NATO and Nuclear Weapons:
On the Road to Budapest

NATO NUCLEAR SERIES, No. 4

Is the U.S. Meeting Its Disarmament Commitments?

By Christine Kucia, BASIC, 18 May 2001

In the upcoming ministerial meetings, NATO member states may confront recent disarmament commitments, which U.S. nuclear policy greatly influences. While the Bush administration stance on many of these steps is still unclear (pending the nuclear posture review and almost two dozen other defense-related evaluations underway this year), an assessment may be made according to the tone of U.S. and NATO policy and statements since the May 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Last year, 187 states gathered to affirm their collective commitment to NPT during a quinquennial review of the status of the treaty. During the month-long meeting, states developed a comprehensive document outlining general commitments to tighten controls on nuclear weapons and further disarmament, including the landmark goal of “total elimination of nuclear weapons” agreed by nuclear possessors and non-nuclear states alike. (1)

Nuclear arms control has faced many challenges recently, from former President Bill Clinton’s failure to deliver ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to statements by current President George W. Bush that he will expedite deployment of a missile defense system for the United States. So how much has the United States achieved in building upon the NPT promises and moving its nuclear posture in closer alignment with the international agreements it has made?

U.S. progress, or lack thereof, on several key steps can be evaluated, and exploring the Bush administration’s anticipated policies and initiatives will suggest possible areas for progress to further U.S. non-proliferation and disarmament commitments.

Reaffirmed Commitment to the NPT
The U.S. affirmed its commitment to the NPT in several venues throughout the year 2000. The NPT Review Conference “was a success, producing in the end a reasoned document upon which all member States could agree,”
according to John Holum, then Senior Arms Control Adviser for the Clinton Administration. (2) Later that year, the meetings of both the NATO Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers included reaffirmation of the NPT Review Conference’s conclusion, lauding the Final Document as a “positive outcome” (3) and stating that “The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.” (4)

However, despite these endorsements of the non-proliferation and disarmament tenets of the May 2000 conference, U.S. activities have drawn some different conclusions about Washington’s dedication to taking steps toward disarmament. Following are several of the 13 steps outlined in the NPT Review Conference’s Final Document, including recent U.S. initiatives and recommendations for moving forward.

COMMITMENT: “The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

In the nearly two years following the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT in 1999, no substantial progress has been made by the United States to move the ratification process along. In his campaign statements in 2000 and after his January 20, 2001 inauguration, President Bush has made clear that ratifying the CTBT is not a priority for his administration. He noted in a response to a survey of presidential candidate views on arms control issues that the CTBT is unverifiable, unenforceable, and would threaten the maintenance of the U.S. arsenal. He asserted, “We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.” (5) The administration’s policy was elucidated further during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s January 2001 confirmation hearings before Congress, when he said, “We will not be asking for the Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in this next session.” (6)

Conventional wisdom in Washington notes that while the administration will not resubmit the CTBT for ratification in the next two years, a shift in partisan alliances after midterm elections in November 2002 may inspire a reassessment of the treaty’s viability and possible ratification. The report of the comprehensive review of the CTBT by former General John M. Shalikashvili also spurred further congressional interest in taking up the issue once again.

While the current President Bush’s administration upholds the testing moratorium put in place in 1992 by the administration of his father, President George H.W. Bush, this should not act as a substitute for ratification of the Treaty. As Shalikashvili’s report emphasized, “A prolonged moratorium would do less damage to U.S. non-proliferation objectives and diplomatic standing than would a resumption of nuclear testing, but most of the benefits that the Test Ban Treaty can provide would be lessened or lost without ratification.” (7) In upholding its commitment to the NPT, ratification of the CTBT must take place in an expeditious manner.

COMMITMENT: “A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.”

The current U.S. government has assured the world that it does not intend to breach the unilateral moratorium on testing established under the previous President Bush’s administration in 1992. Powell again clarified the present administration’s policy early when he stated, “President-elect [George W.] Bush has indicated he has no intention of resuming testing as part of our efforts. We do not see any need for such testing in the foreseeable future.” (8)

However, a controversial study into furthering research on low-yield nuclear weapons threatens this policy. The report, due to be submitted to Congress by July 2001, will make recommendations on options for creating weapons designed to penetrate hardened and deeply-buried targets, such as underground bunkers producing or storing chemical or biological weapons. One possible option would be to develop a nuclear weapon with a yield of five kilotons or less. This would be an addition to the U.S. arsenal that would keep the country’s strike options flexible. However, development of a new nuclear weapon would undoubtedly lead to calls for testing required to ensure the integrity of its design, safety, and capability.

Maintaining the self-proclaimed moratorium is crucial for the current Bush White House as this research option matures and a new nuclear program possibly emerges. Herein lies the strength behind calls to ratify the CTBT: a unilateral moratorium is voluntary and easily dismissed, while a treaty confirming that a state will not test nuclear weapons holds that country to an international commitment that is difficult to brush aside (as evidenced by the sustained global objections to possible U.S. dismissal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty).

COMMITMENT: “An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.”

President Bush has stated his commitment to the reduction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which should be commended. It is anticipated that the current string of defense reviews, including the congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review, will result in a substantially smaller number of weapons in the strategic arsenal. Making irreversible cuts in the land- and sea-based nuclear weapons would create greater stability with Russia, which is concerned about the security and economic ramifications of maintaining its large arsenal. Cuts may also diffuse recently-heightened tensions with China.

However, the one-sided reductions that the Bush administration is expected to propose fall outside the purview of key arms control treaties. This approach, while welcome, has limited value since it will not mandate verification of the cuts to the arsenal, and reducing nuclear numbers unilaterally suggests that the United States may one day decide to increase its nuclear weapons arsenal, also unilaterally. The U.S. proposals should include an invitation to Russia to embark on similar reductions and stipulate mechanisms for mutual verification of each country’s cuts and the ever-critical transparency in the composition and status of their arsenals.

COMMITMENT: “The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.”

Entry-into-force and implementation of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) is currently stalled due to complicating measures by the Russian Duma, which ratified the treaty and several companion documents in May 2000. The Duma linked entry into force of START II to U.S. Senate approval of auxiliary ABM Treaty agreements drafted in 1997. However, the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by conservative Senator Jesse Helms, is unlikely to ratify the additional ABM Treaty agreements. Thus, introducing the package to the Senate would essentially quash the START II process. (9)

Reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal should take place within arms control processes, but the current administration is reluctant to establish international treaties that it believes renders the U.S. defensive posture “inflexible.” However, the stalled process is further highlighted by U.S. aspirations to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, which would abrogate the ABM Treaty as agreed in 1972. “Contrary to President Bush's assertion that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is irrelevant, the agreement continues to stabilize the strategic nuclear balance and does not impede research and early development of national missile defense systems planned in the near future,” according to John Rhinelander, the former U.S. legal advisor for the Nixon Administration’s ABM Treaty negotiation team. (10)

The United States must maintain its commitments under these key arms control agreements with Russia. Abrogating the ABM Treaty unilaterally has been roundly condemned worldwide. (11) The START treaty process has the potential to result in significant mutually-agreed and verifiable arsenal reductions between the Washington and Moscow. The Bush administration must find a way to continue providing national defense for the United States without upsetting international stability or global security. By upholding the ABM agreement and continuing START treaty negotiations, arms reductions can occur within an atmosphere of cooperation and security as the nuclear powers move toward their collective commitment to disarmament.

COMMITMENT: “Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.”

[Note: This lengthy commitment is dealt with the in the following five
sections.]
.

- U.S. AND NATO NUCLEAR POLICY CONTRADICT COMMITMENT

U.S. nuclear policy and its commitment to the NATO alliance have not allowed Washington to fully uphold this step. In December 2000, NATO completed an arms control review mandated at the 1999 Washington Summit. The report presented options for confidence- and security-building measures for conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as proposals for enhancing transparency, verification, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The review highlighted a very clear contradiction between Alliance policy and disarmament commitments made by member states at the NPT Review Conference. It stated, “The alliance’s nuclear weapons will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.” (12) While including in paragraph 106 the 13 disarmament principles outlined in the NPT Conference’s Final Document, NATO’s intent to maintain its present nuclear policy fundamentally undercuts the “unequivocal undertaking” professed in May 2000.

As a member of NATO, the United States continues to uphold these disconnected policies, and does not acknowledge that the Alliance’s declaration (derived greatly from U.S. national nuclear policy) deviates from the commitments made under the NPT. In this atmosphere of policy duplicity, it comes as no surprise that U.S. progress on disarmament remains a challenge.

As indicated above, Washington is expected to conclude its nuclear posture review with an announcement of unilateral arms reductions. But even with unilateral cuts to the U.S. arsenal, NATO policy as agreed among the 19 member states remains unchanged. The Bush administration should heed the words of esteemed arms control negotiator Paul H. Nitze, key constructor of the U.S. Cold War policy toward the Soviet Union, who proclaimed, “I see no compelling reason why we should not unilaterally get rid of our nuclear weapons. To maintain them is costly and adds nothing to our security.” (13) The Bush administration should take these words to heart and to NATO – and urge that the Alliance de-emphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in its collective security policy.

- U.S. INITIATIVES JEOPARDIZE COMMITMENT

Upholding the NPT disarmament steps in the current political environment in the U.S. will be difficult. The Bush administration will announce cuts to the nuclear arsenal, unfortunately intended as a first step in an overall strategy to create a flexible nuclear deterrent by incorporating new missile defenses and possibly developing “mini-nukes” to give the military a potentially usable nuclear option. While the unilateral reductions may promote some level of security, those measures are negated by the U.S. efforts to enhance its offensive posture with “usable nukes” and a missile defense system that, if effective, could be used to guarantee its first-strike option.

Enhancing flexibility and adaptability for U.S. defenses was a key tenet of a report released earlier this year by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP). The study, conducted by a panel comprised of conservative defense strategists (several of whom later received Bush administration appointments), argued that maximum adaptability for the arsenal required few arms control restraints in the form of treaties, and noted that “the U.S. capability to adapt its deterrence policies to a wide variety of challengers and contexts will be critical in this new century.” (14) The report also asserted that maintaining adaptability required the ability to produce new nuclear weapons.

What goes unmentioned by the Bush administration is the risk to the international stability incurred by Washington’s emerging plan. China and Russia have both vocally opposed the development of NMD by the United States, and view such a system as a threat to their own deterrent postures. In addition, European leaders have made known their opposition to development of the planned U.S. system if it breaches the ABM Treaty between Washington and Moscow. (15) With the U.S. initiatives inciting such global turmoil, the Bush administration would do better to respect its international commitments to disarmament first to preserve stability and security worldwide, and continue to ensure national security within the bounds of the promises it has made.

- TRANSPARENCY TO IMPROVE

However, the current U.S. administration has ample opportunity to put itself on a constructive course toward fulfilling some of the NPT disarmament principles. The December 2000 arms control review by NATO moves the transparency issue forward in a practical manner, suggesting increased flow of information between NATO and Russia. Suggested measures include:

- enhanced dialogue on matters related to nuclear forces,
- information exchange regarding the readiness status of nuclear forces,
- information exchange on safety provisions and safety features of nuclear weapons, and
- data exchange on U.S. and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces. (16)

Promoting discussions with Russia, and encouraging NATO to implement these measures quickly, would greatly improve transparency. It would also increase international security in dealing with Russia, which is already wary in light of recent U.S. moves toward abrogating the ABM Treaty and building a missile defense that is perceived as a dual offensive/defensive tool.

- NON-STRATEGIC (TACTICAL) NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION POSSIBLE

Tactical nuclear weapons are viewed as a lingering vestige of the Cold War by many European states, and embarking on reductions for this arm of the nuclear triad would preempt costly modernization of the European facilities. (17) In addition, considering the removal of these weapons would force a much-needed post-Cold War evaluation of NATO nuclear policy, especially when “it seems that today a detailed and precise doctrine of nuclear deployment and employment no longer exists. NATO thus appears to have discarded a comprehensive analysis and discussions of situations in which nuclear weapons might be used.” (18)

Elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would be an enormous boon for European security and would improve relations with Russia. Involving Russia in mutual elimination of these volatile weapons in each country’s arsenal would create a climate of better security, especially with the knowledge that such a measure would help avert a nightmare scenario of accidental launch.

- STAND DOWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Standing down the nuclear arsenal is also an area in which Washington has shown some positive initial signs in advancing the agenda for disarmament. At the outset of his campaign, President Bush pledged that “the United States should work with other nuclear nations to remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation – to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.” (19)

Reevaluating a nuclear stand-down may be a component of the nuclear review currently underway in Washington. Setting a precedent with a wholesale stand-down of its arsenal from high alert status would be the best move by the Bush administration to assure allies and other international actors that the United States is serious about maintaining international security and stability. However, making a mutually-verifiable pact with Russia to remove their arsenals from hair-trigger alert would be a substantial contribution toward both President Bush’s campaign promise and the international disarmament regime.

Conclusion: What the NATO Ministerials Can Bring
The United States’ commitment to disarmament promises made only a year ago is mixed at best, and certainly requires an enormous effort by the current administration to bring national policies in line with its international commitments. Even more, the United States’ heavy hand on NATO nuclear policy means that Washington’s policy shifts greatly impacts the other 18 member states in the Alliance.

Alliance member states are not powerless, despite U.S. reticence to uphold the ABM Treaty or proceed with START II reductions, and its desire to deploy a missile defense system over vehement international objections and concerns for global stability. The upcoming ministerial meetings provide excellent opportunities for European leaders to emphasize their dissatisfaction with Washington’s unilateral approach to defense initiatives that have a global impact.

However, foreign and defense leaders must seize their opportunities now, while the Bush administration is still testing the international waters to get a sense of its allies’ opinions on nuclear issues. The recent “consultations” by U.S. government delegations to key allies to solicit feedback on possible NMD development is a sign that the Bush administration may be responsive to viewpoints on broader nuclear concerns that affect the Alliance. Only by probing the new government in Washington will European allies get to the heart of NATO nuclear concerns.

(1) For the full text of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/finaldoc.html 

(2) Holum Outlines Security Rationale for Arms Control Process
Washington File, May 31, 2000

(3) Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, May, 24 2000,

(4) Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Dec. 5, 2000 

(5) Presidential Election Forum: The Candidates on Arms Control  
Arms Control Today, Sep. 2000, 

(6) Statement and Testimony of Secretary of State-Designate Colin L.
Powell, Confirmation Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations  Jan. 17, 2001

(7) Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty General John M. Shalikashvili (USA, Ret.), Jan. 2001, Section VI,

(8) Statement and Testimony of Secretary of State-Designate Colin L. Powell, Confirmation Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Jan. 17, 2001

(9) For more information, see Bleek, Phillip C., “Russia Ratifies START II, Extension Protocol; ABM-Related Agreements Also Approved” Arms Control Today, May 2000

(10) Nuclear Experts Say Bush Missile Plan Will Decrease Overall Security: Urge Action on Missile Defense Reductions and Nuclear ‘Stand-Down' Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, May 1, 2001

(11) Global Quotations on the ABM Treaty/NMD

(12) Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament NATO, Dec. 15, 2000, para. 101

(13) A Threat Mostly To Ourselves, Paul H. Nitze, New York Times, Oct. 28, 1999 

(14) Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, National Institute for Public Policy, Jan. 2001, Vol. I, p. 12

(15) Global Quotations on the ABM Treaty/NMD

(16) Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament NATO, Dec. 15, 2000, para. 91

(17) For more information, see Koster, Karel, Belgian, Dutch Parliamentarians Confront NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons, BASIC NATO Nuclear Series #3, May 10, 2001 

(18) Potter, William C. et. al., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, p. 37.

(19) 2000 Republican Party Platform, July 2000. 
.

For more information, please contact:
Christine Kucia in Washington at 202-347-8340 ext. 103
or Mark Bromley in London at 44-20-7407-2977

NATO NUCLEAR SERIES, No. 5

Questions on NATO 
Nuclear Policy

By Christine Kucia, BASIC, 25 May 2001

- What are the long term aspirations for NATO’s missile defense capability? Are there any plans to coordinate or share technologies with the missile defense system proposed by the United States? Is your country prepared to shoulder some financial responsibility for this involvement?

- Will member states continue to breach their commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by allowing NATO to bring in new member states and include them under the “nuclear umbrella?”

- Do the recent upgrades to upgrades to the WS3 vaults indeed indicate that NATO is committed to deploying tactical nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapon states until 2018, in clear contradiction of the NPT?

- Does the apparent willingness of the United States to abrogate the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) undercut NATO’s December 2000 arms control report, as well as the commitment of Alliance member states to the NPT’s principles for furthering nuclear disarmament?

- Since all NATO member states have ratified the CTBT except the United States, will NATO members ask the United States to clarify its ratification timeline?

- Will the United States provide in-depth details on its missile defense plans to NATO member states before it decides on whether to abandon the ABM Treaty?

- [For Denmark/UK] Are you prepared to allow the use of your radar sites in a missile defense system for the United States? For NATO?

- Will NATO uphold diplomatic means of addressing proliferation concerns through measures like strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime? The Biological & Chemical Weapons Convention Protocols?

- Would NATO members support the development of new, low-yield nuclear weapons by the United States? Would NATO states support the use of such weapons by the United States as a component of the “nuclear umbrella?

For more information, please contact Christine Kucia in Washington at 202-347-8340 ext. 103, or Mark Bromley in London at 44-20-7407-2977.

NATO NUCLEAR SERIES, No. 6

The European Missile
 Defense Debate

The support of the people and governments of Europe is vitally important to US plans to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Aside from the diplomatic need to maintain good relations with its European allies, the United States also needs to maintain unity within NATO. Given recent concerns over US unilateralism with regard to Kyoto and other important initiatives, the US must move cautiously so as to avoid creating more tension. The need for agreement among the allies is also a practical consideration, since the United States plans to forward deploy radars at sites within Europe. The sites it has earmarked are in Greenland and the United Kingdom. Without these radars, the planned NMD system will be unable to operate, and it will be ‘blind’ to missile attacks from across the Atlantic. For all these reasons, the support of Europe is essential to the future US NMD system.

NATO NUCLEAR SERIES, No. 7

ABM Treaty Dropped By NATO
 Amid ‘Changing Circumstances’

By Christine Kucia, BASIC, 31 May 2001

The meeting of foreign ministers in Budapest was a first glimpse into how arms control and non-proliferation issues may be handled among Alliance members in the post-Cold War world, amid proposals for missile defense development from the new U.S. administration.  The following article provides a brief description of the meeting’s key nuclear-related outcomes, which also may set a significant precedent for the meeting of NATO defense ministers next week in Brussels.

BUDAPEST, 31 MAY – Ministers of the 19 NATO states agreed at their biannual meeting a final communiqué that omitted reference to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which effectively overturned preceding statements that reaffirmed Alliance support for the U.S.-Russian agreement, and ushered into NATO new language that could sanction the U.S.’s unilateral nuclear activities.

The most recent communiqué does not address the ABM Treaty in part due to “changing circumstances” globally, according to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson.  The final statement from this meeting indicates a shift in tenor from December 2000, when foreign ministers called for “preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” 

US Secretary of State Colin Powell gave an early indication of the Bush administration’s sense of achievement in this meeting, stating that he was “pleased that [the ABM Treaty] didn’t warrant particular attention this time around.” 

However, the deafening silence of European allies on the ABM Treaty may be a critical step toward the end for the ABM Treaty and the beginning of more serious national missile defense discussions.  Prior statements from key European allies, concerned about relations with Russia, called for keeping the ABM Treaty and perhaps agreeing an amendment to cover new technologies.  With allies quiet on the issue, the United States may move forward with deployment decisions on a missile defense plan that could breach the treaty.

Europe Divides and Conquers?
European allies claimed their own success, however, in stymieing U.S. efforts to have allies endorse the presence of a “common threat,” which would be a fundamental reason to establish missile defenses in the United States and/or Europe.  France and Germany responded strongly to the draft language, countering that the document instead should cite a “potential threat.”  The foreign ministers concluded that the Alliance should “address appropriately and effectively the threats that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery can pose.”  Further, the text calls for continued consultations that “will include appropriate assessment of threats.” 

Division between the United States and a few key allies over the threat issue reportedly delayed the communiqué’s issue at the meeting.  The dispute led observers to believe that this instance belies a deeper divide in the Alliance over the future of its defense role.

Other Nuclear Issues Weakened
However, other nuclear issues addressed in the communiqué indicated that Europe was more accommodating to American intentions.  NATO member states gave an early indication that they would support U.S. unilateral arsenal cuts when they “welcome[d] the US commitment to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons.”  Absent mention of formalizing the reductions through treaties, this line amounts to an endorsement of unilateral cuts that, while welcome, could prove unverifiable and reversible in the future. 

The communiqué also toned down the language on nuclear testing.  While in December 2000 NATO states professed that they “remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),” the Alliance merely encouraged all states to continue to refrain from nuclear testing.  This change takes the heat off of the United States, the sole NATO member state that has not ratified the treaty, to do so in the near future.

The START treaties received won a modest nod from NATO, which recognized the historic success of the process.  However, the foreign ministers then professed support for the much-vaguer concept of “achieving further reductions of the number of strategic nuclear weapons.”  In not calling for progress specifically on STARTs II and III, as in December, the ministers potentially rendered the process dead.

What Will NATO Agree in Brussels?
European allies have put themselves in a difficult spot as next week’s meeting of NATO defense ministers approaches.  Communiqués from the defense ministerials, which include the Defense Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group (DPC/NPG) statement, tend to be more aggressive on nuclear policy than the diplomatically-oriented documents from the foreign ministers.  The expectation that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will bring some new information on possible U.S. NMD plans also heightens the importance of this meeting for issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction.

Last year’s communiqué of the DPC/NPG upheld the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), supported ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT, and urged progress on STARTs II and III.  These statements illustrate that NATO places “continued importance… to full implementation of and compliance with international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.”  These statements will be watched in the wake of the changed tone by the foreign ministers, and in light of allegations that the United States attempted to remove the reference to the NPT as “the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament” from the Budapest communiqué.

In the document, the Alliance’s nuclear posture also was defined.  It stated, “NATO's nuclear forces are a credible and effective element of the Alliance's strategy of preventing war, and they are maintained at the minimum level of sufficiency to preserve peace and stability… Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.”

These points from the December 2000 DPC/NPG will be carefully monitored next week, as NATO defense ministers conclude a final document refining the Alliance’s stance on nuclear issues.  The suspected divide in the Alliance between the United States and Europe may be seen better at that meeting, when NATO’s all-important nuclear policy, and Bush’s plans for NMD deployment, are at the fore.

For further information

Final Communiqué of the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, Budapest, 29 May 2001

Communiqués from Prior NATO Ministerial Meetings

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site – Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START):  Documents, Analysis, and News – Arms Control Association

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document – BASIC

NATO NUCLEAR SERIES, No. 8

US Concerns Drive NATO 
Debate on Arms Control

By Mark Bromley, BASIC, 8 June 2001

BRUSSELS, 8 June – At the 7-8 June NATO defence ministers’ meeting here, the communiqué from the Alliance’s Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (DPC/NPG) matched the restraint on arms control initiatives shown at the May NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Budapest. As with the official statements issued at the foreign ministers’ meeting, radical alterations in the Alliance’s arms control policy were avoided. However, the United States gave further indication of its determination to move beyond the traditional forms of arms control and deterrence.

An end to arms control?
In what could be declared as a significant victory for arms control supporters, NATO support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged unscathed. In the December 2000 DPC/NPG communiqué, member states “confirmed our commitments made at this year's Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will contribute to carrying forward the conclusions reached there”. The 2001 communiqué reaffirmed NATO’s “determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference”.

At the same time, a clearly discernible change in tone was evident in the DPC/NPG’s 7 June communiqué. The DPC/NPG communiqué of 5 December 2000 “reaffirmed the continued importance attached by Allies to full implementation of and compliance with international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes”. The statement issued at this most recent meeting made no mention of “full compliance”, stating only that “NATO has a long standing commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, which will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance security objectives”.

On the issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a recommendation of “early entry into force, and full implementation” became an urging for “all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing”. The communiqué also implicitly accepted the fact that any future reductions of US and Russian arsenals probably would take place outside of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) framework. All mention of START II and START III were dropped from the communiqué, stating only “we recognize the achievements of the START process to date and strongly support the ongoing process towards achieving further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia”.

US Rebuffed?
NATO officials were keen to play down the impression, prevalent at the recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Budapest, that the United States had been defeated in its attempts to gain further concessions from the Allies, especially on the questions of arms control and threat assessments. NATO Secretary General George Robertson said, “I think this meeting today will bear out the fact that last week’s news stories of an Alliance divided were in reality pure fiction”.

The United States also countered these notions with its agenda for further action on arms control issues. A sheet of talking points, issued by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, talked of a “new framework of deterrence”. The document insisted that deep cuts in the US nuclear arsenal were imminent but made clear that traditional forms of arms control agreements would not necessarily be central to the process. “Moving to lower numbers could be done in a number of ways” the document stated, “including reciprocal approaches, arms control,unilateral initiatives – or some combination”. The document also made clear the US’s intention to “move beyond the ABM Treaty” and deploy a missile defence system at the earliest opportunity.

While its examination of arms control issues is still in its early stages, the direction is clear: US President George W. Bush is determined to move beyond the bilateral and multilateral structures that governed the processes of disarmament and non-proliferation. At present, concrete alternatives to the traditional process of arms control have not been brought forward as the United States works through its numerous ongoing defence policy reviews. In particular, its overarching Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is not yet completed, and any ambitious moves are unlikely until it is completed some time towards the end of 2001.

Missile Defence On the Agenda
NATO moved a step closer to developing a missile defence capability of its own. On 5 June NATO announced two successful bidders for contracts to look at “the technical feasibility, costs and timescales of a TMD system based on NATO requirement”. The issuing of contracts further underlines European interest in lower-tier missile defence capabilities, both by individual member states as well as collectively within NATO. While significantly less ambitious than the Bush administration’s aspirations, the similarities between the NATO and US projects could further undermine European opposition to US missile defence plans.  Rumsfeld made the link explicit at the defense ministers’ gathering, stating: “A number of Allies have, over the past several years, done impressive work on shorter-range ballistic missile defences. The development and testing program we envision will offer opportunities for Allied participation”.

Differing Threat Perceptions
There were still clear indications of the uphill struggle the US faces if it is to convince Allies of the threat posed by long-range, strategic missiles and therefore the need to defend its mainland in ways otherwise limited by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Rumsfeld offered the Allies a video presentation detailing both advances in anti-missile technology, and the growing delivery system capabilities of “rogue states”. While a NATO spokesman said that the presentation had convinced Alliance members that the threat was “more real”, the ministerial communiqués again avoided any mention of a “common threat”. Germany's defence minister, Rudolf Scharping, also raised concerns about the wisdom of the US’s approach to the problem, stating: “There needs to be a coherent political answer to the threats… Technological means alone are not sufficient”.

Rumsfeld described the need to move beyond the ABM Treaty as “simply inescapable”, and again reiterated the US’s determination to deploy a system as soon as possible. He even made reference to the possibility of deploying parts of the system before testing was complete “to provide rudimentary defences to deal with emerging threats”. Exactly how such a move would conflict with the constraints of the ABM Treaty was left open to debate.

However, making modifications to the ABM Treaty will be a significant sticking point at the 16 June meeting between President Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin in Slovenia. In a press conference of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council on 8 June, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters that Russia’s position on the ABM Treaty was “unchanged”. Ivanov pointed to the fact that since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, 32 bilateral and multilateral treaties had been signed that make the modern network of arms control. Ivanov questioned whether what the United States was proposing would maintain international security.

The question of what exactly the United States intends to put in the place of traditional arms control is far from clear, and the Bush administration is unlikely to make significant decisions before the NPR’s completion. Exactly how far the United States tries to push the Alliance away from its general support for multilateral arms control, built up over the past decade, will go a long way to determining how well NATO unity holds up.

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