President Clinton appreciated the importance of the ABM Treaty for maintaining international strategic stability, and as a result sought to negotiate with Russia an amended Treaty that would accommodate a U.S. NMD system.  Negotiations, however, did not go well as Russia remained skeptical of changing the Treaty and reiterated its belief that to do so would in itself undermine strategic stability.  Supported by China, France, and the United Nations, the Russian Duma, under the leadership of newly-elected President Vladimir Putin, quickly approved the START II and CTBT treaties in spring 2000 and positioned Russia with the moral high ground in the ABM negotiations.

Ultimately, Clinton elected not to authorize work to begin on deploying a NMD system.  In reaching his decision, Clinton cited the underachievement of current NMD technologies, Russia’s refusal to modify the ABM Treaty to permit deployment of an NMD system, and the reluctance of U.S. allies to endorse NMD unless strategic stability could be assured through a modified ABM Treaty.

On May 1, 2001, newly elected President George W. Bush delivered what came to be known as the “missile defense speech” at the National Defense University.  In making a case for a national missile defense program, Bush cited the increasing danger of hostile states using weapons of mass destruction, and sought conceptually to move the Cold War strategic framework away from an arrangement of massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction.  He stated, “To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us.  This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace….  Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.”  The Bush Administration argued that constructing a NMD system would alleviate the necessity of essentially defending the country solely through an implicit threat of retaliation.

To this end, the Bush Administration adopted an increasingly unilateralist tact with regard to NMD .  It insisted upon developing a NMD system, preferably with the consent of key allies and Russia, in conjunction with making substantial cuts to the U.S. strategic missile force.  However, many of the European allies gave only reserved, qualified support for NMD; Moscow insisted that the ABM Treaty retain its integrity and that Washington refrain from breaching it; and China viewed the nascent U.S. NMD system as a means of neutralizing its minimal nuclear arsenal.  However, seemingly undeterred, the Bush Administration continued toward development and deployment of a missile defense system.  Opponents of NMD in Congress in turn succeeded in offering provisions that would limit funding for the system, as well as seriously restrict Bush’s ability to conduct further testing that would abrogate the ABM Treaty without congressional approval.  However, the character of the NMD debate, and indeed the security and collective psyche of the American people, were about to undergo a wrenching change.

During the morning of September 11^th, four U.S. commercial airliners were hijacked within minutes of each other.  Two planes were flown into the World Trade Center towers (one plane into each tower), one crashed into the Pentagon, and the other crashed in rural Pennsylvania.  The Trade Center towers collapsed shortly after being struck.  Close to 4,000 people are presumed dead.  The event, the most deadly terrorist attack in history, utterly reorients U.S. defensive and military strategies.  As the Bush Administration prepares to undertake a lengthy ‘war on terrorism’, proponents of NMD argue that the U.S. government should take measures to defend the homeland against all potential threats, and specifically missile attacks from terrorists or hostile nations.  Critics of NMD, conversely, saw their position, that there were more immediate threats to U.S. national security than rogue missiles, tragically underscored.

Timeline

January 18, 2000 – Integrated Flight Test (IFT 4) fails when the infrared sensor on the kill vehicle malfunctions.  The Pentagon, however, declares the test a success due to the amount it "learns". 

February 14, 2000 – Philip Coyle, Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, tells Congress that “undue pressure has been placed on the [NMD] program” through the imposition of the arbitrary deployment deadline of 2005.

June 2000 – Clinton Administration lawyers conclude that initial work connected with constructing the X-band tracking and discrimination radar on Shemya Island in Alaska will not violate the ABM Treaty.

September 1, 2000 – President Clinton decides not to authorize NMD deployment, citing the underdeveloped status of the technology, the refusal by Russia to agree to modify the ABM to permit deployment of an NMD system, and the reluctance of U.S. allies to endorse NMD unless strategic stability can be assured through a modified ABM Treaty.  Read the speech presented at Georgetown University.

December 28, 2000 – The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization announces the award of a six-year, $6 billion cost-plus-award-fee contract to Boeing for further NMD work.

March 9, 2001 – The Defense Department issued a report, signed by Philip Coyle, stating that the sea-based component of the NMD system will not be operational until 2006 at the earliest.

May 1, 2001 – President George W. Bush delivers his “missile defense speech” at the National Defense University.  In making a case for a national missile defense program, Bush stresses that the country’s strategic framework must move away from an arrangement of massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction.

May 14, 2001 – The Pentagon restructures the NMD architecture into a layered defensive arrangement that will attempt to intercept an incoming ICBM at the three primary stages of its flight: boost phase, midcourse, and terminal.  Previously, NMD had focused almost exclusively upon the terminal phase.

June 27, 2001 – The Air Force says that the Airborne Laser (ABL) program will not be completed until 2010, three years behind schedule.  Funding shortfalls were cited as the cause of the delay.

June 27, 2001 – An internal Pentagon report authored by Philip Coyle concluded that none of the NMD systems are mature enough to allow adequate performance evaluation.  The report also stated that the NMD testing to date had been overly rehearsed and unrealistic.

July 14, 2001 – The Pentagon succeeded for the second time in four tries in intercepting a test missile with the developing NMD system.  The test was conducted using a Minuteman missile launched over the Pacific and an interceptor launched from a base in California.

July 17, 2001 – Robert Snyder, executive director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, announced that the Pentagon plans to test a space-based hit-to-kill system with design similar to the Brilliant Pebbles defensive system. 

July 30, 2001 – Pentagon officials admit that a homing beacon was used to help guide the interceptor to its target in the July 14 NMD test.  The Pentagon claims that the beacon was necessary to compensate for the absence of guidance radars not yet in operation.

September 11, 2001 – Four U.S. commercial airliners are hijacked within minutes of each other.  Two planes are flown into the World Trade Center towers (one plane into each tower), one plane crashes into the Pentagon, and one plane crashes in rural Pennsylvania.  The Trade Center towers collapse shortly after being struck.  Close to 4,000 people are presumed dead.  The event, the worst terrorist attack upon the United States in history, fundamentally reorients U.S. defensive and military strategies. 

November 12-14, 2001 – Bush and Russian President Vladamir Putin meet in Washington and Crawford, TX to discuss a renegotiation of the 1972 ABM Treaty to allow for the development of a U.S. NMD system.  The two Presidents also discuss making deep cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals.  Despite the optimism of reaching an historic agreement that surrounded the talks, no deal was codified with a written treaty.

October 2001-January 2002 – Ground testing phase of the Airborne Laser system

February 12, 2002 – First flight of the Boeing 747 complete with mounted Airborne Laser system.

2005 – Target date for the deployment of the Expanded Capability 1 system with 100 interceptors.  The addition of an expanded Ballistic Missile Command, Control, and Communications package, together with the 100 ground based interceptors to be deployed by this year, would “convert” the Expanded C-1 system to the Capability 2 system.

2007 – Initial Airborne Laser operating capability of three aircraft.

2009 – Deployment of full compliment of seven Airborne Laser-equipped aircraft.

2011 – Deployment of the Capability 3 system with 125 interceptors at each of two sites in Alaska and North Dakota, three command centers, five communications relay stations, six early warning radars and nine high resolution UHF or X-band radars, and 29 satellites of Space Based Infrared both High and Low.

NMD History Referenced Material

1940 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000

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