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Threat
Perceptions in European NATO and
The Future of Missile Defense:
A Growing Proxy Between the
Political Left and Right?
Presentation
by
Dr. Ian Davis, Director of BASIC
Conference
on NATO and Missile Defense in the Post 9/11 Environment
Meridian
International Center, Washington, DC, 26 June 2002
Introduction
One
Europe, Many States and Even More Voices
European
threat assessments
What Type of Missile Defense: Theatre or Strategic?
Differing
Approaches to International Relations
Introduction
I
would like to begin by thanking the State Department’s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, and
Meridian International Center for the opportunity to address this
conference. The British
American Security Information Council – or BASIC, for short – began
looking at transatlantic security issues over 15 years ago. With
offices, staff, advisors, and a governing board on both sides of the
Atlantic, we provide research and advocacy, and play a unique
role as a transatlantic bridge for policy makers and opinion shapers on
arms control, disarmament and security issues.
Missile
defenses became a prominent area of research for BASIC about three years
ago, and since then we have been regularly disseminating materials on U.S.
developments on the issue to European government officials, the media, and
the general public. We also try to bring European views into the debate in
Washington.
In
June 2001, for example, BASIC and a partner organization commissioned an
opinion poll of the U.K. public’s attitude towards missile defense.
The survey, completed in July that year, was the first detailed
attempt to assess the opinions of the general British public on the
U.K.’s possible role in enabling U.S. missile defense plans to proceed. Results indicated that 70% of people in Britain believed the
U.S. plans would lead to a new arms race, and 62% thought that the
creation of NMD would make disarmament harder to achieve.
BASIC then teamed up with influential media groups in London to
release the results on the eve of President Bush’s visit to the United
Kingdom.
I
have been asked to discuss the threat perceptions of European NATO allies
concerning the rationale for missile defense. More specifically, I have
been asked to consider whether that rationale has changed in the post 9/11
world, and if not, what would it take to move European NATO threat
perceptions closer to those of the United States?
Five
key points are essential for understanding Europe’s different threat
perceptions and the potential for supporting U.S. efforts to develop
missile defenses for homeland security and as part of a European or NATO
security framework.
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First,
as is the case in many other policy areas, and not unlike the
situation in the United States itself, there is no single European
view on the rationale for missile defense. Statements by European
politicians, defense and foreign policy analysts, and media
commentators differ greatly, even compared with the opinions of their
own parliamentarians and public sentiment.
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Second,
the issue is becoming as partisan in Europe as it is in the United
States, with conservative and right wing political parties generally
supportive and left of center parties expressing reservations about
developing the system. While center-left political coalitions
dominated politics in Europe during the late 1990s, center-right
parties are now flourishing. In turn, this could herald a more
supportive climate in many European capitals for US proposals on
missile defense.
-
Third,
while opinion in Europe is mixed, there is widespread recognition that
the threat from missile proliferation is growing and could endanger large
parts of Europe in the coming years. However, European policy makers
and intelligence officials tend to see this so-called ‘rogue-nation
missile threat’ as one of many threats to European and global
security, and one that is less immediate and acute than others, such
as terrorism and instability on the eastern and southern borders of
Europe.
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Fourth,
most Europeans tend to favor a limited “theatre” missile defense
option, designed primarily to defend forward deployed troops, and
employing a small number of land or sea based missiles. This system
would join with the more traditional approach of strengthening
multilateral non-proliferation regimes, diplomacy and economic
sanctions.
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Finally,
these transatlantic differences in perception of the extent of the
threat from ballistic missile proliferation and the means with which
to counter that threat have not significantly changed in the post 9/11
world. Moreover, transatlantic divisions on this issue seem likely to
grow even wider as a result of the new U.S. national security strategy
of ‘pre-emption’.
Differences
and commonalities within Europe
Outlining the attitude to missile defense of the European NATO allies is a
task easily plagued by generalities. The much vaunted European Common
Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) is still in its infancy, and despite
the development of a limited number of ‘joint actions’ and ‘common
positions’ on European security issues, national governments still make
most of the decisions and reactions to the main strategic issues. European
capitals all too often have divergent interests, and thus differing
approaches.
These
differences in the threat assessments and security policy responses of the
European states are rooted in the different overlapping ‘foreign policy
shaping’ elements within each country: a complex mixture of history,
geography, differing defense and economic strategies, and the influence of
domestic interest groups. That the United Kingdom perceives a greater
threat from Iraq than does France, for example, illustrates the subjective
reality of national security.
As
UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, noted in his speech at the Brookings
Institute in May:
“There
are in fact plenty of differences with our European partners in the EU
– over beef and asylum seekers and energy liberalisation with France,
over a properly functioning free market in financial services with
Germany.”[2]
On
many of these issues, there will also be differences of opinion within
individual European states, and this is certainly the case with missile
defense. Moreover, just as
the issue has become a cause celebre for both the political left
and right in the United States, there is also a possibility that it will
become a political litmus test on how to keep Europe strong and secure –
whether, in broad terms, European security is better served through new
weapons developments or arms control, military-build-up or diplomacy and
nation-building, by unilateral initiatives or multilateral agreements.
In Britain, the debate (albeit limited) is already being framed in
this way.
The Conservative Party/ Political Right Position
Both Ian Duncan Smith, the current leader of the
UK Conservative Party, and Margaret Thatcher, the former prime minister
and Conservative party leader, have spoken in support of U.S. missile
defense proposals. Notes Ian Duncan Smith:
“Freed
from the ABM’s constraints, the United States will exploit fully the
complete range of missile defense technologies. The effectiveness of
these defenses is simply not understood in Europe…The potential of
ballistic missile defense to enhance international stability has been
almost entirely overlooked in a U.K. debate that has often been
parochial and poorly informed.”[3]
Similarly,
according to Margaret Thatcher:
“I
strongly support President Bush’s plan to protect America and her
allies from attack by ballistic missiles, and I trust that the British
government will stop its shilly-shallying and support them too. The West
is faced by an ever-increasing number of dangerous states with access to
weapons of mass destruction. It
is in all our interests that America should recognise and act speedily
on this grave and growing threat. Britain,
as America’s staunchest ally, should not only make available whatever
facilities we can. We should also champion the president’s bold vision
in every international forum.”
The Labour Party/
Political Left Position
Among
many Labour MPs, rank and file supporters and the general public, the
attitude towards missile defense is more hostile. In Parliament, for
example, a recent Early Day Motion (EDM) tabled by Malcolm Savidge, MP,
strongly questioning the wisdom of the U.S. plans to develop missile
defense, collected 280 signatures - a vast number considering that very
few EDMs collect more that 100 names.
Political
opposition to U.S. NMD proposals can also be found outside of parliament
with both trade unions and local Labour groups bringing pressure to bear.
On 14 June 2001, for example, 18 trade union general secretaries
wrote to London’s Guardian newspaper arguing that NMD would do
“immense damage to international treaties covering weapons of mass
destruction” and that it would be “wholly inappropriate for our
government to support this initiative and [we] strongly urge it not to do
so.”
Likewise, at the last Labour Party Conference there were 17 motions,
mostly from Constituency Labour Parties, voicing concern over Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s support for NMD.
These motions were rejected on the grounds that they were not “contemporary” prompting charges that Blair was trying to
“gag” his party.
The Labour Government’s Middle Position
Overall, the Labour government’s position on
missile defense, and particularly the use of British bases at Fylingdales
and Menwith Hill as part of the U.S. system, has been to neither rule it
in or out. Recent statements
by both Blair and Straw, however, have suggested that a limited missile
defense system might be a useful addition to the non-proliferation
toolbox. According to Jack Straw, for example:
“What
missile defence should do is give pause to those tempted down the path
of proliferation even before they begin. Those who seek to acquire
weapons of mass destruction are not usually irrational. They must make a
cost/benefit calculation before seeking to acquire such weapons or the
means of delivering them. Anything that affects this calculation by
raising the cost or reducing the benefit has to be worth considering.’
Although
the conservative party in the United Kingdom is generally thought to be a
marginal voice at present, center-right parties in the rest of Europe are
in the ascendancy.
Rise
of the Right in Europe
Left-leaning governments across Europe are suffering as voters
increasingly turn to conservative, and even far-right parties, for tough
economic reforms and law-and-order policies. Many see the left as out of
step with ordinary people. Left-of-center governments have fallen in Italy, Norway,
Denmark and the Netherlands. France’s Socialists lost power in recent
parliamentary elections, while Germany’s once popular Social Democratic
government is the underdog in September’s elections.
This political shift would indicate a softening in opposition to
U.S. missile defense plans as the right in Europe has long steered a more
pro-U.S. course than the left.
In
the case of Demark, for example, the General Election to the Danish
Parliament held on 20 November 2001, resulted in a right of center
Liberal-Conservative Party coalition gaining control of the National
Parliament. The result meant
that the center left Social Democrats Party ceased being the country’s
largest political party for the first time since 1924.
The shift to the right indicates that Denmark’s previously
cautious approach to the question of allowing the U.S. to make use of
facilities in Thule, Greenland, may be dropped. According to a Liberal
Party policy statement from November 2001:
“The
Government will support negotiations between the USA and Russia
concerning a new framework for international peace and strategic
stability, which will imply a considerable reduction of the number of
nuclear warheads. We will consider US plans concerning missile defence
and possible use of the Thule radar in this context and will regularly
involve the Greenland Home Rule Government in discussions of this
issue.”
In
France, however, despite the mainstream right winning a huge victory in
France’s parliamentary elections earlier this month, forcing the
Socialists to surrender control of the National Assembly and giving
President Jacques Chirac more power than at any time in the last five
years, the picture is more complex. Opinion on U.S. missile defense plans
is not so clearly divided along the left-right political axis.
The Conservative President, Jacques Chirac, has maintained a
healthy mistrust of Washington’s plans, reflecting a historical mistrust
of French nationalists for U.S. power. In a speech in August 2001, Jacques
Chirac, stated:
“There’s
no single response to this new threat [missile proliferation]. Political
means must not be neglected. Deterrence guarantees the protection of our
vital interests. And the missile defence capabilities, at the heart of
the debate, whose efficacy and consequences must be assessed, are far
from constituting a new panacea.”
Despite
these differences of opinion between and within European states, national
defense ministries and intelligence services agree that a clear threat
from ballistic missiles exists – and that such a threat appears to be
growing. A report from the UK Ministry of Defence in February 2001, for
example, stated:
“[A]t
current rates of progress, it seems likely that, well before 2030, one
or more of these [proliferating] states will have ballistic missiles
capable of reaching the UK carrying chemical or biological payloads and,
potentially, nuclear weapons.”
In
the same month, the German intelligence agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst)
released a report alleging that Iraq has been systematically cheating
international controls to build up an arsenal of chemical weapons and a
missile system capable of hitting targets in Europe.
Since
September 11, it is difficult to say whether such fears have grown. In
Britain’s most recent publicly available assessment of the threat posed
by ballistic missiles, presented this past March by the Ministry of
Defence, the mood remains cautious but far from alarmist:
“We
currently assess that there is no significant ballistic missile threat
to the UK. We do not believe that any of the states listed above [North
Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya] currently has the capability to reach the
UK with ballistic missiles……
However, we can state that were a country in the Middle East or
North Africa to acquire a complete ballistic missile system of
sufficient range, a capability to target the UK could emerge within the
next few years.”
In
short, European governments find that the threat from ballistic missiles
is real and growing, and could endanger large parts of European territory
in the coming years. The southeastern part of Europe is already within
range of some Middle Eastern ballistic systems, and intermediate-range
missiles could soon pose a threat to most of the continent. However, this
threat is neither immediate nor acute, especially when considered in the
context of other dangers, such as terrorism and regional crises on the
borders of Europe.
Why
then are Europeans and Americans assessing the threat in different ways?
There
are a number of fundamental differences in how Europeans and Americans
interpret the evidence of rogue-state missile developments. First,
European nations usually consider intentions when evaluating a threat.
Thus, whereas the U.S. approach to threat assessment is primarily
‘capabilities-based’, Europeans tend to take a broader approach that
includes technical capability and hostile purpose. Second, European
analysts require a state’s technical capability to be proven and fully
tested, which can mean that their threat time frame may differ from
Washington’s. Third, the European assessment tends to focus more on the
warhead rather than on the means of delivery—there are many ways besides
a ballistic missile to deliver a WMD attack.
Finally, the US-European split on ballistic missile threat
assessments represents a more fundamental divergence in transatlantic
approaches to security.
The
transatlantic tension on missile defense is not based simply on opposition
in Europe to the concept of missile defense, but on the scope and
strategic implications of what is being proposed. While most European governments and large swathes of public
opinion (as far as can be known – few politicians care to ask) think
building a defense to protect the U.S. mainland from missile attack is
costly and unnecessary, many analysts and
decision-makers in key European states agree that there might be a
need to develop limited ‘theatre’ missile defense systems.
Theatre
Systems
However, the missile defense programs of Europe and the United States
are motivated by vastly different strategic concerns. While the BUSH
administration is determined to push ahead with an ambitious ‘layered’
system to guard against a long-range missile attack, Europe is primarily
concerned with protecting forward-deployed forces and naval fleets from
cruise missile and short-range ballistic missile attack.
Many
countries in Europe, including France, Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom, are currently engaged in developing some kind of limited missile
defense capability. For the
most part these are sea-based point defense systems designed to protect
against cruise missile and ballistic missile attack.
They have a more limited capability than similar sea-based systems
being researched by the Pentagon.
The
most ambitious European system currently under development is NATO’s
ongoing feasibility study on the development of a Theatre Missile Defense
system. NATO labeled anti-missile systems as the “Number one new
equipment priority” as far back as 1993.
More recently, NATO’s new strategic concept from 1999 stated:
“The
alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of
the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must
continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences.”
NATO
awarded two transatlantic consortia with contracts in June 2001 to study
the technical feasibility, costs and timescales for developing a TMD
system. The studies are due
to be completed in December 2002, at a cost of
$13.5 million.
Though
the initial contracts are small, the project could expand to include both
a lower and upper-tier capability. If
NATO does eventually develop a workable upper-tier TMD capability, the
alliance will be providing itself with the ability to protect not just
forward-deployed troops, but also border areas and even cities from
medium-range ballistic missile attack.
Strategic
Systems
Taking the next step and adopting the U.S. vision of a system
designed to protect the entire mainland of Europe, in addition to the
United States, is fraught with political, economic and technological
difficulties. In addition, while past fears about the potential for a new
arms race with Russia have receded, many Europeans remain concerned about
key aspects of the U.S. missile defense system. These concerns include,
the cost, the potential weaponization of space, and the dilemma of using
multilateral diplomacy and arms control versus the faith in technological
and military solutions.
Cost
The cost argument, fits into a wider debate
over the respective defense budgets of Europe and the United States. European governments are being placed under increased
pressure to fulfill a larger number of capabilities with a fairly stagnant
pool of resources. NATO
Secretary General Lord Robertson has been particularly vocal about the
danger to the alliance posed by the growing capabilities gap between
Europe and the United States:
“To
me, the real question is a different one: not whether the US and its
allies want to work together but whether they still can work together.
If the US and its allies could no longer act as a meaningful
military coalition, it would not matter how many countries joined the
alliance – NATO would be marginalized as a serious organisation.”
However,
while missile defense figures on the list of priorities for European NATO
states, there are many other capabilities much higher on the list.
For Robertson and others, strategic lift, air-to-air refueling and
precision-guided munitions present the greatest priorities.
Europe’s ability to commit to an expanded missile defense system
will also be hampered by the inability – or unwillingness – of many
European NATO states to increase their respective defense budgets.
European government’s are increasingly unable to significantly
raise taxes owing to the constraints imposed by monetary union, while
domestic pressures ensure that funding for education and health retain
precedence over the armed forces.
This
dilemma was reflected in recent comments made by the UK Chief of the
Defence Staff, Sir Michael Boyce:
“There’s
no point in completely impoverishing ourselves in order to provide
ourselves with a defence against one particular system and not being
able to do anything else ... As far as I’m concerned there is no way
I’m in the position to suggest we can pay for any missile defence
technology from within the existing defence budget and carry on doing
what we are doing at the moment.”
Moreover,
in February 2002, a UK defense official quoted a figure of £10 billion as
the likely cost of a British decision to participate in the U.S. missile
defense system - more than 40 per cent of the entire defense budget.
The
weaponization of space
There are also serious concerns in Europe
regarding continued U.S. development of advanced space weaponry – in
particular, the Space Based Laser (SBL) and space based kinetic kill
vehicles – for use in the system. To many these technologies suggest a
more expansive aim for missile defense: as a possible means for the United
States to weaponize space and achieve dominance of the ultimate military
high ground.
These
worries are aggravated by an emerging US space policy which stresses the
inevitably of conflict in the heavens and urges the need for powerful
American deterrence to the threat including, if necessary, placing weapons
in space. As the high-level Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Control reported in January 2001:
“We
know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen
conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this
virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to
defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require
superior space capabilities...
The
Commissioners believe the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the
capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the
President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter
threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S.
interests.”
European
officials are seriously unnerved by such thinking as they believe any
attempt to ‘dominate’ space would lead only to a costly and
destabilizing arms race. They are wary of missile defense being used as a
cover for space weaponization and thus are deeply uneasy about the
continued development of systems such as the SBL, which have clear
offensive space capabilities. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in
defending the concept of missile defenses the U.K. Foreign Secretary, Jack
Straw, stressed their ‘limited’ nature
– there is a realization that a more ‘developed’ system, including
space-based elements, would be very hard to defend to a European audience.
Faith in multilateral solutions
Another clear division between Europe and the
United States, is Europe’s continued faith in the power of multilateral
agreements and processes of engagement to check the spread of WMD and
their delivery systems. For
instance, NATO pursues a twin approach to the problem of WMD proliferation
based on defense and military solutions coupled with arms control.
The concern among many Europeans is the extent to which the United
States is pursuing the former approach and neglecting the latter.
In
the field of ballistic missile control, one focus of attention is the
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).
In February 2002 over 80 states met in Paris to discuss a draft Code of
Conduct. Intended to
establish both international norms against proliferation and modest
confidence building measures, the Code has garnered a great deal of
diplomatic support. The EU,
the United States and Russia are generally in favor of the draft Code and,
while differences persist, it seems likely that an agreed document will be
ready by the end of the year.
However,
there is no attempt to commit signatories to legal obligations, with the
focus remaining on broad principles rather than detailed action plans.
Britain’s Jack Straw rightly argues that the Code, while important,
represents only “a tentative first step to developing an internationally
agreed regime.”
There
have been many complaints that the draft Code offers no real enticements
to states such as North Korea and Iran to abandon missile development. In
short, if the agreement contains neither sticks nor carrots it is unlikely
to be very effective. Such a
view is supported by many of the nations involved in the ICOC
negotiations. Other countries, above all the United States, strongly
oppose the introduction of such incentives, believing that they would
actually encourage continued ballistic development by ‘states of
concern’ to force further concessions and benefits.
More
broadly, there is a strong contrast between the willingness of the United
States and Europe to engage with so-called “states of concern”.
For example, Britain and the EU are currently employing a policy of
“constructive engagement” with Iran, which has included reinstatement
of diplomatic relations and dialogue on encouraging democratization of the
country. Straw has visited
Iran twice in the last two years, while the EU has recently approved a
proposal for a trade and co-operation agreement with Iran. Finally, Chris
Patten, EU High Commissioner for External Affairs, has voiced his regret
over the decision by U.S. Congress on 27 July 2001 to extend sanctions
against Iran for 5 more years.
Faith
in Technology
Europeans tend also to place less esteem
than their American counterparts in the reliance on technological
solutions, and especially the belief that with enough know-how, money and
commitment anything can be achieved.
The manner in which the United States continues to pursue strategic
missile defense in spite of having already spent over $100 billion with no
workable system would be unheard of in Europe.
Cooperative
engagement and multilateralism are the key tenets of European
international thinking. After all, this is exactly what the EU is built
on. Missile defense is a diametrically different approach – symbolically
putting up a wall against the rest of the world. Just this year, many
prominent European officials have voiced their concerns about
Washington’s ‘military first’ approach to rooting out terrorism –
an approach that ignores the myriad other possibilities.
-
Hubert
Vedrine, French Foreign Minister: “Should we reduce all the
world’s problems solely to the battle against terrorism? Must this
be waged solely by military means, ignoring the deep-seated causes and
roots? That is what would be too simplistic, dangerous and
ineffectual.”
-
Chris
Patten, EU High Commissioner for External Affairs: “Walls are not
the answer to global woes. But engagement is—with more help for the
poor, more access for them to our markets and more commitment on their
part to improve their standards of government in return for our more
generous help. Liberal mush? Actually, no—just a more comprehensive
and effective way of beating the current generation of bin Ladens and
preventing the development of new ones.
-
Javier
Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy:
“I don’t think the problems of today can
be solved in a unilateralist manner.”
-
Jack
Straw, British Foreign Secretary: “Promoting human rights, fighting
poverty, exclusion and injustice, and preventing and resolving
conflicts are not merely right and just: they can act as a first line
of defence against future crises. By engaging with the world, and
driving back the boundaries of chaos, we are helping to prevent
instability and insecurity, in order to stop conflict, tyranny and
terrorism.”
These
statements, and the other evidence set out above, suggests that there has
been very little significant change in the threat perceptions of the NATO
allies concerning the rationale for missile defense since 9/11. In which
case, what would it take to move European threat perceptions closer to
those of the United States? In short, either the continued growth of right
wing political coalitions in Europe that are sympathetic to the Republican
agenda, or a greater willingness on the part of the United States to share
some of the lucrative missile defense R&D contracts with European
companies. Both scenarios would be in keeping with the highly politicized
nature of ballistic missile threat assessments.
In
particular, the pork-barrel politics of a resurgent European missile
defense industry should not be underestimated. The European missile
industry is now able to compete globally in a market niche in the past the
preserve of the larger U.S. firms, such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.
At present, European companies have had little success in winning more
than minor U.S. NMD contracts. However, they are keen for a slice of a
very large pie. For example, Matra BAe Dynamics Chairman, Mike Rouse, has
stated that involving the company in the U.S. NMD program “would help
Washington sell the concept to Europe, while enabling us to sell some of
our systems and capabilities into the program”.
These economic welfare arguments are already influencing some European
governments. In February 2001, German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder,
softened his public objections to U.S. missile defense plans, citing an
unwillingness to lose out economically: “[A] very important point for us
is that we are not excluded from this technology and the knowledge of the
technology”.
However,
this potential gradual slide towards increased European acceptance of
missile defense systems is likely to be stopped dead in its tracks by the
emerging U.S. concept of ‘pre-emption’, including active consideration
of first-strike attacks against terrorists and hostile states suspected of
possessing weapons of mass destruction. Having sought to reassure its
allies that the proposed missile defense system is limited and purely
protective in nature, the Bush administration will find it difficult to
square this reasoning with a strategy of ‘pre-emption’ that earmarks
missile defense as a tool of offensive power-projection. The U.S. military
will enjoy greater freedom to attack when and where it pleases since the
homeland will be secured against ballistic missile attack. Diplomacy and
multilateral arms controls are likely to take a back seat to unilateral
force of arms. Clearly this developing U.S. agenda is divergent
from the cooperative security model that European governments support.
“NATO’s Theatre Missile Defence System Reaches New Milestone”,
NATO Press Release, 5 June 2001
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