PENN Project on European Nuclear Non-proliferation

NATO Nuclear Sharing and the NPT –
Questions to be Answered

Annex 1:

Programs of Cooperation

Part of the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons that the US maintains in Europe has, since the 1950s, been retained for use by NATO member states. The armed forces of these states are trained for nuclear weapon missions. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey participate in NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the extent of which is defined in bilateral treaties with the US.

Stationing of nuclear components of nuclear weapons, the warheads, as well as their transfer to NATO allies at times of use, is governed under bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes"²² between the US and the state concerned.

The agreement with the Netherlands, for example, states that:

"Each party will communicate to or exchange with the other party such classified information as is jointly determined to be necessary to:

A. the development of defense plans;

B. the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;

C. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and

D. The development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry."²³

The agreement with the Netherlands is typical, containing the same clauses as other NATO nuclear cooperation agreements.

The coordination of NATO policy is achieved through the Nuclear Planning Group, established in 1967, which meanwhile gives all states to NATO that choose to participate a say in planning the nuclear strategy of the alliance.

Annex 2:

Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by US Allies together with Answers given by the United States

1. Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the draft treaty?

A. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

2. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and planning on nuclear defense among NATO members?

A. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.

3. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned and controlled by the United States within the territory of non-nuclear NATO members?

A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.

4. Q. Would the draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear weapon state was one of the constituent states?

A. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

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Endnotes

¹ Leonard Meeker, "Proposed Revised Articles of US Non-Proliferation Treaty, Memorandum for Ambassador ?", US Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Lyndon B Johnson Library, 6 July 1966, original classification: confidential.

² US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Washington 1966, p.77.

³ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1, 9 qua.

⁴ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1, 9 and 9 bis

⁵ Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador K.J. Jele to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Year 2000 Review Conference of The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, 8 April 1997, New York. See also BASIC, Press Release, 8 April 1997.

⁶ Otfried Nassauer, Oliver Meier, Nicola Butler and Stephen Young: "US Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97", Berlin, London, Washington: Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit/ British American Security Information Council (BASIC-BITS-Research Note 97.1), February 1997.

⁷ "Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 91-2, 27 and 28 February 1969, p. 23. [Emphasis added]

⁸ Spurgeon M Keeny, Jr., "The Non-Proliferation Treaty", 24 December 1968, Original Classification: Top Secret.

⁹ ibid, pp.74-75.

¹⁰ ibid, pp.80.

¹¹ "Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With Answers Given by the United States", cited in: NPT Hearings, US Senate, 90-2, p. 262.

¹² "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p.340. Emphasis added.

¹³ Statement of Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p.56.

¹⁴ op cit, p.340.

¹⁵ "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p. ***.

¹⁶ US-Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington 1966, p.77

¹⁷ "Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With Answers Given by the United States", cited in: NPT Hearings, Senate, 90-2, p. 262.

¹⁸ Adrian Fisher, "Memorandum for Mr. Bill Moyers, Subject: Working Group Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements", 30 September 1966, Original Classification: Secret - Exdis, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ Quoted in "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p. 27.

²⁰ "Non-Proliferation Treaty", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p. 424.

²¹ Adrian Fisher, op cit.

²² At least 12 such "Agreements" were concluded with NATO (Effective date: 12 March 1965), Australia (14 August 1957), Belgium (5 September 1962), Canada (27 July 1959), France (Land-Based Prototype Fuel Supply Agreement/ 20 July 1959), France (9 October 1961), Federal Republic of Germany (27 July 27 1959), Greece (11 August 1959), Italy (24 May 1961), Netherlands (27 July 1959), Turkey (27 July 1959), United Kingdom (4 August 1958)

²³ Article II of Netherlands, Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Mutual Defence Purposes, Signed at the Hague, 6 May 1959, entered into force 27 July 1959.

This research note was written by

Martin Butcher, Director of the Center for European Security and Disarmament

Nicola Butler, Analyst, British American Security Information Council

Oliver Meier, Senior Analyst, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security

Otfried Nassauer, Director, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security

Dan Plesch, Director, British American Security Information Council

Georg Schöfbänker, Researcher, Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Research (ASPR) and

Stephen Young, Senior Analyst, British American Security Information Council
.

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