26 October 2000
Ambassador X
NATO HQ
Brussels, Belgium

Re: Paragraph 32 process

Dear Sir:

We are writing to you to express our interest in, and support for, NATO’s ongoing review of options for possible new initiatives in the arena of confidence- and security-building measures, arms control, verification and disarmament.  We would welcome an invigorated Alliance posture in support of both nuclear and conventional arms control efforts on the international stage.

As you review potential changes in NATO plans and approach under the so-called Paragraph 32 process, mandated at the Alliance’s April 1999 summit, we would urge a number of specific measures be considered –  ranging from first-step activities that should be easily achievable to more sweeping actions.

• Allies should consider confidence- and security-building measures and initiatives designed to bring sub-strategic weapons into the fabric of current arms control regimes.  Among the steps that might prove helpful are: 

• an initiative to increase transparency on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, possibly conducted under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (this should include an offer to take into consideration any fears Moscow may have about the government’s ability to accurately report data, perhaps via an agreement to allow certain ‘margins of error’ in reporting or through financial aid);

• talks with Russia on reducing or eliminating the deployment in Europe of sub-strategic weapons;

• and a strengthened NATO commitment to permanently ban the deployment of sub-strategic nuclear weapons on the territories of all new members to NATO.

• A new initiative designed to bolster international efforts to restrict the flow of ballistic missile technology by strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime should be considered.  Proposals on the table include the recent Russian suggestion for a Global Control System (GCS) for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies, and the U.S. call for a code of conduct related to missile technology. Both should be seriously reviewed by the Alliance.

• Consideration of the impact of any future U.S. decision to deploy a National Missile Defence network on the future of the existing non-proliferation regimes and the health of international nuclear disarmament agreements.

• The Alliance, moreover, must bring up to date the principle of allied strategy (paragraph 46 of the 1999 Strategic Concept) which asserts that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution to deterrence and, “thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”  This statement is incompatible with the decision by NATO member states at the May 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to support an “unequivocal” commitment to nuclear disarmament.  Instead, the Alliance should consider reintroducing the 1990 London language characterizing nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort.”  To make the meaning of this term perfectly clear, it should be defined as “an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a (member) State would be at stake.”  This language is modelled after the single case of nuclear use or threat – a situation that was not declared  illegal by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996.   In tandem, NATO should undertake a review of the Alliance’s 1992 Gleneagles “Political Principles for Nuclear Planning and Consultations” to the effect of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance.

• An examination of how Alliance policies conform with each of the commitments made in the NPT context.

• In particular, NATO should no longer claim an exceptional status for the nuclear arrangements of its nuclear and non-nuclear states.  All non-nuclear Alliance members should adopt a common status under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, based on that already accepted by new members.  In other words, all non-nuclear NATO members could remain part of the nuclear planning process, but not participants in so-called nuclear-sharing arrangements with the United States.

• The Alliance should reaffirm the negative security assurances given, in relation to the NPT, by individual allies possessing nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states; perhaps by formulating a strong negative security assurance of its own.  It is crucial that the Alliance makes clear that there is no role for using nuclear weapons against all non-nuclear states.

In addition to these practical steps, we would like to urge the Alliance to reconsider its decision not to undertake an in-depth review of its 1999 Strategic Concept.  Paragraph 65 of the Strategic Concept states that it  “…will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment.”  In our view, the environment is changing quickly and in dramatic ways.  The U.S. Congress recently mandated that the incoming administration review U.S. nuclear posture.  Both candidates for the U.S. presidency – Vice President Al Gore and Texas Gov. George W. Bush – have pledged to undertake such a review if elected.  From our perspective, it would be wise if the Alliance would provide some constructive input.  As the United States prepares for such a review, it would behove the Alliance as a whole to open a rigorous study of collective nuclear policies, doctrine and practice, with an eye to surveying all available options for implementing, and strengthening, its arms control policies.

Outside the nuclear agenda, there also are a number of actions NATO could take to strengthen conventional arms control and non-proliferation, as well as transparency.

• In particular, the Alliance should encourage its member states – as a first step – to ratify the revised Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 2; and consider the potential for a new round.

• Another crucial need is a reinvigorated NATO approach toward helping stem the flow of small arms and light weapons to regions of conflict; for example, a NATO-wide standard for licensing and tracking brokers, and stringent requirements for destruction of weapons declared excess.

• The options paper presented to ministers in December must be made public.  Maintaining transparency throughout this process will help assure the public that NATO is taking appropriate, meaningful steps toward disarmament and non-proliferation.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our views on this crucial Alliance process.  Do not hesitate to contact any one of us if you have questions or want to discuss any other issues.

Sincerely,

Daniel Plesch, BASIC
Karel Koster, PENN/Netherlands
Otfried Nassaeur, BITS
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