WEB NOTES
The
Iraqi VX Warhead Threat: Hype vs. Reality
by Elisa
D. Harris
January 30, 2003
To
bolster the Administration’s case against Iraq,
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in the January
23 New York Times cited former UNSCOM chairman
Richard Butler’s estimate that a VX missile warhead
launched at a major city "could kill up to one
million people." However, Rice misrepresents
Butler’s analysis, at least as outlined in his book, The
Greatest Threat, and neither Rice nor Butler appear
to have fully considered the range of factors that can
influence the outcome of any given chemical attack.
In
his book, Butler does not state that a VX warhead would
result in up to one million deaths. Rather, he notes
that a single 140 liter warhead would contain
enough agent to produce that effect. But the fact that a
warhead contains a million lethal doses does not mean
that a million people would be killed if such a warhead
were deployed. As various commentators have pointed out,
the outcome of any chemical attack will vary greatly
depending on 1) the purity and form of the agent; 2) the
dispersal mechanism; 3) weather and meteorological
conditions; 4) the terrain of the target area; and, 5)
population density and disposition.
In
any strike by a warhead using a "point detonation
and burster" technique, the fuzing method
identified by Butler, a significant portion of the VX
would be destroyed upon impact and by the bursting
charge itself. Those closest to the detonation point
would be exposed to multiple lethal doses, thus reducing
the amount of agent left to cause casualties further
downwind. In an urban area, any agent that impregnated
paved surfaces or nearby buildings’ masonry structures
would be unlikely to cause a wide-spread, high-order
vapor hazard. Residual contamination would exist, but
could be dealt with by cordoning off areas prior to
remediation efforts.
In
short, up to a million casualties could result, in
theory, from a single Iraqi warhead attack. But the
reality is likely to be far, far less. In 1993, the
Office of Technology Assessment modeled the impact of
the release of the nerve agent sarin from a SCUD-like
missile over Washington, DC. It concluded that, under
average weather conditions (neither best nor worst
case), about 600-2,000 people would be killed. Although
sarin is approximately an order of magnitude less lethal
than VX, the OTA study assumed a warhead twice as large
(300 kg) as the warhead used in Butler’s example. The
OTA analysis also assumed that all of the agent
in the warhead was aerosolized and that it was
released at the optimum height above the ground (for
lethal effects).
As
the chemical attacks against Halabja in 1988 made clear,
any large-scale chemical attack on a populated area
would be horrendous. Rice, as both an academic and a
senior policy maker with access to the full range of
government resources routinely used to estimate threats,
should not mortgage her credibility or that of the U.S.
Government by making excessive claims about a single
warhead’s destructiveness. The reality is bad enough.
Elisa
D. Harris
Senior Research Scholar
Center for International and Security Studies at
Maryland
School of Public Affairs
University of Maryland
|