WEB NOTES

 IRAQ AFTER SADDAM: THE NEXT YUGOSLAVIA?

Amb Robert L. Barry

February 9, 2003

Following Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council, war with Iraq seems virtually inevitable. This could be done without a new Security Council resolution - but the United States and the United Kingdom would own the problem of what to do with Iraq on the morning after Saddam goes. Our publics are not prepared to take on this burden, and more time is needed to develop support for a large scale multilateral effort at nation-building.

The central question concerning post-Saddam Iraq is whether we will be looking at Yugoslavia in 1992 or Japan in 1945. Based on my years in post-war Bosnia, the Yugoslav parallel seems compelling. There are strong separatist movements in both countries. Both have neighbours which would pull it in different directions, both are awash in arms, and bloody reprisals will likely take place in Iraq as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Political parties care more about gaining control of resources and state industries than about introducing democracy. Corruption and a weak justice system discourage foreign investment. The military and police and judiciary need to be rebuilt from the ground up. And outside help is urgently needed to repair war damage and deteriorated infrastructure.

In the former Yugoslavia we have dealt with these problems through a major effort at nation-building, involving tens of thousands of peacekeeping troops, thousands of civilian experts from the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, the World Bank, the IMF and more than 50 nations around the world. Yet a decade later the job is far from done, despite the expenditure of somewhere close to $100 billion. There is little sign that serious preparations are under way to deal with post-Saddam Iraq.

The first question to face on the morning after is who is in charge. If Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post is correct, President Bush has decided to assign responsibility to the US Department of Defense, with US Central Command commander General Tommy Franks in command, assisted by a civilian political adviser.

If the past is any guide, the US Defense Department will be eager to get out of the business of running Iraq, especially since the one thing all Iraqi exile groups oppose is a US military government. The idea of a UN civil administration has been mentioned, but no planning for this, or even UN relief operations, can begin without the backing of the Security Council. A UN administration would also be unpopular with many Iraqis and would be slow to mobilize and expensive to maintain. Another option is the appointment of a High Representative of the international community, drawn from among the "coalition of the willing". Lord Paddy Ashdown, who fills this role in Bosnia, has learned that this model fosters dependence, is very expensive, and is difficult to end.

Another urgent question concerns the size of the occupation force and the duration of their mandate. Most reporting points to the need for some 75,000-100,000 troops. The US and the UK could not sustain a force of this size, given the need to rotate units to their home bases and maintain readiness elsewhere. So a new coalition of the willing would have to be created to maintain the peace - or the US and UK standing armies would have to be increased significantly to meet the demand. Based on NATO's experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, peacekeepers will have to remain on the ground for at least five years.

On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an immediate need for large-scale international assistance, to rebuild and provide relief. The costs of rebuilding the infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as followed the victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first resort of the international community. But the Afghan donors' conference was notable for pledges that were never redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and British policies in Iraq, a major contribution by the EU would be a surprise.

If war comes, it will not be about oil, but what to do with the oil fields which will be occupied in the opening days of war will be a major headache. Rival Kurdish groups and the Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around Kirkuk, an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish and Turkmen population. Much has been made of the possibility of using Iraqi oil revenues to finance rebuilding the economy, but increasing production or even restoring production will be slow, and will depend on foreign investment. Who will decide what to do about Iraq's billions in external debts, for example to Russia and France?

Faced with these alternatives and given the US Defense Department's distaste for nation building, a possible "exit strategy" would be to toss the ball to Iraqis as soon as decently possible. This was the course the US aimed at in Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable NATO forces to withdraw. As we learned to our regret, premature elections aggravated the problem.

In some quarters in Washington talk of finding a secular authority figure, possibly a general who might emerge as an early defector from Saddam, has replaced talk about a democratic Iraq inside its current borders. This would be a short-sighted solution.

Secretary Powell made the case that Saddam Hussein is in material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441, and that inspections are not the answer. But turning to the our publics and the international community on the morning after Saddam goes with a request for help in cleaning up the mess left behind will not be good for Iraq, the Middle East or the transatlantic relationship.

Giving diplomacy more time will produce a Security Council resolution, even if not unanimous, which will be needed to mobilize the support of governments for a major effort at nation-building in Iraq. That time can be well used to win the support of our own publics for taking on a burden larger than war.