On November 4, AFP reported that the US had taken the decision to remove the remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, while leaving them theoretically available to NATO and leaving the basing infrastructure in place. The story was based on well placed military and diplomatic NATO sources. BASIC's own sources in the US have been unable to substantiate the story, but it is perhaps significant that DoD spokesman Ken Bacon, questioned about the reports merely replied that he had "no information" on the story - a classic non-denial denial. It is possible the US was letting slip a trial balloon, to see how the story would go over in Europe before deciding to press ahead. It is also possible that the leak, timed to coincide with the vote in the UN First Committee on disarmament resolutions, was a kind of threat to NATO members. Germany, Canada and the Netherlands had all been hesitating over a 'Yes' vote on the New Agenda Coalition resolution - this may have been a warning to them.

Whatever the truth, the leak came at an interesting time. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting on December 2/3 is likely to be taking important decisions on the direction of NATO nuclear policy. Implementation of the Washington Summit decision to hold a review of policy postponed, but didn't end, the controversy over the future role of nuclear weapons in Alliance policy.

Nuclear weapons and their role in NATO defence strategy were a cause for controversy during the debates on NATO's new Strategic Concept, unveiled at the Alliance's 50th Anniversary Summit in April 1999. The controversy centred around a clash between American-British-French insistence in maintaining a central role for nuclear defence, and German, Canadian and Dutch insistence on a wider debate on the role of nuclear forces in a post-Cold War environment. This potential embarrassment was swept deftly under the carpet with a promise from the US for a full review of all aspects of NATO nuclear policy after the Strategic Concept was agreed.

During the Washington Summit in April, the member states of NATO issued several documents, including a 'Summit Communiqué'. Paragraph 32 of that Communiqué stressed NATO's commitment to arms control and disarmament and reiterated the Alliance's interest in containing proliferation. As well as launching an Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Allies promised to do the following:

'In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options.'

Sources on NATO's International Staff told BASIC Reports that initial meetings after the Summit produced little agreement. The essential differences on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance policy remains unchanged. The US and UK argue strongly for the new Strategic Concept to be exempted from the review, and that it should concentrate on arms control and non-proliferation alone. Other nations, including those prominent in the debate before the Summit, remain convinced a wide review of NATO nuclear policy and doctrine is essential.

The nuclear weapon states in NATO have privately said that if there is to be a wide review then a full range of potential policies must be discussed, including potential use of nuclear weapons in Counter-Proliferation policy. This position has been reflected in a series of answers given by the US Department of Defense to Senator Harkin in response to questions submitted by him during hearings earlier this year. Sources who have had access to MC400/1 have told BASIC Reports that it contains phrasing which, while ambiguous, could be interpreted to allow for the use of NATO nuclear forces against potential Chemical, Biological or nuclear weapon proliferators posing a threat to the Alliance. This is widely thought to already be US national doctrine as set out in Presidential Decision Directive 60, signed by President Clinton in November 1997. (See Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy.)

The DoD told Senator Harkin that "US national nuclear policy is established by the President of the United States and is in no way influenced by allies...". The answer continues ".. NATO nuclear policy has historically been consistent with US nuclear policy." The answers also state that "US strategic and theater nuclear doctrine is established by the President and set forth in a series of increasingly detailed documents. (deleted) US nuclear doctrine applies equally to US forces stationed or deployed anywhere in the world, to include those in Europe."

In short, US nuclear forces deployed in Europe are available for potential use against WMD proliferators, whether or not WMD are used against NATO. Secondly, the US would expect to use its influence in the Alliance to apply this doctrine within NATO as a whole including those nations which, although nominally non-nuclear under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have US nuclear weapons deployed with their air forces and train those units of their national air forces for nuclear missions. The countries which participate in this NATO nuclear sharing are Belgium, Italy, Greece, Germany, The Netherlands and Turkey.

There was little or no discussion of these issues at the Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting in Toronto from the 21^st-22^nd September and news from fora such as the Nuclear Policy Committee and other groups remains private.

The Alliance continues to maintain a careful silence over its current and future nuclear policies. In conversation with BASIC Reports and on the condition of anonymity, officials from several national delegations hinted at what was happening to the 'process' which had been decided in Washington. Whilst seeming extremely reluctant to speak on the issue, most gave the impression that some new confidence and security building measures would be announced at the December Ministerials, but that the essence of NATO's nuclear doctrine, as set out in the 1999 Strategic Concept, would remain unchanged.

Other sources have indicated that the question of the nuclear policy review has been caught up in the review of the secret NATO strategy paper based on the Strategic Concept. The strategy described in a document called MC400/1 was last updated at the Berlin North Atlantic Council meeting in June 1996. The new version, MC400/2, is being written to accord with the new Strategic Concept. Some voices within NATO are arguing that the Strategic Concept also needs rewriting after the Kosovo War, and that simply rewriting MC400/1 is not sufficient. The question of the use of nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation missions will certainly be extremely controversial in this process.

In an official reply to a questionnaire sent out by BASIC, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the December Ministerials would be the likely forum for the announcement of new policies, adding 'A process for considering such options will be proposed to the North Atlantic Council of December 1999.' In response to a question on the specifics of the proposed confidence and security building measures, the Foreign Ministry replied: 'The Netherlands is actively investigating measures that would be feasible in this context, and prefers to discuss those with NATO allies before making public statements on the issue.'

This longstanding debate makes the possibility of the withdrawal of the US free fall bombs all the more interesting. While this would not be incompatible with adoption of a new nuclear policy in MC400/2, it would make the policy difficult to apply. NATO nations in Europe would be extremely reluctant to allow nuclear weapons back on their soil except in the most extreme cases of national emergency. Any possible use of nuclear weapons under counter-proliferation doctrine would be seen as a US and not a NATO operation. On the other hand, the US and its allies would gain double credit for the withdrawal in world opinion. The announcement of the withdrawal will be favourably greeted, and the announcement - possibly at the NPT Review Conference in April 2000 - that the withdrawal was complete would deflect off much of the pressure currently building against nuclear weapon states in that forum. The US would also win back the favour of some allies who, already dissatisfied with the direction of NATO policy, were angered by the US Senate rejection of the CTBT. Withdrawal would be a win-win policy for the US and NATO.