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BASIC-DEMOS

Missile Defence Conference

BASIC and Demos hosted a Missile Defence Conference in London on 9 November 2004.

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What is Russia's piece in Europe's missile defence puzzle?

Nicole C. Evans, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

• Russia possesses some of the world's most advanced missile defence technologies, but has also expressed the most consternation about America's global missile defence (GMD) programme.
  
  
• This can be explained by Russia's maintenance of the distinction between theatre missile defence (TMD) and global missile defence (GMD). TMD is not seen as threatening strategic stability or Russia's nuclear deterrent since it only protects against missile attacks in a theatre of operations. In contrast, GMD is intended to provide a shield to all of America and its allies, and in doing so threatens Russia's ability to retaliate to an attack.
  
  
• With this in mind, we can examine Russia's continuing concern about GMD as well as Russia's steadfast movement towards TMD cooperation with Europe.
  
  
• First I will discuss Russian reactions to GMD - mainly developing asymmetrical capabilities and modernising its own TMD. I will then go on to analyse Russian-European TMD cooperation, focussing on the actual state of cooperation, factors encouraging cooperation and factors challenging cooperation. I will close with an assessment of potential pan-European TMD.

1. RUSSIAN REACTION TO GMD

A. BUILDING UP ASYMMETRICAL CAPABILITIES

• Russia's primary reaction to America's GMD programme has been to build-up and modernise its asymmetrical, strategic offensive capabilities. Russia seems to have given up its pre-2002 (demise of the ABM Treaty) strategy of building a global diplomatic and political consensus against GMD.
  
  
• In February 2004, President Putin announced that "as other countries increase the number and quality of their arms and military potential, then Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation arms and technology." He then announced the successful testing "new hypersound-speed, high-precision new weapons systems that can hit targets at intercontinental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they travel." This Crazy Ivan missile, as I've nicknamed it after the Russian submarine manoeuvre, is merely the tip of the Russian strategic offensive iceberg.
  
  
• Buttressing all legs of the Russian strategic nuclear triad is a clear and explicit priority. In June 2004, a Russian nuclear submarine concluded a successful training launch of a ballistic missile (RSM-54) from the Barents Sea. In August 2004, Russia successfully tested SS-19 missiles to determine whether its service life can be extended. This was the fifth out of ten launches in 2004 by the Strategic Missile Forces. In September 2004, the Russian Navy successfully tested 'Bulava' sea-launched ballistic missiles (with MIRV potential) intended for the new Project 955 Borei-class submarines. Testing for the mobile Topol-M ICBM will be completed by December 2004 and it could be included in the state defence order for 2005. In August, Putin announced that Russia would boost its military procurement budget by 40% for 2005. These developments - by focussing on developing MIRVs, mobile missiles, and shortening the boost-phase - are clearly intended as counter-measures to GMD.
  
  
• Russia does not see its actions as offensive or as 'leaning forward.' Rather, they are conceived of as strictly reactive and defensive. As Putin sardonically said in February 2004: "At that time [when the US withdrew from ABM Treaty] they assured us that this decision was not in any way directed against the Russian Federation, and we took note of that...I can say today that our work to modernise our arms and the new weapons systems we have developed are not in any way directed at the United States." Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov has also repeatedly noted that Russia closely follows what the US is doing in the sphere of strategic nuclear forces and argued that each new weapon development modified global stability by posing a potential threat to deterrence. In turn, this necessarily interacts with Russian defence planning, forcing Russia to respond by increasing its own nuclear capabilities. It is this interaction that has caused multiple Russian officials to note that Russian strategic nuclear and space developments have thus far stopped America's missile defence from threatening Russian security.
  
  
• This does not, however, mean that Russia is not concerned about the potential threat that GMD poses.
  
  
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement on the American-Danish agreement to update the Thule, Greenland radar, arguing that the geography of the radar station indicated that despite American assurances US GMD is indeed directed against Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defence also expressed concern about the agreement, in addition to apparent American plans to deploy missile defence equipment in Eastern Europe. In August, Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev expressed similar concerns about the threat these deployments posed to Russia's nuclear deterrent. In response to reports that American interceptors would be deployed at Flyingdales, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that "should the US and Britain make such a joint decision, it would have been an alarming step towards the escalation of NMD deployment." These developments are examples of bilateral agreements between the US and individual European countries that aggravate Russia and threaten the Russian-European relationship - and indeed multilateral TMD cooperation - as a whole.
  
  
• This build-up and modernisation is seen by Russia as defensive because it seeks to maintain nuclear deterrence and to let the US know that it will maintain the capability to defeat any GMD system that the Americans field. As Sergei Ivanov made very clear during his visit to the IISS in July: "Russia regards nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as the basis for global stability." This statement is a reflection of the October 2003 Russian defence 'White Paper' which emphasised Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons. In an age when Russian conventional capabilities have atrophied, Russia is increasingly dependent upon its nuclear might both to guarantee its security and to shore up its international standing.
  
  
• Russia maintains that GMD is an inappropriate way to deal with the threat of accidental launches and terrorists acquiring missile technologies. Russia seeks to control the proliferation threat through arms control and shoring up deterrence, rather than GMD which it sees as both destabilising deterrence and as heightening the proliferation threat.
  
  
• Russia has no apparent plans to build a more widespread missile defence system of its own. The clearest indication was Putin' statement in February that it was too early to take practical decisions and invest large sums in missile defence, although he did not rule out such work at some point in the future.

B. MODERNIZING ITS OWN TMD

• A secondary reaction to GMD has been to refocus resources and attention on Russia's own theatre missile defence systems. These systems are very advanced and in addition to providing Russia with prestige, are also seen as a lucrative source of income for Russia's struggling military-industrial complex. These systems could compete on the international market with America's Patriot systems. If countries chose Russia's S-series systems over the Patriot, Russia can block America's plans to link up theatre missile systems from around the globe into its GMD system by stymieing interoperability requirements. As well, such clients could become Russian allies in its battle against American unilateralism.
  
  
• In September it was announced that the S-400 Triumph missile defence system underwent its first comprehensive tests. It has been in development for a decade and been offered to a range of clients. The S-400 has been touted as superior to the American PAC-3 and is said to be able to detect and destroy enemy missiles at a range of up to 400km and of tracking targets without emitting signals for enemy aircraft. Putin is said to want the S-400 operational by 2005.
  
  
• In July, Lt Gen Vladimir Popovkin, head of the Federal Space Forces, reported to a meeting at the Kremlin with Putin and representatives of the power agencies that Moscow is working actively to improve its missile defence systems and will test a new generation of early-warning radars next year. The new radars, which are expected to be deployed in the next 2-3 years, are modular in design, making it possible to redeploy them quickly and reducing their maintenance costs.

2. RUSSIAN-EUROPEAN TMD COOPERATION

A. ACTUAL STATE OF COOPERATION

• Actual Russian-European missile defence cooperation is occurring primarily within the existing security structure of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which has an active Missile Defence Working Group. It is multilateral, rather than bilateral, cooperation.
  
  
• At the November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO member states agreed to initiate a missile defence feasibility study to examine options for a layered BMD. Russia is not involved in this study.
  
  
• The most concrete evidence of European-Russian cooperation is the groundbreaking exercises held in Colorado in March 2004 to ensure that Russia and NATO could quickly and effective work together to counter a missile threat against troops deployed on a joint mission. Russia sees the exercises as providing a good legal foundation for future cooperation.
  
  
• Russian TMD policy is driven by three aims: to be a key player in the development of regional security structures; to ensure that regional structures are not directed against Russia; and to foster a multipolar international system, curbing perceived American unilateralism.

B. FACTORS TOWARDS COOPERATION

i) Russo-European relations

• There is an overall trend towards increased cooperation on previously difficult issues which could potentially bode well for Russian-European TMD cooperation.
  
  
• The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has worked out in greater detail Russia-NATO communications and consultations in crisis situations and the procedure for forming joint military forces in conflict zones. At the end of September 2004 exercises for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations were held, and in October interoperability courses were held. Russia has adopted NATO codification for its military hardware and can now supply spare parts for equipment. These are previously very sticky and difficult issues, and their resolution bodes well for developments in missile defence cooperation. Russia is involved in 34 NATO events in 2004. There is also a NATO-Russia roadmap towards interoperability of TMD systems.
  
  
• According to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking in February 2004: "I should definitely say we clearly see a turn-around towards more practical work. Substantial positives have been achieved in the field of TMD. There has been worked out and adopted a mandate and a work program to guide an ad hoc group all the way till the year 2005, there has been defined concrete avenues for cooperation, say, TMD concept de-bugging, preparations for exercises and conduct thereof, TMD systems and related capabilities interoperability." Putin also maintains that the common task is to transform the NRC into an effective instrument of the new architecture of European security and stability.
  
  
• At October 2004 NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), created theatre missile defence program office. This institutionalisation speaks to the increased long-term importance of TMD for NATO. As of yet, it is unclear whether Russia will play a role in the new office.
  
  
• Working within existing NATO structures offers Russia both the opportunity to become more firmly embedded in NATO's decision-making structures on missile defence, and thus carries the hope of somehow tempering America's grander GMD plans.

C. FACTORS AGAINST COOPERATION

i) Russo-European Relations

• The Russo-European relationship is still a perilous and aggravated one at times.
  
  
• The issues of Chechnya, Moldova and Georgia are very divisive. Russia sees the European attitude towards Chechnya as pandering to terrorists and extremists. This is but one indication of the very different threat perceptions that Russia and Europe hold.
  
  
• There are still difficulties in the NATO-Russia relationship. Putin did not attend the June 2004 Istanbul NATO Summit after ultimate NATO refusal to place three Baltic states under CFE restrictions and enhanced role for NRC as a means of gaining entry into NATO decision-making process.

ii) Russia's approach to cooperation

• Russia's approach towards missile defence cooperation remains different from Europe's understanding of what missile defence cooperation would mean.
  
  
• President Putin has repeatedly emphasised that Russia will maintain strategic stability through its own means and not by relying on new arms and security systems developed in other countries. Russian officials also focus on the technical-military developments that Russia has made that others have not. This emphasis offers insights into Russia's approach to cooperation. It is not 'true' cooperation in the way that the US and Europe are cooperating on missile defence, whereby both partners accept a degree of vulnerability and dependence. Rather, it is Russia selling its technology and equipment to other partners. These conflicting attitudes towards cooperation are hampering progress.
  
  
• Russia first wants to agree on principles for their cooperation. The principle foremost at the front of Russia's mind is 'equal cooperation.' Russia does not want to be a junior partner. Another condition is that missile defence cooperation must fall under total governmental control. According to Minister of Defence Ivanov: "This is a very sensitive area, and government control should be ensured 100%." There exist very real Russian concerns about the proliferation of such technology, and the prospect of proliferation affecting both Russia's security and Russia's ability to use such technology to earn money for Russia's treasury as one of the few areas where Russia has a competitive edge.
  
  
• Previous attempts at missile defence-type cooperation, notably the RAMOS (Russian-American Military Observation Satellite) program with the US, have not panned out and apparently the American Missile Defense Agency has decided to cancel the project. Former head of MDA General Kadish has suggested that missile defence cooperation should focus on smaller projects. Rumours of American interest in using Russian missiles as targets in training and missile characterisation exercises. As of yet, no Russian response but the symbolism of such cooperation would probably not sit easy in the Kremlin.

iii) Basing of American missile defence components in Eastern Europe also threatens Russo-European TMD cooperation

• US State Department officials have said that US is talking to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland about the possibility of basing missile defence interceptors on their territory but that so far nothing has been officially decided: "We are just measuring the interest of NATO allies that would be willing to host a third site."
  
  
• Polish officials say that the talks have been in progress for 8 months, and, according to Warsaw's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Boguslaw Majewski, "We're very interested in becoming a concrete part of the arrangement." US officials have apparently been investigating potential radar and interceptor sites in its southern mountainous region. Former Polish Defense Minister Yanush Onyshkevich said "A site for the missile interceptors is a very attractive idea. It will not be difficult to persuade Poland to agree with it."
  
  
• The Czech parliament, after learning from the media about the talks, is planning on holding special inquiries into the possibility of a radar site 100 sq km. This early-warning radar would be a sovereign US base on Czech territory. The US is also rumoured to be in talks with Romania and Bulgaria.
  
  
• Russia is extremely concerned about such possibilities and has raised the issue at numerous high-level Russian-American meetings. · It is not difficult to surmise that such moves increase Russia's fears about the long-term robustness of its nuclear deterrent and question the wisdom of linking its theatre missile defence efforts to Europe's, when Europe's missile defence is increasingly tied to America's. This threatens Russia's strategy of using Europe to develop European TMD to offset America's GMD.

3. CONCLUSION - ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL PAN-EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENCE

• The potential for the development of a pan-European TMD can be seen, but it is still a dim light in the far distance. There remains an obvious lack of consensus on certain basic issues, most notably the American GMD system. Until there is a shared understanding of GMD, it is unlikely that any significant Russo-European TMD will go forward.
  
  
• A Russo-European TMD could have significant and positive technical-military ramifications for both sides. It could provide much-needed financial injection into Russia's military industries, and could offer Europe many short-cuts through the development of other missile defence technologies.
  
  
• The political ramifications of such a system are more difficult to gauge, as any cooperation is likely to remain within the NATO-Russia Council framework. Perhaps most importantly for Russia, this is seen as a way for Russia to inch itself even further into the NATO decision-making process. Trust has been building within the NRC since 2002, through various exercises and measures. For this reason, the NRC will remain the vehicle for Russian-European missile defence cooperation. But where that vehicle goes is a more open question.