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[Congressional Record: April 30, 1998 (Senate)] EXECUTIVE SESSION ______ PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive Calendar No. 16, which the clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Treaty Document No. 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. … executive amendment no. 2326 (Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2326. Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it is not a long amendment. That is why I wanted it read. It is very straightforward. It will be my intention to just speak for a few minutes on the amendment, and then I will withdraw the amendment. After seeing how all of the amendments seem to be faring here, it seemed ridiculous to waste any more time of the Senate to be voting on these amendments. I feel strongly about this aspect of going into NATO enlargement. More than anything else, I want to explain the purpose of my amendment and lay down a marker regarding an issue that I know concerns all of us here and which could have very severe repercussions in an expanded NATO. That is the issue of the nonproliferation treaty of which the United States is a signatory and, of course, an issue that we have pushed very hard. Many of us have spoken many times about the importance of not slowing down international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This amendment is simply a sense of the Senate regarding NATO's relationship to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility-- Mr. President, could I have order? I have trouble hearing myself. The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order so the speaker can be heard? He is entitled to be heard. Mr. HARKIN. I thank the President. This amendment just urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility of its nuclear-weapons-sharing programs with our obligations under the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The NPT is one of our most important international agreements. Not only is the United States a member of the NPT regime, we were a strong leader in establishing the treaty. Its purpose, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Through a series of provisions, it helps halt the spread of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons knowledge. That is the important part of this--the nuclear weapons knowledge. The nonaligned members of the NPT have expressed great concern over NATO's nuclear-sharing programs. Let me make it clear. The United States has nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in NATO nations. In time of war the United States could release these nuclear weapons to these allied nations. Of course, in peacetime our allies do not have control over them. We retain control. However, we do assist in training foreign militaries in nuclear-use capabilities. For example, we train our NATO ally pilots how to drop nuclear weapons. We train their ground crews on how to store nuclear weapons and how to load them onto aircraft. And 110 nations have expressed concern over NATO's expansion impact on the NPT. [[Page S3864]] The first indication of this, Mr. President, was in an article that appeared in Defense News, on March 30, saying that: ``The 113 members of the so-called nonaligned movement, none of which have nuclear weapons, have asked conference leaders at the meeting to discuss assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be targeted by nuclear weapons.'' Stephen Young, of the British American Security Information Council was quoted in the article as adding, ``If NATO won't give nuclear weapons up, and in fact continues to publicly declare nuclear weapons as part of its strategy for the future of the alliance, the fear is that some states that do not currently have nuclear weapons may become frustrated and decide to acquire them for protection.'' Now, we have a news release from the same organization that came in just yesterday that stated that: ``At the meeting of the member states of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty''--in Geneva on April 28, just 2 days ago, 110 nations of the nonaligned movement--``demanded an end to NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.'' A working paper representing the position of more than 110 states demands that--and I quote--``the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with states not party to the treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.'' Well, NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear-sharing arrangements. Under these arrangements, somewhere between 150 to 200 U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European States: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. NATO countries, of course, have always maintained that NATO nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war. However, the NPT regime also involves, as I stated earlier, the sharing of nuclear knowledge. So I think it is a well-grounded concern of the nonaligned nations to express their concerns about the expansion of NATO and the fact that we will begin sharing nuclear knowledge with the three new member nations. I think their fears are well founded and worth considering. Will we now, of course, with the addition of these three new nations, begin to share this nuclear knowledge? Are these three new nations full and absolute partners of NATO--as many have said here on the floor during the course of the debate, that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be second-class NATO partners but should have all of the rights, obligations, and powers inherent in any NATO member nation? If that is the case, then certainly we will begin to share nuclear knowledge with those three countries. I believe, Mr. President, that this could fly in the face of our obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Therein lies the conundrum. If we do proceed with NATO expansion--and it obviously looks like the votes will be here to do that--and if these three nations become full partners in NATO, as many have said they should, and obviously they will under the reading of the protocols, we then will proceed to share nuclear knowledge with those three nations. And what of nuclear capabilities? I am not saying that we will turn over control of nuclear weapons--we have not yet done that to any nation of NATO--but we could get to the point where we might turn over nuclear weapons to those three nations if, in fact, conditions warrant it. There is one other aspect--and I was going to offer another amendment, but I will not--the use and stationing of dual-use aircraft in these countries. Again, as members of NATO, we will be stationing aircraft in the countries that have dual uses. They can be used for conventional weapons delivery, but if fitted with the proper hard points and racks, they can also be used for nuclear weapons delivery. And will we then proceed to train ground crews and pilots in those countries in the delivery of these nuclear weapons, in their storage, and in their handling and loading capabilities? Again, I believe that we may do something which probably a lot of Senators have not thought about. That is how NATO expansion affects our obligations and our stated interest in the nonproliferation treaty. So I am hopeful that the President will give due consideration to this. Quite frankly, I don't know what the President can do. Either we are going to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the NPT and not share nuclear knowledge and capabilities and training with the three countries coming in, or we will share nuclear capabilities, knowledge, and training with these countries, and violate the letter and the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. You can't have it both ways. Another reason why I believe this rush to approve these three nations' accession into NATO is a march to folly--to quote the Senator from Arkansas, who last night quoted Barbara Tuchman's book, ``The March to Folly''--is that it just seems that the expansion has not been fully thought through, especially in the nuclear regime. If in fact we go ahead down that course, what then will Russia say? I know a lot of people have said, ``Well, Russia, understands what we are doing; they haven't raised a lot of objections.'' They have raised some. Again, as Senator Bumpers said last night, it is not now, it is when the elections are going to be held in Russia. That is when the hard- line right-wingers and the Communists will come out and say, see, we told you so. They will say that an expanded NATO in violation of oral assurances given to Mr. Gorbachev. Not only that, they could say that we have violated the nonproliferation treaty by providing nuclear capabilities to those three countries. Right now, the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START II treaty. Nationalist elements have begun to gain power by accusing members of the democratic party with appeasement of the West. This will just give them another bullet in their arsenal in arguing that, in fact, Russia should change its course of action. I was interested that former Ambassador Matlock, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union under the Bush administration, opposes NATO expansion. He stated, NATO expansion ``may go down in history as the most profound strategic plunder made since the end of the cold war.'' Ambassador Matlock further stated NATO enlargement ``fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the cold war, and proceeds in accord with the logic that made sense during the cold war.'' I agree with those words of Ambassador Matlock. I don't know Ambassador Matlock, never met him, as far as I know, but I think he has given us wise counsel. He is joined by many others across the Nation. I have watched this debate unfold over the course of the last few months. As more and more knowledge has gotten out around the country as to what NATO expansion really entails, the possibility of derailing START II talks, the unknown factor of what the costs are eventually going to be, the fact that once we have opened this door and with, I am sorry to say, the defeat of the Warner amendment--it was close--with the defeat of his amendment, you can bet your bottom dollar next year elements within our country will start pushing for new nations to be brought into the NATO umbrella. How will we respond to those? By saying that they are less worthy that Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic? Will we say that somehow they are not ready, that we are going to have this hard dividing line in Europe? So it is going to exacerbate and cause even more tensions in Europe in the future. Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will allow me to comment with him. I talked to former Ambassador Matlock today. I have known him since 1972, when he was part of our delegation that went over to work on the agreement. I have the highest regard for him. He confirmed to me very much what he advised the Senator. I just want to acknowledge that I think he is an authority that should be listened to. Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate the Senator saying that. I have not met Mr. Matlock or talked to him personally. It is nice to know that even yet today he feels the same way. With words from respected people like Matlock, and with concerns such as what I have pointed out this evening in this amendment, more opposition has come out in [[Page S3865]] editorials around the country opposed to NATO expansion. The Des Moines Register, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, the Salt Lake Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle--spanning the spectrum of the country geographically, spanning the spectrum of the country, philosophically and ideologically. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some of these editorials be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the Register's Editorials] Why Rush? Why NATO?--Why Expand a Military The end of the Cold War should logically have meant the end of NATO, the military alliance intended to offset the military power of the Soviet bloc, in favor of formal and informal alliances promoting more economic and social links. But logic has run up squarely against the interests of the defense industry. And far from disbanding NATO, the Senate is scheduled to vote soon on expanding it--to include the former Communist states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron have already promised to build arms factories in that area. The World Policy Institute reports that $1.2 billion in U.S. tax money has thus far been spent arming the countries in anticipation of NATO membership, and billions more must follow. Meanwhile, the proposed NATO expansion has been one of the soundest sleeper issues in American politics. While the defense industry has dumped millions on Congress to win a favorable vote, the matter has rated the most meager of media coverage. But both President Clinton and the Senate Republican leadership favor it, and the skids are greased. ``What's the rush?'' Republican Senator John Warner of Virginia asked in a recent floor speech. Warner said expanding NATO will isolate Russia, needlessly threatening an already-insecure nation that retains a huge nuclear arsenal. Our priority, Warner said, should be further reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Instead, we seem intent on beefing up a military alliance that has no logical opponent--unless we succeed in creating one. The Senate can vote to approve expansion, reject it or delay action pending further discussion. Expanding NATO without allowing reasonable time for considering alternatives is reckless and foolhardy. ____ [From The New York Times, April 29, 1998] NATO and the Lessons of History The small but vociferous band of senators opposed to NATO expansion retreated yesterday to trying to sell a series of amendments they hoped would delay enlargement or limit the financial costs to Washington. Only one, offered by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and John Warner, would put off this round of growth by making NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic contingent on their gaining admission to the European Union. While it was encouraging to see the Senate at last thoughtfully debating the merits of expansion, the significance of the moment seemed to escape many members. Pushing NATO eastward may, as its proponents argue, only reinforce democracy and unity in Europe. We will be pleased if that proves true. But with the Senate now moving toward approval, the consequences could be quite different. The military alliance that played such a crucial role in preserving peace in Europe through the hard decades of the cold war could become the source of instability on that Continent. The reason enlargement could prove to be a mistake of historic proportions is best explained by comparing the decision before the Senate with the far different course America chose at the end of World War II. America acted then not to isolate Germany and Japan, or to treat them as future threats, but rather to help make them democratic states. It was a generous and visionary policy that recognized that America's interests could be best secured by the advancement of its principles abroad and the embrace of its former enemies. Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, the United States is taking an entirely different approach to the loser of that conflict. Though it has offered financial assistance and friendship to Russia, the Clinton Administration has made NATO expansion the centerpiece of its European policy. It is as if America had sent Japan and Germany a few billion dollars when the the war ended while devoting most of its energy to strengthening a military alliance against those countries. It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile. At the very moment when Russia is shedding its totalitarian history and moving toward democracy and free markets, the West is essentially saying it still intends to treat Moscow as a military threat. The best way to defend Eastern Europe is not to erect a new barrier against Russian aggression but to bring democracy and prosperity to Russia so it will not be aggressive. The genius of American policy toward Japan and Germany was that it looked to the future rather than the past. It is lamentable that Washington lacks the imagination and courage to do so again. ____ [From the Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1998] A Case of Less is More With NATO? Like a fighter aircraft flying just above treetop level to evade detection by radar, the issue of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is moving, all but unnoticed by the American public, toward ratification by the Senate. With formal consideration of the expansion treaty expected to begin in March, most knowledgeable observers look upon NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as an all but foregone conclusion. And with no serious opposition among the 15 other current members of the alliance--Turkey is the only one that has even feinted at rejection--that conclusion seems well warranted, even if the actual expansion is not. This means that, very shortly, the U.S. will be committed to treat an attack on Prague like one on Peoria, a blow to Budapest like one to Birmingham. Since it is their sons and daughters, husbands and wives who will put their lives on the line. It would behoove the American people to give this issue the most careful thought. Unfortunately, that has not happened. Indeed, the Clinton administration and its supporters in the expansion effort also may not have thought as carefully about it as they might, because expanding NATO could have the ironic result of making Europe, in the end, less secure than it otherwise would be. Americans who supposed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. could finally lay down the burden of defending Europe may be surprised to learn that that is not so--at least not in the view of many in the foreign policy priesthood. What it has meant, according to the new NATO theology, is that NATO's raison d'etre has become not European defense from a ferocious USSR but European security. The difference may seem so subtle as to be insignificant, but it is not. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, summed it up as a matter of keeping the Europeans from falling into a ``war of all against all,'' of becoming ex- Yugoslavia on a continental scale. That is not an ignoble thing to do. The question is why is it the job of the U.S. any more than it is America's job to keep Hutus and Tutsis from each other's throats in Rwanda or to separate antagonists in any of the several dozen other places in the world where they insist on killing each other? Good question, and one that never gets satisfactorily answered in discussions with European supporters of NATO expansion--and virtually every European of any standing or influence seems to support bringing in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. We have argued in the past--along with such foreign policy eminences as Henry Kissinger--that expanding NATO is a bad idea mainly because it would feed Russia's centuries-old insecurity about having foreign powers along its western border. Certainly the West should not kowtow to Russia out of such concern, but neither should it needlessly antagonize Moscow and strengthen the anti-democratic crazies who use NATO expansion to promote themselves. In interviews last week with NATO and American officials in Brussels, it was clear they believe they have disarmed the Russia argument by the friendship and cooperation treaties and consultations that have been concluded with Russia over the last year. That's all very nice, but it's not at all clear that this era of good feeling is all that good or that it will outlast the perpetually infirm Boris Yeltsin. Even if Russia is currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will not always be so weak. Leaving Russia aside, the question remains: Is it wise for the U.S. to make a commitment so grave as that implicit in expanding NATO? It is not, and for an ironic reason: The more such promises America makes, the less seriously, ultimately, they will be taken, by those to whom they are made and those who might be tempted to test them. Even without a NATO commitment, the U.S. probably would treat an attack on Warsaw as it would an attack on London or Wausau. But even with a NATO commitment, would it do the same for Bucharest or for Prague (where there seems to be a resounding public indifference to NATO enlargement)? The very fact that the question can be asked--and it is asked by serious thinkers on this issue in Europe--suggests that, instead of increasing security in Europe, NATO expansion could weaken it. Philippe Moreau Defarges, an expert with the French Institute of International Relations, sums up this irony with a French proverb that, translated, means. ``He who seeks to kiss everyone, kisses badly.'' [From the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1998] Quash NATO Expansion The expansion of NATO is a policy in search of a justification. The U.S. Senate should reject it. The pivotal truth in the debate is this: NATO was created as a defensive alliance to contain the spread of Soviet communism in Europe. When the Soviet Union died, the reason for NATO died with it. Expanding an alliance which lacks a reason for being makes no sense. [[Page S3866]] If NATO had been redefined to meet a new threat or to serve a new purpose, the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to its membership might be logical. But that has not occurred, except on a basis that is ill-defined and ad hoc. If the new NATO is to be the policeman of Europe--a force to keep ethnic bloodshed and civil war in check in the Balkans, for example--that job can be accomplished without an expanded membership. Exhibit A is Bosnia, where NATO has taken the lead but where peacekeepers also have been drawn from nations outside the alliance. The Clinton administration argues that adding the three new members will integrate them back into the West after five decades of separation. But NATO expansion is not necessary to bring the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians back into Europe's embrace. They already are there by virtue of having established democratic governments and market economies. Indeed, their inclusion in the European Union would be a surer sign of their return to the democratic European family. The largest challenge for genuine European integration is not the three nations invited to NATO membership but rather Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Enlarging NATO toward the Russian frontier complicates this task, not because NATO threatens Russia or vice versa, but because, psychologically, the expansion looks backward to Cold War hostilities and suspicions. The NATO expansionists charge that it is old Cold Warriors who cannot grasp the vision of a new, larger alliance. In fact, the opposite is true. It is those who are still thinking in Cold War terms who would expand an alliance whose purpose no longer exists. ____ [From the Houston Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1998] Arms Cash--Don't Let Weapons Dealers Unduly Affect NATO Expansion Like any group or individual, arms makers have a right to petition the government. But America's six biggest military contractors have spent $51 million over the last two years mainly to promote North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and that raises concerns. As does the fact that 48 companies whose primary business is weaponry have given $32.3 million to candidates to advance their companies' causes, including NATO expansion. American arms manufacturers stand to gain billions in weapons and other military equipment sales if the Senate approves the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. New alliance members will be required to upgrade their militaries, and there is absolutely nothing wrong with weapons makers getting this business. However, it is vital that lawmakers not be blinded by lobbyist cash to the importance of approving NATO's eastward expansion only if NATO retains its focus on military matters and if enlargement costs are shared equitably among member nations. Also, the United States must continue to insist that the new NATO-Russian Council has no real or implied ``veto'' of alliance matters--a move that had been designed to make the expansion more cooperative with and palatable to Russia. These are important conditions, and they will continue to be important as perhaps a dozen other countries come to be considered for NATO membership. So however arms dealers' enthusiasm might infect senators considering expansion, lawmakers must keep their focus on maintaining NATO's integrity. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would have more articles, but I believe these are representative, geographically and philosophically, as to why we should not be rushing to expand NATO. I will close by saying that I will withdraw my amendment, but I wanted to lay it down as a marker. We are going to hear more about the NATO expansion treaty and what it will mean to the nonproliferation treaty with our sharing of nuclear knowledge with these three countries, all of whom, I might point out, are signatories to the NPT. I think therein lies a dilemma. To this Senator's way of thinking, I believe the NPT is more important to us and more important to the world community than the expansion of NATO to include these three countries. Again, as Barbara Tuchman said in ``The March of Folly,'' ``I believe we are rushing into this without considering all of its ramifications, especially with nonproliferation.'' So, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. HOME
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