequences must be assessed, are far from constituting a new panacea."¹³

European threat assessments

Despite these differences of opinion between and within European states, national defence ministries and intelligence services agree that a clear threat from ballistic missiles exists - and that such a threat appears to be growing. A report from the UK Ministry of Defence in February 2001, for example, stated:

"[A]t current rates of progress, it seems likely that, well before 2030, one or more of these [proliferating] states will have ballistic missiles capable of reaching the UK carrying chemical or biological payloads and, potentially, nuclear weapons."¹⁴

In Britain's most recent publicly available assessment of the threat posed by ballistic missiles, presented in March 2002 by the Ministry of Defence, the mood remains cautious but far from alarmist:

"We currently assess that there is no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK. We do not believe that any of the states listed above [North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya] currently has the capability to reach the UK with ballistic missiles...... However, we can state that were a country in the Middle East or North Africa to acquire a complete ballistic missile system of sufficient range, a capability to target the UK could emerge within the next few years."¹⁵

Other analysts argue that while there are growing numbers of shorter-range cruise missiles and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles in the world, the number of long-range ballistic missiles is decreasing from Cold War levels. Outside Russia and China, and possibly North Korea, it is doubtful that any nation possesses long-range missiles that can reach Europe or the United States from its territory.¹⁶

Thus, most European governments appear to find that the threat from ballistic missiles is real and growing, and could endanger large parts of European territory in the coming years. The southeastern part of Europe is already within range of some Middle Eastern ballistic systems, and intermediate-range missiles could soon pose a threat to most of the continent. However, this threat is neither immediate nor acute, especially when considered in the context of other dangers, such as terrorism and regional crises on the borders of Europe.

Why then are Europeans and Americans assessing the threat in different ways?

There are a number of fundamental differences in how Europeans and Americans interpret the evidence of rogue-state missile developments. First, European nations usually consider intentions when evaluating a threat. Thus, whereas the US approach to threat assessment is primarily 'capabilities-based',¹⁷ Europeans tend to take a broader approach that includes technical capability and hostile purpose. Second, European analysts require a state's technical capability to be proven and fully tested, which can mean that their threat time frame may differ from Washington's. Third, the European assessment tends to focus more on the warhead rather than on the means of delivery-there are many ways besides a ballistic missile to deliver a WMD attack. Finally, the US-European split on ballistic missile threat assessments represents a more fundamental divergence in transatlantic approaches to security.

3. What Type of Missile Defence: Theatre or Strategic?

Current US missile defence thinking anticipates a multi-layered architecture to destroy hostile warheads in all stages of flight. Systems currently under development include infrared satellites to detect launches; ground & sea based early warning and X-band radar for tracking; and at least eight different kinetic energy (i.e. hit-to-kill missile interceptors) and directed energy (i.e. lasers) systems. President Bush has promised that a limited Ground-based Mid-course Defence (GMD) system will be operational by the end of September 2004 - just a month before the Presidential elections. This will consist of six silos at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; each silo will contain one interceptor missile. More are expected to follow in succeeding years

The transatlantic tension on missile defence is not based simply on opposition in Europe to the concept of missile defence, but on the scope and strategic implications of what is being proposed. While most European governments and large swathes of public opinion (as far as can be known - few politicians care to ask) think building a defence to protect the US mainland from missile attack is costly and unnecessary, many analysts and decision-makers in key European states agree that there might be a need to develop limited 'theatre' missile defence systems.

Theatre Systems

However, the missile defence programs of Europe and the United States appear to be motivated by vastly different strategic concerns. While the Bush administration is determined to push ahead with an ambitious 'layered' system to guard against a long-range missile attack, Europe is primarily concerned with protecting forward-deployed forces and naval fleets from cruise missile and short-range ballistic missile attack.

Many countries in Europe, including France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, are currently engaged in developing some kind of limited missile defence capability. For the most part these are sea-based point defence systems designed to protect against cruise missile and ballistic missile attack. They have a more limited capability than similar sea-based systems being researched by the Pentagon.

The most ambitious European system currently under development is NATO's ongoing feasibility study on the development of a Theatre Missile Defence system. NATO labelled anti-missile systems as the "Number one new equipment priority" as far back as 1993.¹⁸ More recently, NATO's new strategic concept from 1999 stated:

"The alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences."¹⁹

NATO awarded two transatlantic consortia with contracts in June 2001 to study the technical feasibility, costs and timescales for developing a TMD system. The studies were due to be completed in December 2002, at a cost of $13.5 million²⁰ - neither has been made publicly available.

Though the initial contracts are small, the project could expand to include both a lower and upper-tier capability. If NATO does eventually develop a workable upper-tier TMD capability, the alliance will be providing itself with the ability to protect not just forward-deployed troops, but also border areas and even cities from medium-range ballistic missile attack. Indeed, NATO defence ministers have since raised the bar by not only directing that in the run up to this year's Istanbul summit, work should continue on protecting deployed NATO forces against theatre ballistic missiles, but that options should be examined for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

Strategic Systems

Taking this next step and adopting the US vision of a system designed to protect the entire mainland of Europe, in addition to the United States, is fraught with political, economic and technological difficulties. In addition, while past fears about the potential for a new arms race with Russia have receded, many Europeans remain concerned about key aspects of the US missile defence system. These concerns include, the cost, the potential weaponization of space, and the dilemma of using multilateral diplomacy and arms control versus the faith in technological and military solutions.

Cost

The cost argument, fits into a wider debate over the respective defence budgets of Europe and the United States. European governments are being placed under increased pressure to fulfil a larger number of capabilities with a fairly stagnant pool of resources. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has been particularly vocal about the danger to the alliance posed by the growing capabilities gap between Europe and the United States:

"To me, the real question is a different one: not whether the US and its allies want to work together but whether they still can work together. If the US and its allies could no longer act as a meaningful military coalition, it would not matter how many countries joined the alliance - NATO would be marginalized as a serious organisation."²²

However, while missile defence figures on the list of priorities for European NATO states, there are many other capabilities much higher on the list. For Robertson and others, strategic lift, air-to-air refuelling and precision-guided munitions present the greatest priorities. Europe's ability to commit to an expanded missile defence system will also be hampered by the inability - or unwillingness - of many European NATO states to increase their respective defence budgets. European government's are increasingly unable to significantly raise taxes owing to the constraints imposed by EU enlargement, while domestic pressures ensure that funding for education and health retain precedence over the armed forces.

This dilemma was reflected in comments made by the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Michael Boyce in July 2001:

"There's no point in completely impoverishing ourselves in order to provide ourselves with a defence against one particular system and not being able to do anything else ... As far as I'm concerned there is no way I'm in the position to suggest we can pay for any missile defence technology from within the existing defence budget and carry on doing what we are doing at the moment."²³

Moreover, in February 2002, a UK defence official quoted a figure of £10 billion as the likely cost of a British decision to participate in the US missile defence system - more than 40 per cent of the entire defence budget.²⁴

The weaponization of space

There are also serious concerns in Europe regarding continued US development of advanced space weaponry - in particular, the Space Based Laser (SBL) and space based kinetic kill vehicles - for use in the system. To many these technologies suggest a more expansive aim for missile defence: as a possible means for the United States to weaponize space and achieve dominance of the ultimate military high ground.

These worries are aggravated by an emerging US space policy which stresses the inevitably of conflict in the heavens and urges the need for powerful American deterrence to the threat including, if necessary, placing weapons in space. As the high-level Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Control reported in January 2001:

"We know from history that every medium-air, land and sea-has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities....

The Commissioners believe the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests."²⁵

European officials are seriously unnerved by such thinking as they believe any attempt to 'dominate' space would lead only to a costly and destabilising arms race. They are wary of missile defence being used as a cover for space weaponization and thus are deeply uneasy about the continued development of systems such as the SBL, which have clear offensive space capabilities. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in defending the concept of missile defences the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, stressed their 'limited' nature²⁶ - there is a realisation that a more 'developed' system, including space-based elements, would be very hard to defend to a European audience.

Faith in multilateral solutions

Another clear division between Europe and the United States is Europe's continued faith in the power of multilateral agreements and processes of engagement to check the spread of WMD and their delivery systems. For instance, NATO pursues a twin approach to the problem of WMD proliferation based on defence and military solutions coupled with arms control. The concern among many Europeans is the extent to which the United States is pursuing the former approach and neglecting the latter.

In the field of ballistic missile control, one focus of attention is the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) agreed in November 2002. The Code establishes both international norms against proliferation and modest confidence building measures, and has garnered a great deal of diplomatic support. But more concerted action is needed to turn this Code into a set of legally binding obligations and to provide real enticements to states like North Korea and Iran to abandon missile development. In short, if the Code contains neither sticks nor carrots it is unlikely to be very effective. Such a view was supported by many of the nations involved in the Code's negotiations. Other countries, above all the United States, strongly opposed the introduction of such incentives, believing that they would actually encourage continued ballistic development by 'states of concern' to force further concessions and benefits.

More broadly, there is a strong contrast between the willingness of the United States and Europe to engage with so-called "states of concern". For example, Britain and the EU have employed a policy of "constructive engagement" with Iran, which included reinstatement of diplomatic relations and dialogue on encouraging democratization of the country and adherence to non-proliferation commitments. In October 2003, the British, German and French foreign secretaries flew to Tehran to persuade the Iranian government to avoid confrontation with the US by agreeing to IAEA spot checks of its nuclear facilities. Continuing concerns about Iranian willingness to implement a suspension of its nuclear enrichment-related activities, suggest that the diplomatic route is not without its problems, but certainly represents a different emphasis to that of the United States.²⁷

It is also worth noting that while stating a clear concern about ballistic missile proliferation, the US administration is looking to amend the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to allow greater sharing of missile technology (indeed, largely under the auspices of bringing allies into the missile defence programme). Indeed, the US is prepared to share controlled WMD technologies with close allies-currently renewing the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, for example, to allow continued and increased nuclear technology transfer between the US and UK-yet expecting other countries to prohibit such activities.

Faith in Technology

Europeans tend also to place less esteem than their American counterparts in the reliance on technological solutions, and especially the belief that with enough know-how, money and commitment anything can be achieved. The manner in which the United States continues to pursue strategic missile defence in spite of having already spent over $100 billion with no workable system would be unheard of in Europe. The technological differences between theatre missile defence and strategic missile defence are also significant.

4. Differing Approaches to International Relations

Cooperative engagement and multilateralism are the key tenets of European international thinking. After all, this is exactly what the EU is built on. Missile defence is a diametrically different approach - symbolically putting up a wall against the rest of the world. Many prominent European officials have voiced their concerns about Washington's 'military first' approach to rooting out terrorism - an approach that ignores the myriad other possibilities.

• Hubert Vedrine, French Foreign Minister: "Should we reduce all the world's problems solely to the battle against terrorism? Must this be waged solely by military means, ignoring the deep-seated causes and roots? That is what would be too simplistic, dangerous and ineffectual."²⁸
  
  
• Chris Patten, EU High Commissioner for External Affairs: "Walls are not the answer to global woes. But engagement is -- with more help for the poor, more access for them to our markets and more commitment on their part to improve their standards of government in return for our more generous help. Liberal mush? Actually, no -- just a more comprehensive and effective way of beating the current generation of bin Ladens and preventing the development of new ones.²⁹
  
  
• Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy: "I don't think the problems of today can be solved in a unilateralist manner."³⁰
  
  
• Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary: "Promoting human rights, fighting poverty, exclusion and injustice, and preventing and resolving conflicts are not merely right and just: they can act as a first line of defence against future crises. By engaging with the world, and driving back the boundaries of chaos, we are helping to prevent instability and insecurity, in order to stop conflict, tyranny and terrorism."³¹
  
  

These statements, and the other evidence set out above, suggests that there has been very little significant change in the threat perceptions of the NATO allies concerning the rationale for missile defence since 9/11. In which case, what would it take to move European threat perceptions closer to those of the United States? In short, either the continued growth of right wing political coalitions in Europe that are sympathetic to the Republican agenda, or a greater willingness on the part of the United States to share some of the lucrative missile defence R&D contracts with European companies. Both scenarios would be in keeping with the highly politicised nature of ballistic missile threat assessments.

In particular, the pork-barrel politics of a resurgent European missile defence industry should not be underestimated. The European missile industry is now able to compete globally in a market niche in the past the preserve of the larger U.S. firms, such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. At present, European companies have had little success in winning more than minor US missile defence contracts. However, they are keen for a slice of a very large pie. For example, Matra BAe Dynamics Chairman, Mike Rouse, has stated that involving the company in the US. Missile defence program "would help Washington sell the concept to Europe, while enabling us to sell some of our systems and capabilities into the program".³² These economic welfare arguments are already influencing some European governments. In February 2001, German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, softened his public objections to US missile defence plans, citing an unwillingness to lose out economically: "[A] very important point for us is that we are not excluded from this technology and the knowledge of the technology".³³ A charm offensive by Pentagon planners on a tour of European capitals in the summer of 2002 to sell the idea of missile defence seems to have added to the level of anticipation on the part of European defence manufacturers.

However, this potential gradual slide towards increased European acceptance of missile defence systems is likely to be countered by European political hostility towards the new US doctrine of 'pre-emptive' or 'preventive' military action,³⁴ including active consideration of first-strike attacks against terrorists and hostile states suspected of possessing weapons of mass destruction.

The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review sets out a "New Triad" for deterring and responding to emerging threats. Whereas US nuclear forces previously were spread over a triad of land-, sea-, and air-launched delivery systems, the New Triad proposes a greater range of strategic options by creating a more flexible structure, incorporating missile defences and blurring the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Nuclear and non-nuclear weapons together provide the president with offensive strike options as the Triad's first "leg", while the proposed missile defence system is envisaged as the second component. The third leg is a strengthened defence infrastructure that includes revitalised research, testing and maintenance for nuclear weapons and facilities.

Having sought to reassure its allies that the proposed missile defence system is limited and purely protective in nature, the Bush administration will find it difficult to square this reasoning with a strategy of 'preventive war' that earmarks missile defence as a tool of offensive power-projection.³⁵ According to Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Qinghua University, for example:

"The United States says this is a defensive system, but everyone knows it will be used to strengthen your offensive capability," he said. "It protects your troops so you can attack any time without fear of retribution. If the United States feels 100 percent secure, it may believe it doesn't need to worry about a third world war. This will make the American military too brave, and that will be very, very dangerous for everyone."³⁶

The US military will enjoy greater freedom to attack when and where it pleases since the homeland will be secured against ballistic missile attack. Diplomacy and multilateral arms controls are likely to take a back seat to unilateral force of arms - as was the case in Iraq. Clearly this developing US agenda is divergent from the cooperative security model that European governments support.

Thank you for listening.

Footnotes

1. The actual oral presentation was an abridged version of this paper, which itself is an updated version of a paper given previously by the author at the 'Conference on NATO and Missile Defense in the Post 9/11 Environment', sponsored by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State and Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Meridian International Center, Washington, DC, June 26, 2002.

2. 'European Government's Official Positions on Missile Defence', BASIC Papers, February 2003, No.42.

3. "EU-US Relations: The Myths and the Reality", Speech by Jack Straw at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 8 May 2002

4. "Allies Face Critical Race" by Ian Duncan Smith, Defense News, 10-16 June 2002

5. "Thatcher backs Bush over Missile Defence Plan", BBC News Website, 2 May 2001

6. "NMD: Overview of the Political Debate in the United Kingdom", David Grahame and Mark Bromley, BASIC Note, 1 December 2001

7. Ibid

8. "The Future of Arms Control and Proliferation", Speech by Jack Straw at King's College, London, 6 February 2002

9. This same tact-public denial and obfuscation for months, followed by quick announcement that private deals have concluded-has been emblematic of the method the US has used on other allies in missile defence efforts as well: in addition to Denmark, Canada and Australia followed the same model, largely without sufficient consultation of the respective parliaments or public.

10. Barry Renfrew , "Can the left hold? Europeans are losing faith", Associated Press, 17 June 2002.

11. Andrew Osborn, "Danish voters swing to the right: Exit polls predict victory of anti-immigrant parties", The Guardian, 21 November 2001.

12. Government platform 2001: Growth, welfare - renewal, Danish Liberal Party, November 2001.

13. 27 August 2001, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, Speech to the Ninth French Ambassadors' Conference

14. "The Future Strategic Context for Defence", UK Ministry of Defence, February 2001

15. Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence, Supplementary memorandum from MoD on: the Ballistic Missile Threat (March 2002)

16. For example, according to Joseph Cirincione, 'The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Brief, No.7, 28 April 2003, around 40 states are known to have acquired or developed ballistic missiles, but the majority have at present only short-range capabilities, such as the FROG, SCUD and Al Hussein. Up to 11 states possess medium (1000-1300 km) range capabilities: the five declared nuclear weapon states plus India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, such as the Shahab, Ghauri and No-Dong missiles. Only the five declared nuclear weapon states have intercontinental (ICBM) capabilities.

17. This is a new strategy undertaken by the Bush administration and their conservative allies in Congress. Additionally, "capabilities-based" more often refers to US capability, not some possible enemy's. The new US doctrine says that any "capability" that is developed should be fielded, whether it is mature, sufficient, relevant, or not. It is an incremental approach that leads to redundant acquisition strategies and deployment problems down the line.

18. "NATO in search for missile 'umbrella'", London Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993.

19. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23-24 April 1999.

20. "NATO's Theatre Missile Defence System Reaches New Milestone", NATO Press Release, 5 June 2001

21. "TMD: NATO starts the countdown", Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 January 2001.

22. "NATO Warned on Capabilities Gap", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 May 2002.

23. "Military Chief Casts Doubt on Star Wars", The Guardian, 8 July 2001.

24. Richard Norton-Taylor, "Missile system's £10bn price tag", The Guardian, February 28, 2002.

25. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001.

26. Speech by Jack Straw, "The Future of Arms Control and Proliferation", King's College, London, 6 February 2002.

27. See, for example, Andreas Persbo and Dave Andrews, 'The IAE and Iran: No smoking guns so far but the smell of gunpowder lingering in the air', BASIC Notes, 5 March 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN040305.htm

28. French Foreign Ministry Website, 6 February 2002.

29. Chris Patten, "Fighting Terrorism: Beyond the Military Campaign", 25 March 2002.

30. BBC Website, 8 February 2002.

31. Jack Straw, "EU-US Relations, the Myths and the Reality", 8 May 2002.

32. "Missile House Matra BAe Targets Teaming Deals With U.S. Firms", Defense News, 13 March 2001.

33. "Germany would seek share in U.S. missile shield: Schroeder", AFP, 1 March 2001.

34. Pre-emptive and preventive military actions are not the same thing. For example, a pre-emptive military strike with conventional forces to destroy an imminent attack with nuclear weapons would be lawful under the UN Charter and morally justified. However, a preventive war to forestall a nuclear threat that is a potential but not yet imminent threat is not a generally accepted principle in international law. It is the latter, for example, that the Bush administration and Blair governments adopted in the case of Iraq in 2003, and is why international legal opinion remains, at best, divided on the legality of the intervention which seemed to owe more to balance of power considerations than international law.

35. See, for example, Karel Koster, "The Offensive Use of Anti-Ballistic Missile Shields", Presented at the Landau NMD Conference, Rome, January 2001; David Krieger and Stanley K. Sheinbaum, "Offensive Defense" http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2001_summer/offensive.htm.

36. Quoted by Erik Eckholm, 'Experts Try to Make Missile Shield Plan Palatable to China', New York Times, 28 January 2001.