The end of the Cold War, followed by the thundering victory of coalition forces against Iraq in 1991, ushered in a fundamentally transformed international security environment.  President Bush articulated as much in his 1991 State of the Union speech when he presented his vision for a “New World Order,” where multinational coalitions would coalesce to produce a type of global collective defense against international malcontents such as ‘rogue’ nations and transnational criminal and terrorist groups.  He also announced the integration of SDI into a system called the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).  GPALS consisted of ground-based national and theater missile defenses that would operate in conjunction with a space-based global defensive system, and which was designed to defend against tactical theater missiles, as well as up to 200 nuclear warheads launched from rogue nations. 

Ambitious ABM programs such as GPALS gained substantial support and momentum in the latter half of the 1990’s as a result of two developments: 1) a Republican-controlled Congress supportive of the NMD initiative, and 2) intelligence reports pointing to the ICBM ambitions of potentially hostile ‘rogue’ nations such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, among others.  

Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress in 1995 and began to push for a NMD deployment by 2003 (the date was eventually pushed back to 2005 to accommodate research and development).  This same year, the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) was released, offering a subdued assessment that the U.S. homeland was not likely to face the threat of a missile attack over the next 15 years. The report, as is the practice with most all NIE’s, focused upon the probabilities of threats, not the more broad and inconclusive possibility of threats.  Although the report was classified, its findings were leaked in a letter to Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and were subsequently used to criticize the Republican-backed missile defense program.  When the leak was revealed, Republicans labeled the report biased and politicized, and demanded that an independent commission be formed to reevaluate the ballistic missile threat.  Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet empanelled the commission and appointed former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as chair.  

The strategic assessment gaining momentum at the time within the U.S. defense establishment was that ‘rogue’ nations and non-state terrorist organizations would not be affected by the dynamics of deterrence—the stabilizing element of the Cold War.  In general, states understood the implicit threat of annihilation should they launch a missile attack against the United States or any other nuclear power and were thus dissuaded from overly bellicose policies that may provoke war.  However, it was not thought that ‘rogue’ states and terrorists ascribed to the rational deterrence school of thought, but rather were ‘crazy’, ‘irrational’, ‘fanatical’, or plain suicidal.  Thus, the argument was offered that the United States could not rely upon deterrence theory for its security and must provide an active defense against such missile threats.

The Rumsfeld Commission reported, with dissenters, in July 1998 that “ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States.”  As if on cue, Iran and North Korea conducted missile tests within months.  Congress, in turn, passed in quick succession legislation committing the United States to fielding a national missile defense system as soon as technologically feasible.  President Bill Clinton, however, remained concerned that the development of a missile defense system would undoubtedly abrogate the ABM Treaty, thereby straining relations with Russia and dealing a major setback to international arms control and nuclear non-proliferation efforts.  These concerns were articulated in Clinton’s statements following the signing of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 as narrated by Donald R. Baucom, Historian at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization:

The Clinton Administration was thus eager to strengthen the ABM Treaty and other arms control agreements, and recognized the political tension that would result if the United States undermined those initiatives by violating the treaty.  This sentiment was balanced with the newest NIE report which suggested that many rogue nations could soon have the capabilities to launch missiles against the United States.

The proposed NMD architecture, as articulated by the BMDO, was designed to operate as follows:

The system currently is designed to engage the target missile at three phases of its flight: the boost phase, midcourse, and terminal.  This layered defense is intended to provide the greatest number of interception scenarios as opposed to initial NMD designs that focused solely upon terminal phase interception.

However, tests of the developing system have indicated that the interceptor’s discrimination capabilities—the ability to recognize the target warhead amidst countermeasure decoys—remained a liability.  During the IFT 3 test intercept, the kill vehicle initially homed in on a countermeasure decoy and only at the last second acquired the actual warhead.  Lack of confidence in the technical competency of the proposed NMD system continued to undermine support for the initiative. 

Timeline

March 15, 1990 – As a component of the Bush Administration’s overall review of national security requirements, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper released his independent analysis of the SDI program.  In the report, Cooper endorsed the Brilliant Pebbles defensive scheme and proposed the concept of  the system for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

January 29, 1991 – In his State of the Union Address, President Bush announces the integration of SDI into GPALS.  The President said, “I have directed that the Strategic Defense Initiative program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.  Let us pursue a SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.”  He anticipated that GPALS would afford protection against as many as 200 long range missiles. http://www.c-span.org/executive/stateofunion/sou91_trans.asp  

April 23, 1991 – During the Gulf War, American military operations relied heavily upon space assets such as global positioning, reconnaissance, and battle management satellites.  To this point, General Donald Kutyna, USAF commander of U.S. Space Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it is imperative that the U.S. develop the means to defend its space assets and attack enemy assets. http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/au-18/part05.htm

December 5, 1991 – President Bush signs the Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part of H.R. 2100) which mandates the Department of Defense to “develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant anti-ballistic missile system…designed to protect the United States against limited Ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks.”

May 1993 – Secretary of Defense Les Aspin renames the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and reorients its priorities to developing theater missile defenses.

November, 1995 – A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) reports that “no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.” http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/resources/intelligence.asp

April 1996 – The Clinton Administration institutes a “3+3” national missile defense plan which entails three years for development and, if warranted, three more years to deploy a system.   

October 1, 1997 – The U.S. Army establishes its Space and Missile Defense Command, which was to be a component of the national missile defense initiative.

March 19, 1998 – Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) introduces the American Missile Protection Act which establishes “U.S. policy to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a National Missile Defense system.”  

July 15, 1998 – The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, established under the 1998 Defense Authorization Act and chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, states with dissent that the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. is real, credible, and could appear sooner than early intelligence predictions.  Download document

January 20, 1999 – The Pentagon requests more money for NMD programs, delays the target date for achieving initial operating capability from 2003 to a “more realistic” 2005, and sets a June 2000 date for a deployment decision by the Clinton Administration.

March 16, 1999 – By a vote of 97 to 3 the Senate passes the “The National Missile Defense Act of 1999,” which requires that the United States “deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system.”

May 20, 1999 – By a vote of 345 to 71 the House of Representatives approves legislation mandating the deployment of national missile defenses as soon as technically feasible.

June 20, 1999 – President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issue a joint communiqué on the ABM Treaty that states: “Proceeding from the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and from the need to maintain the strategic balance between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to continuing efforts to strengthen the Treaty, to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future.” 

July 23, 1999 – President Clinton signs “The National Missile Defense act of 1999,” which outlines the four criteria Clinton will use in making a final decision on the future deployment of an NMD system:  the missile threat against the U.S., the cost of the NMD system, the technological status of the system, and its impact on the ABM Treaty.

September 1999 – The Welch panel, initiated jointly by several Department of Defense programs, concludes that the NMD program remains a “high risk” for failure.  In the same month, a new NIE report is released that includes a section entitled “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,” which states that “during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.”

October 2, 1999 – An Integrated Flight Test (IFT 3), employing elements of the proposed NMD system, attempts to intercept a target missile and is lauded by the Pentagon as an unqualified success.  It is later revealed that the kill vehicle initially homed in on the single decoy released by the target.

Continue to year 2000

NMD History Referenced Material

1940 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000

Back to NMD Home Page