WEB NOTE
Plotting the Aftermath
Fiona
Simpson
Last
week, alongside final efforts to find a diplomatic
solution to the question of Iraqi disarmament, planning
had long since begun regarding the aftermath of the
possible war. The
Bush administration has been at pains to clarify its
determination to be involved in the physical and
political reconstruction of Iraq.
Nonetheless, there are concerns that such
preparations as there are remain inadequate and the
funding insufficient.
Moreover, there is growing unease over the
eventual authors of the proposed reconstruction.
Preparations
thus far
Demonstrating
their concern, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has been holding hearings on this question.
The chairman of these hearings – Dick Lugar –
was careful to assert what he saw as the primary goal of
the proposed occupation.
This,
he claimed, must be “to ensure security by
preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq while
simultaneously finding and destroying the weapons and
materials of mass destruction and their means of
delivery.” This
reiteration of American military policy in Iraq was
complemented by Senator Biden’s suggestion of who was
to lead the reconstruction of Iraq.
Specifically, Biden
has proposed that such efforts must be made “under
a UN flag, as opposed to a US flag, [so as to]
minimalize resentment from malcontents in the region and
beyond.”
Plans
are afoot. In February 2003, the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) published a thirteen-page report entitled Vision
for Post-Conflict Iraq.
The paper divided the priorities in a
post-conflict Iraq into five categories, specifically:
“water and sanitation; public health;
humanitarian seaports and airports; re-establish food
distribution; and emergency electricity.”
Within each of these sections, USAID has
established the course of reconstruction over an
eighteen-month period, as well as longer-term solutions.
USAID recently established an “Assistance for
Iraq” website,
to spread information regarding American plans for the
humanitarian assistance in Iraq and its reconstruction.
In addition, in January 2003 the Department of
Defence (DoD) established the Pentagon Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, cited as
evidence by administration officials that the US takes
seriously its obligations to Iraq after the war has
ended. .
In
the United Kingdom, the Department for International
Development has held Select
Committee hearings also focusing on post-conflict
strategies. Not
only would the reconstruction and resuscitation of the
infrastructure of Iraq take significant time and
resources, a summary of one hearing noted the
difficulties of planning in this area prior to the
outbreak of hostilities.
“The UK government and the UN”, it was noted,
“have been reluctant to plan openly for fear that this
would be seen as condoning military action or accepting
it as inevitable. The
US Government, through USAID, has developed a plan in
isolation from other agencies.”
The
United Nations has engaged in its own contingency
planning. A
December
report by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee –
UN Inter-agency humanitarian preparedness and
response plan for Iraq and neighbouring countries –
worried openly about the potential for what it labelled
“a humanitarian emergency of exceptional scale and
magnitude.” It further expressed concerns regarding
funding, resources and security.
The report, however, subdivided a UN response
into three phases: pre-emergency preparedness; initial
30 days response; and humanitarian response operations
for up to six months.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, while proposing
that some funds for humanitarian relief are provided for
by Iraqi oil funds, noted the particular responsibility
of the US to provide the bulk of such assistance and
reconstruction.
Growing
concerns
There
have been a number of concerns over both the method and
the means of the reconstruction process planned by the
US, UK and the UN.
As noted by the UK Parliament International
Development Select Committee, the US has been developing
reconstruction plans in isolation from other agencies.
A March 10 article in the Wall Street Journal
claimed that the Bush administration was preparing to
award a contract for reconstruction, valued at possibly
$900 million, to a private American company.
The article went on to note that USAID had sent
out a request to bid on the contract. A USA Today
article also asserted that the administration’s plan
for rebuilding Iraq “leaves much of the work to
private US companies.”
Finally,
Condoleeza Rice – interviewed on Al Jazeera
television – described the administration’s plans to
establish a post-Saddam “Iraqi Interim Authority”,
which is to comprise “Iraqis from all of the
country’s major tribal, ethnic and religious
groups.”
Questions
remaining
American
plans for the reconstruction of Iraq continue to raise
questions that carry profound implications for the
successful reconstruction of postwar Iraq and more
widely for the US (and its allies) and the UN.
- How
will the reconstruction be paid for? While the US government has signalled
its
intentions to ask Congress for some of the funds for this reconstruction, it is
as
yet unclear how much this project will cost. President
Bush has made clear his
intention to provide $22M in
humanitarian assistance for those fleeing Iraq. It seems
likely that much of the reconstruction will largely
be paid out of Iraqi
oil revenues, which would not only be ethically delicate,
but would do little to
enhance the image of the US in the region or elsewhere.
- How,
precisely, does one impose democracy?
Leaving aside the basic problem of creating a
democracy in the absence of a pre-existing
democratic culture, a democratic political system
– by its simplest definition – reflects the will
of the majority and thus implies a bottom-up process
of implementation.
Equally, it remains unclear who will impose
democracy and how this can be achieved without
appearing neo-imperial. It would be dangerous to take too much comfort from the
American experience in Japan following World War II,
as some in the Pentagon appear to have done.
The international and regional context in
2003 is clearly very different.
- How will decisions regarding the reconstruction
be made and, again, by whom? As Senator Biden rightly observed, such activities
conducted solely
under a US flag risk further inflaming the resentment of
those who view
the United States as occupiers.
With the latest reports of contracts on reconstruction to be won by private
American companies, no clear multilateral decision chain, and the possible
near-exclusion of the UN as a result – such sentiments will spread
easily. Not
only will the US leave itself open to accusations of profiteering,
but the credibility of the United Nations may be further eroded
by such marginalisation.
While
it is unreasonable to demand or expect a conclusive
answer to questions of reconstruction at this time, it
is crucial that they be addressed.
However, post-war reconstruction scenarios may
already have had a significant bearing on the manner of
war-fighting, if the ‘shock and awe’ tactics spoken
of so frequently by Pentagon briefers are not as
devastating as we have been led to believe.
Certainly, the unfolding US war-fighting
strategies must surely take into account their impact on
the psychology of the Iraqi people and their
infrastructure. If
war is as quick as the US and UK expect and hope that it
will be, the questions of post-war reconstruction must
be answered soon. If
it is not, of course, it will be necessary to adapt them
accordingly.
Fiona
Simpson (Ph.D., University of St. Andrews) is an Analyst at
BASIC (London). After receiving her Ph.D. for a thesis
on the effect of shocks on the development of the
nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, she
monitored the 2002 United Nations First Committee on
behalf of the Acronym Institute of Disarmament
Diplomacy and joined BASIC in
November.
Email: fsimpson@basicint.org
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