Discussion Papers
IRAQ:
The Crisis Deepens
By
Tim Garden
January 28, 2003
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Military
on the move
As the British Government announces a major deployment
of combat ground troops to Kuwait, the sense of
inevitability of war with Iraq deepens. For those,
like the author, who over the years have argued that
the containment and deterrence strategy was reasonably
effective in keeping Saddam Hussein in his box, events
seem to be racing ahead of logic. Nevertheless, like
all planners, we must start from where we are today.
For much of the past year, the US Administration has
made it clear that it intended to change the Iraq
situation. President Bush's axis of evil speech put
Iraq firmly at the top of the agenda for action. After
the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, those who
advocated a more pro-active military strategy for the
USA found wider domestic support.
The
worry for the rest of the world has been that the new
American strategic thinking seemed to ignore the
constraints of the international system. It was
therefore widely welcomed when President Bush brought
the United Nations centre stage one year after the
attacks on New York and Washington. Iraq had flouted a
series of UN resolutions through the 1990s. Now, the
will of the Security Council to disarm Iraq of any
nuclear, biological or chemical weapon capability
could be enforced. The real threat of force by the US
made Iraqi compliance much more likely. As with any
threat, it will only be credible if there is both a
clear capability to carry it out if necessary, and
also the political will to do so. On this basis, the
deployment of US military forces in parallel with the
beginning of the UN inspection process is entirely
reasonable.
The
military threat posed by 170,000 US troops within
striking distance of Iraq is very real. Saddam Hussein
can have no doubt of the political will of President
Bush to use his air, land and sea power if necessary.
Co-operation with the UN inspection process is
therefore a better survival strategy for Saddam.
However, the build up of forces has been swift
and large. If as a result, Saddam comes to believe
that war will happen whatever he does to disarm, then
the calculus changes markedly. The presence of UN
inspectors hampers Iraqi military preparations against
any attack; they may also be suspected of providing
intelligence which would help attackers. Co-operation
with the UN thus depends not just on a credible
military threat, but also on a credible non-military
way forward. Getting that balance rightis very
difficult. The concern is that the US does not even
want to try.
Disarming
Iraq
The advantages of an honest policy through the UN are
significant. Disarmament in Iraq in the past has been
more successful through inspection than through
combat. Keeping the Security Council at the centre of
policy allows much greater diplomatic pressure to be
brought to bear on Iraq, and others who may plan to
follow the same path. If it is clear that there is a
real choice for Iraq between war or disarmament, then
there will be much greater international support for
military action should the work of the inspectors be
subsequently obstructed. That support would translate
into an explicit UN resolution for the use of force,
which would leave no doubts about the legitimacy of
any operation. The credibility of the UN would be
strengthened, and future proliferators would be
constrained.
The
alternative route, which is now seeming more likely,
is that the US decides to use force before the
inspection process has had time to work. There are a
number of drivers which point towards such a scenario.
The US military planners are doubtless agitated about
the rotation cycle in and out of the potential combat
zone. With over 50% of the expected final deployment
for a major war, they can no longer directly swap
units on standby in the US with those in the region.
For the UK, with a much smaller army, the problem is
even more acute. The US Administration may also feel
action is urgent for domestic reasons. Public support
for military action appears volatile, and may decline.
There are also strong voices arguing for the need for
regime change in Iraq, and also those who look to
secure oil supplies. The inspection route does not
address these aims.
If
the US pushes for early military action, it will
justify it through discrepancies between the Iraqi
12,000 page weapons declaration and US intelligence
information. The
recent find of small numbers of empty chemical
artillery munitions will be added to the list.
Diplomatic and
economic pressure will be brought to bear on the other
Security Council members to sign up, or at least not
object, to authorisation for war. At this stage there
is a dilemma. Discrepancies in the Iraqi statement are
a reason for more intrusive inspection. In any combat,
sorting out where hidden chemical or other weapons
have gone would be more difficult. Yet, the Security
Council will be keen to maintain the credibility of
the UN, and will try to avoid its being sidelined by
the USA.
Choosing
the Route
There are three possible outcomes to any early push by
the US for military action. The Security Council might
pass a resolution authorising the use of force; it
might be unable to agree on such a resolution, but the
US acts anyway; or the US might decide to delay until
it can get UN agreement.
A
new UN resolution authorising the use of force would
reduce much of the current anti-war sentiment. It
would ease basing problems that the US currently has
in Turkey and elsewhere. The United Nations
credibility would be reinforced. Yet, the consequences
of such a war remain unpredictable, and international
security may well be put at risk by instability in the
region and the rise of anti-Western sentiment more
generally.
Much
worse would be unilateral action by the US, with
perhaps active military support only from the UK and
Australia. The precedent, which has been trailed in
the new US strategy document, would be set for others
to try pre-emptive military action without legal
basis.. The 1999 Kosovo example has no relevance to
today's situation. Then, NATO acted over Kosovo
because there was an urgent humanitarian crisis, not
because it worried about some long term possibility of
a growing threat. Iraq does not pose an urgent threat
today. Indeed, it is much less capable than it was
when it invaded Kuwait over a decade ago.
The
best outcome will be for the US to stay its hand, and
allow the inspectors to continue their business. We
must be prepared to use military action if Iraq
disrupts the inspection effort. However, if the
inspectors find undeclared weapons, they should
destroy them as they have done in previous years. This
process can go on for many months, and will continue
to diminish any regional threat that Iraq might pose.
It should be the responsibility of all UN Security
Council member states to try to achieve the
disarmament aim without recourse to war.
European
Perspectives
As we approach the crucial milestone of the
inspectors' report to the Security Council on 27
January, the position of Europe is important. Of the
15 Security Council members, four are EU member
states. The UK and France as permanent members with a
veto have greatest influence, but Germany and Spain
are significant players. The EU has taken a low key
approach. Javier Solana has already made clear his
preference for a further UN resolution before any
military intervention in Iraq. As Greece took on the
Presidency, Prime Minister Costas Simitis said that
the EU would do everything possible to prevent war.
NATO
is on the sidelines. Doubtless the US would like to
see a coherent alliance approach, which could give it
legitimacy for action even without express UN
authorisation. Despite US briefings of the North
Atlantic Council, there is little sign of NATO being
prepared to take a central role in any war. The US
would at minimum hope to see NATO defending Turkey
from possible Iraqi counter-attacks.
Currently,
Britain seems to be the only EU member making any
serious preparations for taking part in a military
operation in Iraq. The sailing of a naval force has
attracted widespread publicity. Reserves have been
called up and equipment modified for operations in
Iraq. A small number of extra combat aircraft have
been sent to the region. The announcement of the
deployment of some 26,000 more ground forces was made
on 20 January. This represents a maximum military
deployment for the UK, which will be left with no
scope for rotating fresh troops through the combat
formation.
In
France some precautionary military preparations have
been undertaken, but there is little sign of imminent
deployments to the region. Germany finds itself in
continuing difficulty over relations with the US, and
also with significant domestic anti-war sentiment. It
has made it clear that its troops will not be part of
a coalition force against Iraq. The mixed messages
from Chancellor Schroeder add to the confusion. He
will allow the use of German bases by US forces, and
also German personnel in NATO AWACS aircraft defending
Turkey. However, it is not clear that he will give
Germany's support to a UN resolution, which authorises
the use of force.
An
interesting player in this crisis is Turkey. The new
government has shown great reluctance to put at risk
regional stability and its economy through support for
a war in Iraq. Yet US pressure, and also internal
Turkish military sentiment may make such independence
unsustainable. The rest of Europe seems to be hoping
that the problem will go away. It is a time when there
is a real need for a common European position, but it
looks as though the traditional division between the
anglo-saxons and continental Europe is about to be
reinforced. None of this bodes well for NATO or a
European common foreign and security policy.
At
a time when Europe and the US are under a real
security threat from international terrorism, the
focus on military action in Iraq is particularly
unfortunate. In
the UK, the Prime Minister has attempted to link
action against Iraq with the war on terrorism. He has
not yet managed to convince a sceptical public.
Members of the US Administration are at pains to point
out that "the US can walk and chew gum at the
same time".
Yet already the lack of strategic forethought
has seen a
crisis over North Korea, a worsening situation in
Israel, an
arms race in the Indian sub-continent,
undermining of NATO, and divisions in Europe to
add to the problems of the Gulf and a continuing
threat from al-Qaeda.
The
Way Ahead
Never has the need for a grand strategy been more
acute. We face a number of separate but
inter-connected serious security problems. The most
dangerous and urgent threat to the citizens of the UK
(and the US and the rest of Europe) is from a
mass casualty terrorist attack by al-Qaeda type
extremists. This is primarily a matter for
intelligence, police and border control action. The
need for resources to cope with post attack
consequences is one issue which has received
insufficient government attention.
The
second problem comes from the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and other conventional weapons.
The primary sources of such weapon developments are
states, some of which are less stable than others.
Iraq is certainly on the list of proliferators, but is
not the most threatening. North Korea sells on its
weapon technology to gain hard currency. Russia has
too many sources of such weapons under less than
complete control. Pakistan has capable nuclear, and
perhaps other, systems in a country with an uncertain
future. These and other states of concern need to be
addressed, but in a way which reduces the risks and
allows control to be exerted. This means the tools of
diplomacy and persuasion rather than the uncertainties
of military combat.
There
are a series of peace keeping tasks that remain
important. The Balkans and Afghanistan are not yet
stabilsed, and will consume western military effort
for years to come. There are then a series of long
term security problems. They range from the peace
process in Israel, though international crime
to the spread of disease and the implications
of environmental change. These all require attention,
and the longer they are left, the more likely they are
to spawn more urgent problems.
For
now, Iraq is in our sights. It saves the world from
having to think about the more intractable problems.
To get through this dangerous period, the member
nations of the UN need to ensure that their
organisation remains honest. The threat of force has
put the inspectors back in to Iraq. The threat is
needed to keep them doing their job. The consequences
of war are always unpredictable, and usually less
benign for all concerned than has been hoped. Only
major obstruction of the UN inspection process should
be the trigger for military action. Most of the EU
states support such an approach. They need to speak
with one voice.
Sir Timothy Garden
spent over 30 years in the RAF as a pilot, and was the
assistant chief of defence staff responsible for long
term planning for all 3 services. His last post was as
the air marshal running the Royal College of Defence
Studies. After retirement, he was appointed Director
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is
now visiting professor at the Centre for Defence
Studies, King's College London.
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