CONFERENCE
Missile Defence - Threats, Responses and
Projections
University of Bradford - Thursday 18 March
2004
Co-hosted by British American Security Information Council
(BASIC)
and Bradford Department of Peace Studies
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Conference
The Context of Missile Defence
Summary of keynote address by Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford
University
Defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles dates back
to the 1960s when the United States and the Soviet Union developed
nuclear-armed interceptors. The US Safeguard system was abandoned
soon after deployment at great expense, and the Soviet Galosh system
has long been considered a wholly inadequate defence for Moscow.
Further development of missile defence was controlled by the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, partly on the grounds that
a competitive advantage to one side might destabilise the East-West
balance of nuclear power.
In the 1980s, technological advances and the renewed Cold War resulted
in US attempts to develop Strategic Mission Defence ("Star Wars"),
as well as a more limited Soviet response, but progress was subsequently
limited by the end of the Cold War, technical problems and costs.
Subsequently, though, the problems created for the United States
by the Iraqi use of Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War resulted
in a new emphasis on missile defence and this, coupled with further
technical developments, gave missile defence a new lease of life.
After the 2000 Presidential Election, the Bush administration moved
rapidly to develop theatre and strategic missile defence systems,
abrogating the ABM treaty in the process. The stated purpose was
a response to ballistic missile proliferation, but many analysts
argued that the real concern was with preventing any limitation
on US pre-emptive action against perceived threats.
Moreover, the drive to missile defence now forms part of a wider
neo-conservative desire to ensure the evolution of the "New American
Century" in which world civilisation based on a US-style free-market
global system ensures peace and stability as well as a dominant
position for the United States. That this is for the good of the
world is, to an extent, an article of faith, with missile defence
helping to ensure untrammelled military superiority in the pursuit
of a world developed in the American image.
This ideological context means that it is highly unlikely that
there will be any substantial rolling back of the commitment to
missile defence unless technological problems prove insurmountable.
Moreover, the sheer momentum now developing means that US missile
defence programmes are likely to survive a change in the Presidency,
although the pace and forms of development may change.
There are several problems with missile defence. One is that the
idea of a missile defence screen that improves the chances of pre-emptive
action may mean that potential opponents will move towards asymmetric
responses, especially the use of paramilitary campaigns and political
violence.
A second is that potential opponent states with offensive nuclear
forces, especially Russia and China, may be unable to develop effective
missile defence and will therefore seek to expand their offensive
nuclear forces in order to "swamp" any US missile defence system.
A third factor, for the long term, is that research and development
of missile defence systems may give rise to new forms of offensive
technologies such as directed energy weapons that might themselves
set of new arms races.
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