WEB NOTES

 PRESIDENTS POODLES AND PRE-EMPTION
THE UK-US SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN IRAQ & BEYOND 

Dr Ian Davis, Director BASIC

February 21, 2003

Ever since Winston Churchill first used the term in his ‘iron curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946, the ‘special relationship’ has endured and prospered despite a number of formidable disagreements over the ensuing years. The two low points were the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Vietnam War. The political and economic consequences of Harold Wilson’s refusal to send British troops to fight the Vietcong, despite Lyndon Johnson’s desperate attempts to secure Britain’s active support, were considerable: a devaluation of the pound and an economic crisis brought about partly by the US refusing economic assistance.

Vietnam aside, there is no recent precedent of Britain opposing US foreign policy in times of conflict. And British military and political cooperation in the 1991 Gulf War re-established the tradition of US and British invincible military cooperation. Proponents argue that Britain gained from the special relationship through fuller access to intelligence briefings, Polaris and Trident, and assistance in the Falklands War. Critics suggest it prevented (and continues to prevent) Britain undertaking a truly independent or Euro-centric world role.  The truth is that, as in any bilateral relationship, there are costs and benefits, and invariably a junior partner: in this case Britain.

So what are Tony Blair’s objectives in this long-standing Anglo-American ritual?  First and foremost, he aims to stay as George Bush's best friend in Europe. In public he plays a supportive role to Bush, acutely aware that his leverage with the President in the private sphere will be greatly enhanced if he is shown to be a loyal ally. While this has led to much domestic criticism, Blair is certainly no ‘poodle’. According to two analysts from the Heritage Foundation writing in the Washington Times in January this year, “Britain has emerged, in the eyes of Washington, as the world's second-most-powerful nation. Mr. Blair's standing shoulder-to-shoulder with President Bush in the war on terrorism has reaped enormous dividends in terms of British prestige and influence on the international stage. In every key area…Britain's star is rising”.

High praise indeed, and   contingent on Britain not rising too far above its station and challenging US hegemony. Assuming this to be unlikely, the authors conclude “it remains in London's best interest to look toward Washington and not Brussels in order to maximize its power”. However, with ‘old Europe’ fighting back in the currency markets―the euro’s value rising sharply against the dollar―news of the demise of the EU may be premature.

That the prime minister is one of the few people able to wield real influence in the White House is difficult to deny. He played a key role, for example, in pushing President Bush to seek the UN route that resulted in Resolution 1441. However, there has been very little evidence of reciprocation from Bush when it comes to meeting key UK foreign policy priorities, such as strengthening multilateral controls on small arms and biological weapons, US ratification of the nuclear test-ban treaty and agreement on an International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. 

So where does the special relationship go from here?  In the short-term, the focus will continue to be on Britain’s support role in any US-led attack on Iraq, and in the wider ‘war on terror’. Both leaders believe that the Baghdad regime is a major threat, and that regime change would benefit the Iraqi people and the Middle East as a whole. At their recent White House meeting disagreements on strategy came to the fore: the President insisted on bringing the disarmament standoff to a head "in a matter of weeks and not months", while Blair argued that "the most important thing is to maintain the integrity of the United Nations process".

But since the reality is that Blair is unlikely to be able to arrest this final diplomatic countdown to war, his attention is likely to turn towards what happens after Saddam. The debate seems to have gone back and forth, from a provisional government led by Iraqi exiles, to a military government led by a US general, to a UN led civil administration.
The one constant in all these scenarios has been the need for a large army of occupation - perhaps 100,000 strong - for an indefinite period. While the cost of such an occupation was apparently included in former economic adviser Larry Lindsey’s estimate of the $100-200 billion cost of the war (one of the factors in his removal), it is now missing from the official Administration estimate of $60 billion. Britain should be pressing for a Marshall Plan-level of engagement in the region. Otherwise any military victory in Iraq is likely to be short-lived and pyrrhic.

In the longer term, however, does Britain have a better option than simply basking in the reflected glory of a new Pax Americana? Is there an opportunity to use the UK-US Special Relationship to reshape the transatlantic agenda in a way that supports an international law-based approach guided by negotiated treaties and common security principles?

Blair is an idealist and constantly presents a strong moral case for Britain (and EU) engagement around the world, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, and would clearly like to see the US playing a more progressive role in world affairs. He needs to turn this idealism into a hard-nosed strategy to influence the direction of US foreign policy.  The myriad of contacts between the two governments’ bureaucracies – essentially the heart of the special relationship – could provide the means to do so.

First, he must reinforce the message to President Bush that military might is not enough in the fight against ‘rogue states’ and terrorism, and that American strength needs to be combined with humility, partnerships with allies and the development of a strong ethical dimension to US foreign policy. There are many moderate legislators in Washington who share a similar vision, and who are extremely disturbed by the “blustering unilateralism” of the Bush administration.

Second, a potential route-map has already been outlined by Republican Senator Richard Lugar, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in an article in the Washington Post in January. Known most widely for his Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme (which has worked to safeguard and destroy WMD stockpiles in the former Soviet Union), the senator from Indiana, outlined a new five-part US foreign policy campaign, which even ‘old Europe’ would find difficult not to embrace. It sets out an agenda for dealing with root causes of conflicts through a stronger commitment to democracy, the environment, energy and development. Helping to build a US coalition in Washington in support of such an agenda would be a truly positive use of British influence.