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This assessment was made just prior to President Bush's "Axis of Evil" January 2002 State of the Union address in which he publicly advanced the argument that Iraq's WMD threatened the "peace of the world" and posed a "grave and growing danger."2 But even before the January 2002 State of the Union address, the president made a series of statements hinting that the war on terrorism would be expanded to include WMD and Iraq.3 Yet there is nothing significantly new over a 18-month period to indicate that the potential threat posed by Iraq had suddenly and dramatically changed. |
1 January Through 30 June 2002
This is the first time that aluminum tubes are cited as a concern:
"Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs."
But even though this assessment shows greater concern about a possible Iraqi nuclear program, this passage is consistent with every other assessment since January 1, 2000:
"The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon."
Worth noting is:
"Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear device until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad."
1 July Through 31 December 2002 (emphasis added)
This is the last assessment before the United States invaded Iraq. The only significant difference from the prior assessment relates to the aluminum tubes:
"All intelligence experts agreed that Iraq remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and these tubes, if modified, could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assessed this to be the intended use, but some believed that these tubes were probably intended for use as casings for tactical rockets."
The CIA's "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002 is the assessment used by the Bush administration to make its case for war. Certainly the overall tone of the document is more ominous (especially those parts that are highlighted by bold face type), but it is important to understand that it is a highly qualified assessment with many similarities to the previous CIA assessments about Iraq.
Chemical
"Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors. Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent capability."
"Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production."
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But any country with a civilian chemical industry (e.g., pesticides) could also produce chemical weapons. |
Biological
"Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so."
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But as is the case with civilian chemical industry, any country with civilian biological industry (e.g., vaccine production) could also produce biological weapons. |
Nuclear
"More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq's physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] oversight have not diminished Saddam's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons."
"Iraq's acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon."
"Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad."
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The bottom line is that intelligence about Iraq's WMD capabilities was largely consistent over a nearly three year period. So the question of being "all wrong," as David Kay asserts, is less a question of the quality of the intelligence itself and more a question of how the intelligence was interpreted to assert that Iraq was such a grave threat that the United States had no other course of action other than to go to war. |
North Korea Threat Assessment
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003" (emphasis added):
"North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agent, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. North Korea possesses a stockpile of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means."
"North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW) capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use bioltechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the first half of 2003, North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents, and may have such weapons available for use."
But the real concern about North Korea's WMD has been its nuclear weapons program. In 2001, the CIA determination was:
"We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. Spent fuel rods canned in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework contain enough plutonium for several more weapons."4
In 2002, the CIA determination was:
"We did not obtain clear evidence indicating that North Korea had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility until mid-2002."
"In 2001, North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems. North Korea's goal appears to be a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational."5
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003":
"In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon... IAEA seals and monitoring equipment were removed and disabled, and IAEA inspectors expelled from the country."
"In February 2003, North Korea restarted its 5 Mwe [megawatt] reactor which could produce spent fuel rods containing plutonium."
"In late April 2003, North Korea told US officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, and signaled its intent to reprocess the 1994 canned spent fuel for more nuclear weapons. On 9 June, North Korea openly threatened to build a nuclear deterrent force."
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In January 2004, a U.S. team visited the Yongbyon facility and a scientist says they were shown what appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but they did not see any evidence of a nuclear bomb. |
Iran Threat Assessment
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003" (emphasis added):
"Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents - and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them - which it previously manufactured."
"Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has limited ability to weaponize them."
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Iran's chemical and biological weapons programs are likely in response to Iraq's use of WMD during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. But, as with North Korea, the bigger concern has been Iran's nuclear weapons program. |
"The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program."
"Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities."
"Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel cycle activities... In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons."
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Prior to December 2002, the focus of Iran's capability to develop nuclear weapons was on the Bushehr light water reactor. But in December 2002, it was discovered that Iran was constructing two secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities at Natanz and Arak. Natanz was believed to be an uranium enrichment plant and Arak was thought to be a heavy water reactor. Iran denied any military purposes for these facilities and agreed to IAEA inspections. In August 2003, IAEA inspectors at Natanz found traces of highly enriched uranium, deemed questionable for non-military purposes. In December 2003, Iran signed an IAEA protocol allowing for surprise inspections at suspected nuclear sites. In February 2004, the IAEA found blueprints for building P2 gas centrifuges that are better suited for producing weapons grade plutonium than the hundreds of P1 centrifuges that Iran already acknowledged possessing.6 Subsequently, actual P2 centrifuge parts have been discovered.7 Iran denies that it has any P2 centrifuges and that the country's nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. |
Syria Threat Assessment
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003":
"Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently treid to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probably that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability."
"Syria - an NPT [Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons] signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards - has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Jajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities."
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Syria has not admitted to possession of WMD or an active WMD program, but Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told the Daily Telegraph in January 2004: "We are a country which is [partly] occupied and from time to time we are exposed to Israeli aggression. It is natural for us to look for means to defend ourselves. It is not difficult to get most of these weapons anywhere in the world and they can be obtained at any time."8 Reportedly, Assad claimed that "Syria is entitled to defend itself by acquiring a chemical and biological deterrent" and "that any deal to destroy Syria's chemical and biological capability would come about only if Israel agreed to abandon its undeclared nuclear arsenal."9 Syria's nuclear program is only in its very early stages of development. The miniature neutron source reactor at the Dayr Al Jajar Nuclear Research Center near Damascus became fully operational in 1998 and gives Syria the capability to produce neutrons for nuclear analysis, isotopes for industrial applications, and radioisotopes for training purposes, but is not suitable for weapons production. Syria has a cyclotron facility that uses the same model as the cyclotron in Iran, which is suspected of being used for uranium enrichment, but the status of the facility is unknown. |
Libya Threat Assessment
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003":
"Libya remains heavily dependent of foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment... Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive CW capability and an indigenous production capability for weapons. Evidence suggests Libya also is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents."
"Libya - an NPT party with full scope IAEA safeguards - continues to develop its nuclear research and development program but would still require significant foreign assistance to advance a nuclear weapons option."
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In December 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate its WMD programs and stockpiles of weapons, including allowing immediate inspections and monitoring to verify compliance. The Bush administration claimed Libya's WMD capitulation was the result of the new U.S. that threatens preemptive war against regimes that pursue or possess WMD. And the Iraq war likely had some bearing on Libya's decision. But it's also important to note that Libya's WMD programs (particularly nuclear weapons) were in their most nascent stages. If Iraq was truly a "gathering" threat, Libya was considerably less so. Also, Libya had been making overtures for several years to normalize relations with the United States, including accepting responsibility for the Lockerbie Pan Am flight 103 bombing. So in some respects, Libya's acquiescence is not a total surprise and Khaddafi may have given up very little in return something it wanted. |
Sudan Threat Assessment
According to the CIA's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003":
"Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad."
According to the CIA's prior 6-month report:
"In the WMD arena, Sudan, a CWC States Party, has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it historically has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Sudan my be interested in a BW program as well."
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If Sudan's ability to obtain WMD was principally dependent on Iraq, then it is reasonably safe to say - especially given the inability to uncover WMD or active WMD programs in Iraq - that Sudan's WMD capabilities are essentially non-existent. |
Assessing the Assessments
Actual possession of WMD - or the capability to produce WMD - is just one part of determining the potential threat posed by states of concern. While possession of such weapons may be an unwelcome development, it is important to place it in context.
Consideration must be given to the motivation for countries to acquire WMD. For example, Iran's chemical and biological weapons development is probably a direct response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran during their eight year long war in the 1980s. Similarly, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons can be attributed to regional power aspirations. Of course, in the wake of the Iraq war and an explicit U.S. policy of preemption and regime change, nuclear weapons may now be seen by countries such as North Korea and Iran as the only way deter a preemptive military attack by the United States.
It is also important to understand that any country with a civilian chemical or biological industry has the inherent capability to produce chemical or biological weapons. It is a question of how the facilities are used, not the facilities themselves. Without the actual ability to observe and constantly monitor production activities, there is no way to know with absolute certainty whether dual-use agents and facilities are being used for WMD production. Moreover, the nature of chemical and biological agents production for use as weapons can be easily concealed. A trained scientist working inside a laboratory the size of a small room in a house can produce chemical or biological agents suitable for weapons use.10 So a concerted effort to conceal such a laboratory would have a relatively high probability of eluded even the most intrusive inspections regime. Ultimately, it comes down to what level of uncertainty one is willing to accept.
It seems clear that there is a correlation between acquisition of civil nuclear power capabilities and the potential to develop nuclear weapons. Development of heavy water reactors, which use natural uranium (the now infamous yellow cake uranium that President Bush alleged Iraq was trying to acquire from Niger)11 that can be used to breed plutonium for possible weapons use, is a legitimate WMD concern. But it is not the only concern. Electric power light water reactors typically need less than 5% uranium enrichment. So-called breeder reactors typically require 15-30% uranium enrichment. Nuclear weapons production requires 90% enrichment. So the issue is whether in the course of nuclear power reactor development a country can also acquire the capability for uranium enrichment for weapons use. The problem is that uranium enrichment has legitimate, peaceful civilian purposes but it could also be used for the production of nuclear weapons. So the question is whether a country's civil nuclear power capabilities can be constrained in such a way so that the capability for weapons grade enrichment is not achieved.
Even if a country possesses WMD (including nuclear weapons), the issue of deterrence is also important. All the evidence suggests that while the United States may not be able to dissuade countries from acquiring WMD, the large and overwhelming superior U.S. nuclear arsenal (currently over 5,900 strategic, i.e., intercontinental range, warheads)12 is able to deter the use of WMD by states of concern. For example, even though the Iraqis used chemical weapons against the Iranians, they refrained from using such weapons against U.S. forces in the first Gulf War. North Korea is thought to possess at least a few nuclear weapons and has demonstrated a technical capability to launch a long-range missile that could reach the United States. But Pyongyang has not launched such a weapon despite its brinkmanship with the United States. Of course, just because the United States has an ability to deter states of concern from using WMD does not mean that the same will be true for other countries vis-a-vis states of concerns.
Beyond the actual capability to produce WMD and the possession of such weapons, a country must also have the ability to credibly deliver weapons to be considered a threat. From a U.S. perspective, the only countries with long-range (i.e., intercontinental) capability are the United Kingdom (America's staunchest ally), Russia (which possesses the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world,13 but is no longer considered an enemy and military competitor against the United States), and China (which has a very small nuclear arsenal, estimated at 20 strategic warheads).14 To be sure, Chinese nuclear weapons modernization and development bears watching, but whether China will or even has the intention to become an aggressive great power that challenges the United States remains an open question. The only state of concern that might have the capability to strike the United States is North Korea, but this capability is far from certain. The North Koreans have flight tested a 3-stage rocket, which demonstrates that they have the technical know-how to build an intercontinental range missile. But their one flight test (in 1998) is a far cry from demonstrating a militarily effective and reliable system. Of course, some of the shorter range systems that states of concern currently possess or are attempting to develop would pose threats to those countries within range of those systems.
Finally, in the post-9/11 world, the question of WMD and terrorism cannot be ignored. This was the concern that obviously motivated the Bush administration in making its case for war against Iraq. In an October 2002 speech, Bush said: "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints."15 But outside of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, no other government is known or proven to be supporting or providing safe haven for the al Qaeda terrorist network, the group that attacked the United States on 9/11. Of course, some states of concern are known to support terrorist groups. For example, according to the State Department, Iran is considered a state sponsor of terrorism and supports Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.16 But these groups do not focus their attacks against the United States. These and other terrorist groups, however, would represent threats to other countries, e.g., Israel.
In the final analysis, WMD proliferation and development by states of concern cannot be ignored. But WMD in and of itself does not constitute an inherent threat. WMD cannot be viewed in a vacuum and must be assessed in the context of a number of other factors. And whether missile defense (assuming it is a technically achievable solution) is an appropriate policy response requires a broad assessment that goes beyond simply WMD capabilities.
Notes
1. "Transcript: David Kay at Senate hearing," CNN.com, January 28, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/.
2. George W. Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
3. See Charles V. Peña, "Iraq: The Wrong War," Cato Policy Analysis No. 502, December 15, 2003, pp. 2-3, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa502.pdf.
4. CIA, "Unclassified Report to Congtress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001."
5. CIA, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2002."
6. Joby Warrick, "Iranian Nuclear Plans Found," Washington Post, February 13, 2004, p. A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37806-2004Feb12.html.
7. Barbara Slavin and John Diamond, "Nuclear machinery found in Iran," USA Today, February 19, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-02-19-iran-nukes_x.htm.
8. Benedict Brogan, "We won't scrap WMD stockpile unless Israel does, says Assad," Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2004%2F01%2F06%2Fwsyria06.xml.
9. Ibid.
10. Kathleen Bailey, "Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," National Institute for Public Policy, October 2002, pp. 9-11, http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Bailey%20Protocol.pdf.
11. "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." George W. Bush, "President Delivers 'State of the Union'," January 28, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
12. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004, London: Oxford University Press, October 2003, p. 229.
13. More than 5,400 strategic warheads according to ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. George W. Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," October 7, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.
16. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, April 2003, p. 77.
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