TacNukes News summarizes recent developments related to transparency, accounting, and reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a jointly published by the Arms Control Association, the British American Security Information Council and the Institute for Peace Research and Security at the University of Hamburg under a joint project funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. For more information on the project, please visit our website at http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de
TacNukes News No. 4, March 2013
In this Update:
1.NATO Agrees to New Arms Control Body
2.European Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence
3. Turkey and TNW
4.The Netherlands and TNW
5. Conventional Imbalance and TNW
6. B61 LEP news
7.MPI Framework Forum Roundtable news
8.TNW and Confidence and Security Building Measures
9.Updated CRS Report
On Feb. 8, NATO agreed on the mandate of a new arms control body. Allies tasked the “Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee” to prepare a dialogue on confidence building and transparency measures on tactical weapons with Russia. Potentially, the new body could also deal with other arms control-related issues, including a dialogue between Russia and the United States about further nuclear cuts.
Meier, Oliver (February 2013)NATO agrees on new arms control body(Arms Control Now)http://armscontrolnow.org/2013/02/26/nato-agrees-on-new-arms-control-body/
BASIC’s Executive Director reflects upon the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, which included a BASIC event on “European Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century” on February 20, 2013. This brief paper includes summaries of views expressed by a number of international participants at the conference, with a focus on transatlantic relations.
Ingram, Paul (February 2013)The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: An InternationalPerspective (BASIC)http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/201302basic-ingram-usnucleardeterrence-internationalperspectives.pdf
This paper, the third in a series examining the position of a key group of NATO member states in the debate, focuses on Turkey. Turkey has a particularly interesting vantage point, sitting geographically on Russia’s southern border, neighbouring Iran, and being directly affected by the conflict in Syria and the wider process of change underway in the Middle East. It is also one of the countries hosting the weapons in dispute. Moreover, Turkey’s role and place in the world is undergoing rapid change, impacting markedly on its own perceptions of its national interests, which is, in turn, changing the context within which the country views the debate on NATO nuclear policy. For all of these reasons, Turkey not only brings a unique range of interests and concerns to the debate but is also central to it.
Kearns, Ian (February 2013)Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Weapons(Royal United Services Institute)http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/OP_201201_Turkey,_NATO_and_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf
As part of its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey is one of five1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries currently hosting an estimated 200 American tactical nuclear weapons at six European air bases. The weapons are deployed as part of NATO’s collective security posture and during the Cold War were meant to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rationale for the B-61’s deployment disappeared, raising questions about their military value, and whether or not the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons continue to have a place in the Alliance’s collective security posture. Despite growing opposition from other countries hosting NATO nuclear weapons, Turkey quietly supports maintaining the estimated 60-70 weapons deployed on its territory. Ankara also expects other NATO countries to continue their nuclear stewardship as part of the Alliance’s burden sharing principle.
Stein, Aaron (November 2012)Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Political Love Affair(Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies)http://edam.org.tr/disarmament/EN/documents/Turkey_TacticalNuclearWeaponsCleandraft.pdf
In December the Dutch Parliament passed a motion calling on the government of the Netherlands to make the removal of tactical nuclear weapons a "hard goal".
van der Zeijden, Wilbert (January 2013)Dutch Parliament to MFA: Make removal TNW a hard goal(IKV Pax Christi)http://www.nonukes.nl/en/news/dutch-parliament-to-mfa:-make-removal-tnw-a-hard-goal
The new Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. As recent as April 2012, he made it clear that he and his Labour Party believe that the Netherlands should negotiatethe ending of nuclear deployments with the US - without NATO consensus backing if necessary. Earlier attempts by the Dutch and German governments failed, apparently after huge pressure from NATO allies. Will Timmermans be the one to succeed?
van der Zeijden (December 2012)Enter Timmermans - Will the Dutch finally get rid of nuclear weapons? (NATO Watch) http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/enter_timmermans.pdf
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (December 2012)Motion 33 400, nr. 100Omtzigt c.s. About the Removal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Europe(Dutch Parliament)http://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20121220/gewijzigde_motie_van_het_lid_9/document3/f=/vj64ki5j05zr.pdf (in Dutch)
The analysis concludes that, while using all diplomatic efforts to reach maximum security vis-à-vis its neighbors, Russia can be expected to decline any steps toward reducing its non-strategic nuclear weapons without a dramatic change in the overall strategic force potential, ratio, correlation and balance with regard to its neighbours.
Shulga, Oleg (February 2013)The Conventional Imbalance and Debate on Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons(ELN)http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-conventional-imbalance-and-debate-on-russian-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons_462.html
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) expects additional delays in production and delivery of the B61-12 nuclear bomb as a result of so-called sequestration budget cuts.
Kristensen, Hans (February 2013)Additional Delays Expected in B61-12 Nuclear Bomb Schedule (FAS Strategic Security Blog)http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2013/02/b61-12delay.php
Representatives of national organizations working on global security issues called the Congress towithhold funding in fiscal year 2014 for the B61 bomb Life Extension Program until a public, independent review of technical options, U.S. security requirements and scheduling alternatives is completed.
(February 2013) Letter to Congress on the B61 Nuclear Bomb (Friends Committee National Legislation)http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/letter_to_congress_on_the_b61_nuclear_bomb/
"Substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe are of a questionable military value. If it had only been for us, we could live without them. As a member of the Alliance, however, we cannot and do not want to act unilaterally."
Nikel, Rolf (February 2013) D2A Speech at the Berlin Framework Forum: Creatingthe Conditions and Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World
(Auswärtiges Amt) http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/130221%20MPI%20Er%C3%B6ffnungsrede%20Nikel.pdf
On 7-8 February 2013, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted the seminar: The Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information-sharing and Confidence-building on non-Strategic Weapons in Europe. The workshop was aimed at advancing European security and stability through informal dialogue on the benefits of information-sharing, transparency, and confidence-building measures regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, including categorisation-and-verification issues.Several papers presented at the conference are publicly available. For more information please visit PISM's website: http://www.pism.pl/Events/The-Warsaw-Workshop
Winid, Bogusław (February 2013) Opening Address by B.Winid on the occasion of the workshop on Prospects for information sharing and confidence building (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12850
Gottemoeller, Rose (February 2013) Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller Acting Under Secretary for State for Arms Control and International Security (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12882
Larsen, Torgeir (February 2013) Transparency Needed on Short-range Nuclear Weapons. Opening address by State Secretary Torgeir Larsen, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12885
Durkalec, Jacek (February 2013) NSNW Transparency and Confidence Building: Adapting Concrete Measures to Different Goals (PISM)http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12844
Dvorkin, Vladimir (February 2013) The role of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the problems of their control (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12845
Enger, Elin (February 2013) The challenge of verification: The UK-Norway Initiative on Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’ participation in the verification of nuclear disarmament (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12846
Kolbin, Alexander S. (February 2013) Russia and NSNWs Reductions: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12847
Kozin, Vladimir (February 2013) Russian Approach to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Confidence Building Prospects (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12848
Kristensen, Hans M. (February 2013) The Challenge of Categories: Possible Paths of Solving a Problem of a Lack of a Common Definition of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12887
Miasnikov, Eugene (February 2013) Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Possible Scope and Conditions for Information Sharing, Transparency Measures and Verification (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12843
Pifer, Steven (February 2013) Possible scope and Conditions for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building Measures regarding Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12851
Schulte, Paul (February 2013) NSNWs: Definitions, Information Sharing and Confidence Building Measures, and their Role in the Wider Context European Security (PISM) http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12852
This report provides basic information about U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It begins with a brief discussion of how these weapons have appeared in public debates in the past few decades, then summarizes the differences between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It then provides some historical background, describing the numbers and types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by both nations during the Cold War and in the past decade; the policies that guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; and the measures that the two sides have taken to reduce and contain their forces. The report reviews the issues that have been raised with regard to U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and summarizes a number of policy options that might be explored by Congress, the United States, Russia, and other nations to address these issues.
Katarzyna Kubiak, Researcher IFSH
Oliver Meier, Researcher IFSH and International Representative ACA
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