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BITS
Policy Note 00.3
ISSN 1434-3274
June 2000
Europe’s
NMD Dilemma
By
Clara Portela-Sais and Denise Groves
When
European Union leaders meet on June 19 and 20 in Portugal for the European
Council summit, they will have a full agenda. The most pressing issue facing
the EU, however, is not on the formal program. US intentions to construct a
National Missile Defense (NMD), although not directly related to the EU, is an
issue they must deal with. The challenge will be whether the EU can form a
Common Position expressing widely shared concerns over the effects such a
system would have on the future of arms control, disarmament, and
international security. Given the growing pressure on the EU to make clear its
opposition, as well as the EU’s desire to prove its credibility, it should
declare a Common Position on this subject.
The
Issue
US
plans to build an NMD is causing concern among Europeans. They are worried
about the future of the ABM Treaty, which they consider the cornerstone of
arms control. They are also worried about Russia’s reaction to deployment of
NMD. To date, they have expressed their dissatisfaction, but have been careful
to avoid seeming too energetic in their opposition because they recognize that
the issue is primarily one between the US and Russia. Still, NMD will have
consequences for European security because of the effects it may have on
Russia and on international security. Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s surprising proposal to develop a joint NATO-Russia defense system
pulled the Europeans directly into the debate. His proposal and recent travels
through Europe were well-timed: it is likely that the issue of NMD will creep
into conversations at the upcoming EU Summit. Putin may be trying to exploit
European objections over the plans for an NMD, perhaps in the hopes that they
might form a Common Position on the matter, a position he believes would be in
his favor.
The
Stakes
It
is clear that the EU has real stakes in the question of NMD. First, and most
important, Europeans believe there is a reasonable risk that deployment of NMD
will spark a renewed nuclear arms race and destabilize international security.
Russia has already made it clear that it will only consider further reductions
of its nuclear forces if the ABM Treaty is preserved. If the US decides to
abrogate the Treaty, Russia will then respond by withdrawing from all other
existing nuclear arms control agreements, such as the START treaties. In
addition, Russia has also threatened conventional arms control agreements such
as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Attention should also be drawn
to the fact that NMD would render China's nuclear arsenal irrelevant, possibly
forcing that country to upgrade its nuclear program. This nuclear competition
could spread to India and Pakistan, and may persuade other non-nuclear
countries in the region to follow suit.
Second,
given the close economic, political, and geographic links with Russia, Europe
has strong interests in preserving stability and security there. Construction
of the NMD system could undermine Russia's faith in its strategic deterrent
and subsequently compel Russia to divert resources from its economic
development programs towards its nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, as
evidenced by the Common Strategy on Russia, the Europeans have been talking
for years about the need for constructive engagement with Russia; ironically
it seems Russia has taken the initiative and is engaging Europe. Now seems to
be a suitable occasion for the EU to improve its relationship with Russia.
Third,
an American NMD could actually increase the vulnerability of Europe. The
location of some of the radar facilities that would be used for NMD in England
and in Greenland, a Danish territory, directly involves the EU in the
construction of the American system. This means that acquiescence to US plans
would make these countries partly responsible for the operation of the system
without actually benefiting from it. Putin made the stakes more clear, warning
that if those governments allow the early warning radars located on their
territory to be upgraded and linked into the NMD system, they would be
injecting themselves into a process that will destabilize international
security.[i]
In addition, members of the local parliament in Greenland have noted that the
radars there and in Britain could be attacked in an attempt to defeat the
defense system.[ii] Therefore, NMD presents a
clear threat to the integrity of Europe and its security.
The
Obstacles
Is
it likely that the EU will actually take this chance to develop a Common
Position?
The
Leverage
The
time seem ripe for the EU to articulate a Common Position on this question.
Individual members of the EU have already expressed dissatisfaction with the
plans for an American missile defense in various venues. For example, during
President Clinton's recent visit to Germany, Schröder expressed the wish that
the President take into consideration the concerns of the European allies
before he makes a decision on deployment. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
also suggested that the Europeans should adopt a joint position on this
controversial subject, but recognized that “interests are not homogeneous
within Europe, so we will need time for discussion.”[iv]
Europeans can find the common ground with regard to the ABM Treaty. For
example, statements issued at the UN conference to review the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty in April and May demonstrate French and British
reservations. At the conference, the
UK stated that the US position on NMD and amendment of the ABM Treaty
“should be addressed bilaterally with the Russians...[W]e hope that they can
reach an agreement. We have made clear to both sides that we continue to value
the ABM [Treaty], and wish to see it preserved.”[v]
For its part, France declared that it was “anxious to avoid any challenges
to the treaty liable to bring about a breakdown of strategic equilibrium and
to restart the arms race.”[vi]
Putin's
surprising proposal to develop a joint defense system also served to place the
onus on the Europeans to directly respond to missile defense questions. In
other words, rather than merely echoing the opinion of US officials who assert
that the proposed system will not be able to protect the whole of Europe, EU
and NATO member states should grasp the opportunity to directly respond to the
offer and make clear their own positions on the effect NMD can have on arms
control and international security. Besides, the integration of security and
defense policies under the auspices of the CFSP will call for members to
harmonize their views on crucial issues. By taking a decisive position, the EU
can add credibility to its claims that it is striving for greater autonomy and
responsibility in its external relations.
The
Choice
The
EU has already officially stated its intentions to work with Russia and to
deal with matters related to arms control and disarmament as well as
international security. The Treaty on the European Union empowers the European
Council to adopt Common Positions that "safeguard the common values,
fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union...to preserve
peace and strengthen international security...[and] promote international
cooperation..."[vii]
Common Positions "shall define the approach of the Union to a particular
matter of a geographical or thematic nature.”[viii]
In addition, in June 1999, the EU agreed to a Common Strategy on Russia—its
first Common Strategy—which stated that the EU would seek to cooperate with
Russia to "identify common responses to the security challenges in Europe
and beyond...by promoting arms control and disarmament and the implementation
of existing agreements.”[ix]
If
the EU decides to fulfill this express mandate, there are several options
available to it. On one extreme, the EU could adopt a Common Position that
declares its unconditional opposition to the deployment of NMD on the basis of
the disruptive impact it would have on arms control and international
security. Alternatively, the EU could call for the preservation of the ABM
Treaty and suggest that the US delay its decision on deployment to allow
enough time for negotiations with Russia to proceed. This might include
consideration of working cooperatively with Russia on missile defense
development and on non-proliferation initiatives. Or the EU could simply
repeat the vague language already used to express a desire to see
international security preserved, for arms control treaties to be respected,
and for the concerns of the allies to be weighed in preparation for the
decision on deployment. This third choice is as good as not adopting a Common
Position at all.
On
the other hand, the framing of a more strongly worded Common Position such as
the first or the second option can show that the EU is capable of acting
effectively and in unison on security issues. In an even more concrete way, a
Common Position would be a useful and unambiguous tool with which to influence
the US or the timing of the decision for deployment. Specifically, the express
opposition of Britain and Denmark to the NMD system would improve the EU’s
leverage over the US considerably.
However,
the EU should not be content to adopt a feeble declaration. There is clearly a
need for the EU to shift away from the usual practice of timid objections. It
should respond persuasively and demonstrate its resolve. By doing so, the EU
can prove the credibility of its CFSP and advance its security interests. The
European Union should therefore agree to a decisively worded Common Position
that makes its opposition to National Missile Defense clear.
[i]
The comments were made during an interview with Welt
am Sonntag, which appeared on 11 June 2000
[ii]
See the statement made by Member of Parliament Lund Olsen, cited in
Theresa Hitchens and Stuart Samuels, ‘NATO takes first look at US
Missile Defence’, Basic Paper No. 32, April 2000.
[iii]
Testimony of Robin Cook before the House of Commons Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 7 June 2000.
[iv]
From a joint press conference with Secretary of State Albright, 8 May
2000. The text is available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/
[v]
See the comments by Peter Hain, Foreign Commonwealth Officer Minister of
State, Representative of the United Kingdom at the NPT Review Conference,
11 May 2000.
[vi]
See the comments by Hubert De La Fortelle, Representative of France at the
NPT Review Conference, 11 May 2000
[vii]
Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 11.
[ix]
Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 June 1999.
[x]
Jane Perlez, “US Missile Plan Could Hurt Security Ties, European
Says.” The New York Times, 2 May 2000.
This
Policy Note was written by Clara Portela-Sais and Denise Groves. They are
researchers at the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security.
BITS
acknowledges the generous support received from the Ford Foundation for
its work on NATO-Russia-EU relations.
Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)
Rykestr. 13, D-10405 Berlin, Germany,
Tel: +49 30 446858 -0, Fax: +49 30 4410-221
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