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BASIC and Demos hosted a Missile Defence Conference in London on 9 November 2004.

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Missile Defence: Political Fantasy or Military Reality?

The Lord Garden KCB

The Political Problem

The debate within Europe over US proposals to deploy defensive systems to counter ballistic missiles became less heated in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, In supporting its stricken ally, European governments seemed less willing to criticise such measures, even if they seemed unnecessary or unwise. Those who had argued that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was the cornerstone of arms control and strategic stability have had to accept that the unilateral withdrawal by the US was accommodated by President Putin of Russia with remarkably little difficulty.

However, the pendulum swings; and the deep divisions over Iraq, concerns about the new US National Security Strategy with its emphasis on pre-emption, and the re-election of President Bush last week are all combining to put US Missile Defence plans back on the political agenda. Despite the changing strategic backdrop, there still remains a responsibility for national governments to look carefully at US proposals for missile defence. They need to assess what implications the programme has for their own national and regional security. Radical changes in military capabilities and deployments or arms control arrangements need to be examined in the light of national and wider European interests. Increasing worries about proliferation both of nuclear weapon and long range missiles are problems for Europe as much as for the USA, and the EU leaders signed up to their own strategy document in December 2003 identifying this as a major challenge. Europe will have to look at how best to meet these challenges. For today, we will inevitably focus on one aspect of any strategy, that is missile defence. Might it be useful, practical, affordable, and sensible? Would we be safer with it, or less secure?

It is particularly difficult to conduct such an examination, however, when the exact nature of any future missile defence system is still uncertain. The effect, both on friendly nations and on possible enemies, is also to an extent speculative, particularly at a time of such upheaval in international security relationships.

The costs and technical feasibility of such systems are still highly debatable. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine a range of possible outcomes, and assess whether they might either reduce or increase the risks to UK and European security. Where alternative approaches are available, European governments should encourage the US to adopt those schemes that offer the greatest benefit to security overall. Similarly, they have a responsibility actively to oppose any schemes that they assess put national or regional security at risk. Once the possible outcomes have been assessed by governments, there will be a further political choice to be made. The relationship between Europe and the United States has itself an important security dimension. It may therefore be necessary to make a judgement about the possible effect of any national policies on the future transatlantic relationship, which is under so many strains at the moment.

Forty years of trying

As we know, missile defence is not a new phenomenon. The US has been interested in protecting itself from the threat of ballistic missile attack for over 40 years. The short warning times, great distances and high speed of flight of long-range ballistic missiles have made such a defence difficult to design. In the 1960s, the approach was to use very fast interceptors, which would themselves carry a nuclear warhead. For a brief period (April 1975 to February 1976) the US deployed a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system called Safeguard. The system was made up of a perimeter acquisition radar, a missile site radar, a long-range missile (Spartan) and a high acceleration short range missile (Sprint). This was a basic layered defence with nuclear tipped interceptors. The short-range missiles were designed to catch any incoming weapons that had penetrated the high altitude interception layer. The use of nuclear-armed interceptors carried many obvious disadvantages for the defender. The only realistic strategic rationale was as a defensive screen for retaliatory forces; justified in terms of preserving second-strike capability and thus reinforcing deterrence. It had little utility as a pure defence of US territory. From a Western European perspective, the improved survivability of second-strike retaliatory forces was a useful reinforcement of the West's deterrence posture.

The desire to protect US territory with a BMD system was next expressed by President Reagan in March 1983. It was at this time that I first came to examine the claims being made. The political attractions of Reagan's question were obvious - and have echoes today:

"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our own soil or that of our allies?"

This led to a large research and development programme under the auspices of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - more popularly referred to as "Star Wars". European leaders were sceptical of the feasibility of the project, although some, including the UK, were keen to share in any defence industrial benefits that might flow. Costs, technical problems and the ending of the Cold War meant that Congressional support declined over time. In January 1991, President Bush revived elements of the SDI programme with proposals for a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system. European interest in this was minimal. GPALS was abandoned by Bush Senior's successor, President Clinton, who initially changed the focus to Theatre Missile Defences (TMD).

In the second term of the Clinton presidency, a renewed focus on the possibility of a National Missile Defence (NMD) emerged. The threat to be countered was the possibility of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) ballistic missile attack by proliferating states such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The Clinton proposals would have required a number of international negotiations. Following the failure of a test of part of the intercept system on 7 July 2000, coupled with political resistance to the scheme from many European allies, President Clinton remitted decisions on future NMD systems to his successor.

The Bush Approach

President George W.Bush has made attainment of a missile defence capability a central part of his defence policy. The new administration was determined to explore all avenues for a technical solution. The attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001 removed what few domestic constraints on the project remained.

The new closer relationship with Russia as a result of the US leadership in a "war on terrorism" allowed the six-month notice of US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty to pass without diplomatic difficulties. International opinion has been softened further by the agreement between Bush and Putin to sign a treaty that reduces deployed strategic nuclear missiles to about one third of current levels over 10 years. Critics of this agreement point out that the detailed milestones of serious arms control treaties are missing, and that either side could legally retain its current capabilities. Nevertheless, the overall effect is a more stable and peaceful relationship between the US and Russia, and this benefits Europe.

It is not yet clear what the detailed architecture of such a system will be. Indeed it looks as though any system which might help is likely to get funded, and deployment is being authorised before full testing and development. To date, the US has tested hit-to-kill (HTK) interceptors, which achieve their aim by crashing into incoming warheads. Plans are also afoot to develop powerful lasers that would destroy ballistic missiles through use of directed energy. The technologies are still far from proven, and difficulties of interception have even re-opened debates about the feasibility of nuclear-armed interceptors. The use of sea-based systems to contribute to a layered defence arrangement remain of interest, but are unlikely to be able to replace the need for land facilities outside of US territory. There is also the possibility that interception capabilities will eventually be space-based. In January 2001, a commission led by Donald Rumsfeld warned of growing threats to U.S. space assets from so-called "rogue states." The commission cited the dangers of a Pearl Harbor-style attack in space. It recommended that the President be given the option of putting weapons in space to protect U.S. assets.

Almost certainly, any system would gain benefits from the use of the Danish and UK radars. It could be that extra tracking installations would be needed as capabilities of potential attackers were developed. In this respect Poland has been mentioned as a possible site. In any architecture of a defensive system, there will be a desire to reduce the time between warning and missile kill. This argues for forward based radars, but also for the interceptor missiles to be fast and, if possible, located where they have the maximum engagement time. This may result in proposals for forward deployments of interception missiles in Europe itself and also around States of Concern.

Given the importance of forward early warning radars and communication nodes to any defensive system, they will have to be protected from pre-emptive attack from land, sea or air. Any attacker trying to penetrate a missile defence system would target the control system, and the forward radars are likely to be the most vulnerable points. Defending these facilities will require fast reacting point defences using high speed missiles, a significant ground troop presence and a policed exclusion zone around the base.

Timescales remain very uncertain. Costs are even more uncertain. Nevertheless, work is well underway on an untested limited system. So far 6 ground-based interceptors have been installed in Alaska, and this is expected to increase by 20 over the next few years. The California site is also under construction and will have perhaps 4 missiles on line by the end of this year. The Department of Defence is quite open about the fact that these are being deployed before normal evaluation and testing.

Assumptions

Give all this uncertainty is difficult to make any realistic assumption about the timescale and cost of any BMD system that might be deployed. The history of the past 40 years should act as a strong warning about the difficulties inherent in any missile defences. Some progress has been made in providing the defence of point targets (such as ships) from missile threats. However, the problem is much simpler when the target is known in advance, and the defences can therefore be optimised. There is a high degree of scepticism within some elements of the European defence scientific establishment, however, about the technical feasibility of wide area missile defence.

For the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that any deployed US missile defence system will have some capability to intercept incoming missiles and warheads, but that we cannot yet know whether the theoretical leakage rate will be large or small. Any analysis of the potential implications of missile defences needs to take into account the possibility that the system's effectiveness against small numbers of incoming missiles may vary between being relatively porous to being highly effective. One should also be wary of assuming that theoretical laboratory values of effectiveness will be representative of what might be achieved under operational conditions.

Global Security Effects

In looking at the effects of the development and deployment of large-scale missile defences on European security, the effects on other major international players must be considered. There has been a strong perception in China that the US wishes to dominate the world militarily. The new US Administration's focus on missile defences - scaled against China's relatively small strategic deterrent force - is viewed by the Chinese as a confirmatory sign of this analysis. The lack of ratification by the US of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another. The deployment of US forces into Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan has done little to reassure the Chinese. As missile defences begin to be deployed, it is likely that those in China who advocate an increase in strategic nuclear capability will be in a stronger position to argue their case for a larger arsenal. They could however afford to delay this decision until the scale and effectiveness of a future US missile defence system becomes clearer.

India and Pakistan have been nuclear-armed states for two decades or more. Even if they settle their current difficulties over Kashmir, there will continue to be a complex interaction between China, India and Pakistan in mutual perceptions of any changes in nuclear posture. Thus, an increase in nuclear capability by China may spark an increase in India. Pakistan, in turn, would feel obliged to react to any increase by India.

The one undeclared nuclear weapon state, Israel, may also have a part to play in any future missile defence scenario. Its defence researchers have been working on point missile defences for many years. Israel kept out of the 1991 Gulf War when US Patriot missile defences were deployed to defend it. It is highly likely that Israel will expect to benefit from any future US missile defence deployments.

Although the potential difficulties with Russia have been largely defused and President Putin has welcomed the re-election President Bush, there will be a number of issues that will worry Russian military planners. They would not welcome a growing strategic nuclear capability in China. They will wish to ensure that their strategic nuclear deterrent retains its credibility whatever type or scale of missile defences the US eventually deploys. They will expect to share in missile defence technology. Some of these expectations may not be realised. They have also indicated worries about defence installations in Europe.

The effects of all these influences on potential WMD proliferators and the States of Concern are more difficult to quantify. Iran almost certainly wishes to keep open the option of a nuclear capability. It sees itself as potentially threatened by neighbours with WMD capabilities, and it believes that it needs to be able to deter a number of potential enemies. The development of a US missile defence capability is unlikely to make a great deal of difference to the strategic analysis in Tehran, as its perceived threats are much closer to hand. It is still many years away from posing a potential strategic threat.

North Korea is a different case, and it has probably acquired nuclear weapon capability already. A failing and desperate North Korean leadership represents a real potential threat to its neighbours. However, the problem needs to be solved now, and a potential missile defence system is unlikely to have a major effect on the dynamics of the situation there within the next decade.

One other aspect of the US approach to missile defences is the possible development of space-based weapon systems. Any defensive system is likely to have a considerable reliance on satellites for surveillance and communication. Unprotected satellites might be vulnerable to countermeasures by attackers. There is also the possibility that in the longer term, some missile defence proponents might wish to deploy a space based interception system. Placing weapons in orbit either for defence or offence would be a further unhelpful step in relation to global arms control. It would accelerate developments in anti-satellite weapon systems, which could reduce security.

In summary, the potential deployment of a missile defence system, whether it works or not, may have a negative security effect on China, the Indian sub-continent and in the longer term even on Russia. The interaction between the nuclear players could reduce the incentives for arms control, and push each towards increasing its fielded nuclear capability. Plans to put weapons in space would add to this climate of international suspicion. This might not make a great deal of difference to global security in absolute terms, but could change the nature of international relations for the worse.

US Security Effects

The way that missile defence would affect US perceptions of its own security are very important when looking at implications for Europe. It is sometimes argued that a missile defence system would allow the US to be more pro-active in its role as a global policeman. The question is posed as to whether the US would have been prepared to intervene in Kuwait against a nuclear-armed Saddam, in Kosovo against a nuclear-armed Milosevic, in Afghanistan if the Taleban had possessed a strategic nuclear system, or in 2003 against an Iraq with a strategic nuclear capability. Certainly, there may be an element of this thinking in the minds of potential proliferators. The current US approach to North Korean intransigence appears to support the proposition that the US can be deterred by even a very limited nuclear capacity. However even with a missile defence capability, any US President would have to make a difficult judgement about the efficacy of his defensive system. If a President without missile defence were deterred from intervention by the possibility of a WMD attack on the US, would a President with missile defence be so confident in its effectiveness that he would proceed with intervention?

If US vital interests are at stake, intervention may be undertaken and mutual deterrence keeps any conflict at the conventional level (the first Gulf War gives an example of this as Iraq had both chemical and biological warfare capability which it was deterred from using). If there is only a limited US interest at stake and an assumption of an irrational enemy, the President would not be prepared to rely on a 95 per cent assurance of a missile defence system working. With nuclear weapons the risks are always too high, which is why deterrence has been so effective at restraining aggressive nuclear-armed inter-state behaviour over the years.

The National Security Strategy for the USA was published in September 2002. It has little to say about NMD. It assumes that military technology will be exploited to defeat the enemies of the US. In the introduction to this document, President Bush explains:

"The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will co-operate with other nations to deny, contain and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed."

It could be argued that after the publication of this new strategy document ballistic missile defence has moved from centre stage in US planning. It is now more about a safety net if the pre-emptive offensive action fails to deal with the emerging threats.

In any look at the effects of missile defence on US security thinking, the question of costs must also be taken into account. Although the US defence budget is large and growing post 11 September, it is not limitless. US forces are suffering from many of the shortcomings experienced by European forces. Too much of their equipment dates from Cold War scenarios, retention of personnel is difficult, and costs are rising faster than budgets. The open-ended commitment to ballistic missile defence technologies will divert resources needed for more mundane upgrading and sustainability. Iraq has shown that despite its sole Superpower status, the US has difficulty in fielding and sustaining enough troops for its operations.

Coupled with a focus on new technologies for military operations, the difficulties of working with Allies will increase over the years. It could be, therefore, that a US with some missile defence would be less able to intervene because of weaknesses in its deployable capabilities.

European Regional and National Security Effects

If European nations are to express views on US development of missile defences, they should do it from the perspective of their own regional and national interests. If such systems had no effect on stability and security outside of the US, it would be inappropriate for the Europeans to criticise such proposals. How US taxpayers decide to spend their money is their business if it does no harm to the rest of the world.

The above analysis, however, suggests that missile defence deployment may precipitate pressures for a possible increase in numbers and types of nuclear systems, a reduction of mutual trust, and a lack of confidence in arms control for the future. Prospective proliferators may increasingly decide to abandon the missile option, and focus on the less technological WMD delivery systems. Biological and chemical weapons' programmes are more difficult for the international community to control. Delivery systems using ships, aircraft, lorries, small drones, and suicide bombers are much more difficult to identify and hence counter. Non-State actors will inevitably be more attracted to these methods whatever happens to missile defences. The focus of resources on what may turn out to be the least likely attack option may increase the risk of a successful WMD attack by these alternative delivery means.

None of these negative security trends are certain; but they are possible. On the positive side of the equation, there may be the possibility that the US will be more willing to act on behalf of the international community. This is a somewhat double-edged advantage, as there is also a concern that the US may be more prepared to act in what it perceives to be its self interest, without regard for wider international views. This view is reinforced by the new National Security Strategy.

From a purely European viewpoint, it might be considered that the possible deleterious consequences of missile defence deployment would be acceptable in exchange for an assurance of being included under the umbrella of its protection. This would only be the case, however, if such an extended missile defence system were technically feasible, impermeable, affordable, and available in much the same timescale as the North American protection. It is unlikely that these criteria could be met, and if they were it would reinforce a perception of a divided world - between those protected from ballistic missile attack and those still vulnerable.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that now there are different perspectives on how to tackle the limited problem of proliferating states. The international community has had some success in reducing the number of potential nuclear weapon states over the years, and Europeans believe that the process should continue. In particular, they see the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the key vehicle for progress in this field, and other arms control measures as important. It is very much in Europe's interests to continue the process of nuclear arms reductions in Russia, and this may still be affected if Russia feels its interests are not being given appropriate weight. However, even the apparently satisfactory recent arrangements with Russia may leave China suspicious, isolated and unhelpful on other arms control processes.

There may also be consequences for the two nuclear-armed European nations, UK and France, of US missile defence deployment. This is not much voiced in current debates, but a fully deployed global missile defence system might make it difficult to claim that either had true independence from US decision making. In the current international system, this is probably of little significance, apart from raising the question of why they would continue to spend scarce resources on nuclear systems.

Two European nations, UK and Denmark, as host governments to joint user systems have a particular interest. The necessary upgrades to Thule, Fylingdales and Menwith Hill were not permitted under the ABM Treaty, but once the US's withdrawal from the Treaty took effect on 13 June 2002 they became possible. The upgraded X-band radar sites would become the forward eyes of a defence system. They would therefore become the priority targets for any enemy that wished to strike the US with ballistic missiles. An attack on these sites would not necessarily be carried out by ballistic missile. The Russian Foreign ministry reaction (10 August 2004) to the upgrade of Thule was of interest:

"The United States has more than once assured us that the future missile defense system will not be targeted against Russia…However, the very geography of the radar in Greenland gives us reasons to think that even at this stage the U.S. missile defense could potentially threaten Russia' s national security."

An effective missile defence system would need its forward radars defended against all forms of surface and air threat. This may require a significant air defence (including point anti-missile defence) and ground defence of the sites. It has been suggested by some that the sites would have to be protected by an extended missile defence system. This would be more expensive and more difficult to arrange, and would inevitably have a higher leakage rate than the main missile defence system. It is likely that the US would expect those nations coming under their missile defence protective screen to contribute to the costs of such a system. We might expect that the US would wish to provide the forward defensive arrangements for its installations. This would reduce costs of the host nation, but perhaps increase the political difficulties.

If an extended European missile defence system were to be developed, there would certainly be an expectation that participating nations would offer both base facilities and financial support. The order of costs can only be guessed at. The current UK defence budget in cash terms is under considerable pressure. A modest contribution to a project of this scale might perhaps be of the order of $10bn over 5 years. This would require either an uplift in UK defence spending which has not been politically attractive in recent years, or the dropping of some other major military capability.

In summary, from a European perspective there are a number of possible negative security implications in the development of a US or alliance missile defence system, while the security benefits are not yet clear. Russia needs to be kept engaged to ensure future security in Europe. It also needs to continue with its programme of strategic arms reductions. Europe is finding it difficult to fund current defence requirements, and diversion of funds towards an extended missile defence system is not a high priority. For the UK and Denmark there are particular security concerns that would stem from being the home to the forward eyes of any such system.

Policy Implications for European Governments

In deciding how to address the missile defence proposals, the easiest route for most European governments will be to ignore the problem. However, any defensive deployment (whether it eventually works or not) may have an effect on European security. Ideally, the EU should decide on a common policy towards this important security issue. This will be difficult. The alternative to an EU policy is for each European government to adopt policies according to their own particular national circumstances. For some like Germany and Italy, this will be a focus on theatre missile defence systems.

In the background of all policy thinking is the question of future relationships with the US. There are already strains in that relationship over developments in EU defence arrangements. European nations do not wish to undermine NATO, but they do believe that they should play a more significant role in the transatlantic partnership. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have combined to make NATO less relevant as a military alliance.

The gap between American and European military technology has been widening for years. Yet in the days of the Cold War, it was possible for all NATO members to contribute to the common defence. Over the past decade, the technology gap has widened, and European nations find themselves left with the peacekeeping tasks after US led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

All of this makes policy recommendations over US development of missile defences very difficult. It is possible to argue that such moves are more likely than not to reduce security for European countries, and particularly for those hosting parts of the defensive architecture. However, it can be assumed that the US intends to continue this work regardless of views from Europe. The question then becomes whether European security will be better or worse after a confrontation with the US over its proposals. The answer to this question is almost certainly that an added contentious issue would not help NATO cohesion, which is now very fragile following Iraq. Falling out between Europe and the US over security matters is not in the interests of global or regional security.

This does not mean that the Europeans have no role to play in the development of US policy. While many may believe that the missile defence project is doomed to technical and affordability failure, as was the case in the past, there will still be a need to question the effect of each stage of deployment. The money devoted to research and development could probably be used more constructively for promoting security in other ways. However, this is not the area in which the UK Government or the EU will be able to change US policy. What will be needed will be a continuing analysis of the direct security implications of each and every advance in the US programme. In particular, deployments or upgrades, which either make European territory a necessary pre-emptive target for any attacker or deflect defence funds from more important security needs, must be questioned.

These issues will come to a head in the UK if interceptor missiles are to be based on UK soil. Proposals for European countries to contribute to costs of an extended system will need to be examined against other security needs, and are likely to be some years away. The UK and France will need also to consider whether a successful US missile defence system compromises the independence of their own nuclear forces. If this is the case, they may need to consider whether a move to fulfil their NPT commitment to nuclear disarmament would be appropriate.

From this analysis it appears that the most appropriate policy position for Europe is to continue to keep all options open for as long as possible. Early decisions are not needed, and future options should not be foreclosed.. It would be unwise to offer unrestricted facilities on UK territory until much more about technical operational capability is known. The Alaska and California deployments of unproven systems are likely to prove much more problematic than missile defence proponents argue. The UK does not need to accept any added risk to its security while there is no evidence to suggest that missile defence system deployments on its territories would provide any extra protection.

Lord Garden is a former Assistant Chief of the UK Defence Staff and Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is now Visiting Professor at the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, and is a Liberal Democrat peer.