


***Britain and BMD:
Fylingdales, Fence-Sitting,
and Force Protection***


Mark Smith
Division of Politics & International Relations
University of Southampton

E-mail: mjs10@soton.ac.uk




Britain and BMD

- ✪ Shameless plug: this presentation draws on an article written for a forthcoming collection titled *Democracies and Missile Defence*, to be published in the journal *Contemporary Security Policy* next year. If you would like a copy of the article, e-mail me at mjs10@soton.ac.uk




My Objective

- To highlight some of the decisive influences on British BMD policy
 - Which factors and relationships actually make policy?
 - What does a British government have to take into account when deciding what, if anything, might be useful about missile defences?




A Unique Combination of Influences

- An Anglo-American issue: through Fylingdales, Britain make a political commitment on BMD that other states do not.
- A small 'a' alliance issue: 'coalitions of the willing'. Most likely source of missile threats
- A capital 'A' Alliance issue: NATO slowly moving towards missile defence decisions
- A defence industry issue: Britain has one of the largest in the world and is well-placed to collaborate with US programme. If the so-called military-industrial complex has influence in UK, we should see it here.



The Anglo-American Connection: Fylingdales

- ⊕ Unlike its European allies, Britain has already made a political commitment on BMD
- ⊕ Fylingdales: a small decision with big implications
- ⊕ Early Day Motions in Parliament
- ⊕ Pre-ABMT abrogation policy was pragmatic and sensible, but sounded tangled and evasive...




Fylingdales

● ...for example:


- “What view we took on that decision [i.e. Fylingdales] would of course depend on the circumstances surrounding that decision, for instance the relationship to the ABM Treaty on which the United States is in discussion with Russia. Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question”.

Robin Cook
Foreign Secretary



The Small 'a' alliance Connection

- Coalitions of the willing and British strategy
- The likely source of missile threats to UK forces and the UK itself
- TMD: the TRRAP study
 - “surface-based interceptors employing hit-to-kill are a feasible mechanism to counter TBM systems and payloads”.
 - Deterrence regarded as less effective against theatre-range WMD missile threats




The Small 'a' alliance Connection

- ⊕ “Deterrence policies may not prove effective against small scale use of CW or BW, especially attacks on deployed troops or “untraceable” terrorist attacks...We should be aware that some states may not respond to deterrence as we might expect”

Strategic Defence Review, 1997

- ⊕ Despite this, deterrence still appears to be regarded as the most reliable option.
- ⊕ Sub-strategic Trident?




The Capital 'A' Alliance Connection: *NATO*

● TMD

- Feasibility study established in 2000
- TMD deployments to support a Crisis Response Operation (CRO) involving NATO and Russian forces.
- 2003: "We noted an agreement on the first phase of a detailed interoperability study addressing technical requirements and possibilities for co-operation in joint, combined operations"
- March 2004: NATO-Russian Command Post Exercise


● Territorial BMD

- Study commissioned November 2002.
- Establish the technological basis for political decision.



The Defence Industry

- BAE Systems:
 - \$17bn defence revenue (77% of its total)
 - Europe's largest defence company, and the largest non-US defence company in the world
- Links with the US: acquired 3 large US defence companies, including Lockheed Martin's Control Systems and DigitalNet. Put into place the stringent export control safeguards required by US govt. By 2002 did more business with the Pentagon than it did with MoD
- MDC: established a management structure for cooperation on missile defence
- Summer 2002: BAE joins Boeing to work as sub-contractor on BMD programme (it was already working on THAAD).
- But, but, but...it was made fairly clear that substantial involvement in the R&D programme would be contingent on European govts making a firm commitment of their own on missile defence. This has not been forthcoming. (So accusations about the military-industrial complex being influential appear to be unfounded)



Summary

- ⊕ 3 key changes in the international context: end of ABMT, evolving NATO debate, opportunities for industry.
- ⊕ But limited shift in British position.
- ⊕ Conformed to type on Fylingdales; willing to speculate on British homeland defence.
- ⊕ Policy tends to be incremental and pragmatic
- ⊕ Much of British thinking on its own BMD appears to be highly inertial. Fence sitting is rather the norm