Summary
The
increasingly ambitious agenda for post-Saddam Iraq
now includes disarmament, regime change, democracy
in Iraq and a safer world for all. What is missing
is any realistic discussion of the sacrifices that
will be required to produce this kind of rosy
scenario. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
seem determined to avoid discussing the costs and
burdens of defeating Saddam Hussein and rebuilding
the country afterwards until after a decision to go
to war has been made. This creates a serious risk
that our publics and parliaments will decline to
shoulder the burdens of victory. Losing the peace in
Iraq may carry greater risks than attempting to
contain Saddam Hussein. We need to look carefully at
plans for peace before the die is cast for war.
The
usual argument for not being drawn into a discussion
about what will be needed to win the peace is that
the future is too difficult to predict. Yet the
Pentagon is quite capable of juggling multiple sets
of war plans, and the major outlines of challenges
presented by an occupation of Iraq are clear.
Initially at least it may require as many troops to
secure Iraq as to defeat Saddam. Some occupation
forces may have to remain for five to ten years.
Responsibility
for the civil administration of Iraq will fall
largely on the US at first, and there may have to be
an international civil presence there for a decade.
The creation of a ‘democratic Iraq within its
current borders’ is a long-range goal, not an
instant product of victory over Saddam.
There
will be a major humanitarian crisis that we are not
yet well prepared to deal with.
Iraqi
oil revenues will first go to providing food and
humanitarian aid, and what is left over will not pay
for Iraqi reconstruction. Getting others to help pay
to clean up after a war they have opposed is going
to be harder than has been acknowledged.
We
are talking about an even higher cost for war and
the subsequent peace than the $100-200bn Bush
economic adviser Larry Lindsey got fired for talking
about. Even without the unknowns, such as Saddam’s
use of WMD or the widespread destruction of the
Iraqi infrastructure, the bill may be upwards of
$300 billion, including grants and loans to members
of what is coming to be known as ‘the coalition of
the billing’. Yes, the US economy could afford
this, but are the American people prepared for the
sacrifices? And how much are even coalition allies,
such as the UK, able to contribute if their people
and parliaments are not convinced?
President
Bush has made the case that with Saddam gone and
Iraq under democratic rule; peace in the Middle East
will be more attainable. A more convincing case can
be made that a US occupation of Iraq will inflame
the Middle East and encourage terrorism and attacks
on Israel, thus making an Arab-Israeli peace amore
distant prospect.
A
skeptical if not hostile world will be watching how
the US and the UK meet these challenges. Failure
will undermine our security, as well as the
political careers of Bush and Blair.
Risks
of invasion
Military
victory against Saddam's military can be taken for
granted. But there are risks that have not been
adequately discussed.
The
bad guys, be they Iraqi, al Qaeda, or Hezbollah
could well beat us to hidden caches of WMD and then
use them against the US or its supporters. As
demonstrated in Afghanistan, terrorists are more
nimble than even Special Forces commandoes, and one
must expect that, with or without Iraqi connivance,
terror cells are preparing to take advantage of the
fog of war to grab stocks of chemical or biological
weapons. Seven years after 60,000 NATO forces
entered Bosnia, caches of prohibited conventional
weapons are still being found – and used.
Saddam
and/or some of his key lieutenants could escape
capture and organize to take revenge, as Osama bin
Laden and Mullah Omar have done so successfully.
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the most wanted
war criminals of the Bosnian war, are still at large
seven years after NATO entered Bosnia, and US and
allied forces have shown little enthusiasm for going
after them.
US
officials erroneously compare post-Saddam Iraq with
post-World War II Germany and Japan, two homogeneous
and disciplined societies. A more apt comparison
would be Yugoslavia. Chaos and violence could follow
the collapse of Saddam’s regime, as various
factions indulge in reprisals or simple looting.
This could be compounded by the intervention of
outside actors, supporting their own clients within
the country. For example, one of the most sensitive
issues involving Turkey is the role its forces will
play in Northern Iraq. Their stated desire to disarm
the Kurdish militias, or to promote the return of
the Turkomen minority to strategic Kirkuk, or to
severely limit Kurdish autonomy, represent only one
such hazard. Whatever the Turks do in the north, the
Iranians may follow suit in the south in support of
the oppressed and disenfranchised Shiia majority.
Undoubtedly,
there will be an initial large increase in the
numbers of Iraq refugees and internally displaced
people, followed by a massive return flow. The
returnees will be looking to return to their homes,
many of which are now occupied by those resettled by
Saddam. This will create new demands for pluralistic
government as well as challenges for law
enforcement. In addition, conflicting demands will
come to the fore - for example Kurdish and Turkish
insistence on control of Kirkuk.
The
removal of Saddam and the installation of a US-led
interim government in Baghdad will in itself have
destabilizing effects in the region. If the effort
is botched, the effects will aggravate anti-American
feeling in the Muslim world with attendant damage to
US interests. For example, the UN administrator in
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, has warned that the
weak government in Kabul may not be able to
withstand the buffeting from all sides that would
result from turmoil in Iraq and unrest in the rest
of the region.
US
planning for post-Saddam Iraq
In
2002, two parallel planning processes were going on
in the State and Defense Departments. In the State
Department, the "Future of Iraq" project
brought together US officials and Iraqi exiles to
produce a blueprint for reconstruction and
governance after Saddam. Hundreds of pages of
documents were produced, including suggestions for
amending the Constitution and other basic laws.
Meanwhile,
civilian Defense Department planners were thinking
along more ambitious lines, envisioning a democratic
Iraq that would be a model for change throughout the
Middle East. This conflicted with the views of many
in the uniformed military, which has a deep distaste
for ‘nation-building’ and fears being stuck with
an impossible task. But only the Defense
Department has the manpower to develop and implement
detailed plans of the kind required, and the
resources to carry them out. Therefore, in January,
President Bush decided that responsibility for the
period immediately after Saddam’s departure should
rest in the Defense Department.
Following
this decision, the creation of an Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was announced
on January 20. It is headed by the man who had
responsibility for relief operations in northern
Iraq in 1991, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.
A month after the formation of Garner’s office,
the Defense Department convened a (classified)
interagency planning meeting, involving some hundred
individuals from a dozen US agencies "each
responsible for a different mission in post-war
Iraq".
Overall
responsibility for Garner’s office and for the
planning process rests with Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, a noted
unilateralist. Michael Mobbs, a former legal
associate of Feith’s, will be handling issues of
civil administration in Garner’s office; though,
it has been pointed out, not reporting to Garner on
issues of substance. Although much of the press
reporting about developing plans has been based on
leaks or unattributed background briefings, the tone
has been strikingly unilateral. For example, the Washington
Post of February 21 speaks of "complete,
unilateral (US) control of a post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq".
Based
on our experience in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan
some projections can be made about our ability to
deal with the problems we will face over the medium
term.
Security
The
primary task of US forces after the collapse of
Saddam’s regime will be to maintain security so
that humanitarian aid can be distributed and a
working civil administration can be set up.
Conservative military planners assume that scattered
hostilities and the search for WMD will continue for
several months after the collapse of Saddam’s
regime, and that the task of stabilization will only
begin in 2004.
Currently,
a public debate is going on within the Pentagon
concerning the size of the security force that will
be needed immediately following the collapse of
Saddam’s regime. In response to a question posed
during a Senate hearing, Army Chief of Staff Eric
Shinseki offered his personal opinion that a
security force would have to be essentially the same
size as the invasion force, ‘hundreds of
thousands’ of US and coalition forces. This same
estimate has been put forward by outside experts,
such as the Brookings Institution’s Michael
O’Hanlon. A security force of 230,000 would be
less than half as large in proportion to the Iraqi
population as that deployed in Kosovo today or in
Bosnia in1996.
Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz dismissed Shinseki’s
estimate as "wildly" off the mark.
According to a number of press accounts, the US
Joint Staff is planning for a stay-behind US force
of 45,000-60,000, and expects that coalition
partners will supply a larger number. This
suggests a repeat of the situation in Afghanistan,
where US forces concentrate on mopping up Iraqi
armed forces and running down WMD while other
nations provide a peacekeeping force designed to
provide security in areas where there is little
organized resistance. Based on the lack of
enthusiasm for expanding the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, our ability to
persuade others to send tens of thousands of ground
troops to operate under US command in Iraq is at
least open to question.
It
would be nearly impossible for the US to sustain a
military presence of even 150,000 without increasing
the size of the standing army and restructuring it.
This is particularly true as we are looking over our
shoulder at the next actor in the ‘axis of
evil’, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, whose threats
become louder as our preoccupation with Iraq grows.
Thus there is a real possibility that, as in
Afghanistan, we will not be willing or able to field
a security force large enough to do the job, and
that other nations will not be able or willing to
fill the gaps.
A
heavily-armed US ground force of even 50,000 would
be adequate to deal with organized resistance by
military units, as was the case in Bosnia. But US
emphasis on force protection means we will be less
effective in dealing with small-scale violence,
reprisals and internecine strife. Part of US
invasion strategy involves arming opposition groups,
as we did in Afghanistan. Disarming and pacifying
these groups later, however, will certainly be
problematic, especially if they are not satisfied
with the newly emerging political structure of the
country. Thus, a 60,000 strong Kurdish militia
in the north and 100,000 Shiia in the south could
mount a robust resistance to a post-Saddam regime
they opposed.
The
provision of security involves policing, and US
ground forces are traditionally reluctant to do
this, lacking both the training and the equipment.
As US commanders in Bosnia repeatedly said, US
combat troops are prepared to use deadly force, but
not to arrest, detain and investigate criminals or
control riots or looting by civilians. Other
countries’ forces that participate in a
multinational security force will be bound by their
own rules of engagement, which generally forbid
taking action against civilians
International
civil police are likewise poorly prepared to deal
with armed mobs. In Bosnia, NATO decided to rely on
European paramilitary police, such as Italian
Carabinieri or Spanish Guardia Civil, but these
units were often ineffective, and NATO commanders
feared that they would get caught in a situation
that spun out of control, requiring NATO forces to
come to the rescue. An excellent study of the task
of nation building by a commission made up of
prominent Americans with experience in the field
suggest that NATO and/or the EU set up a
multilateral gendarmerie of this sort, to supplement
peacekeeping forces. Perhaps our experience in Iraq
will persuade political leaders of this need.
Demobilized
Iraqi military may present a special security
challenge. According to press reports, we plan to
confine defeated units to barracks and then
reconfigure a much smaller force. This could result
in hundreds of thousands of unemployed ex-soldiers
with easy access to weapons roaming the streets.
While US officials have frequently compared
post-Saddam Iraq to post-War Germany, this aspect of
post-WW I Germany is not what they had in mind.
Then, demobilized soldiers formed an anarchic "Freikorps"
that ran riot throughout the country and set the
stage for later revanchism.
Administration
of Justice
Closely
related to the policing and security situation is
the need to establish the rule of law. Leaving aside
the question of war crimes and the creation of some
sort of international tribunal to deal with them,
plans must be made to deal with those who indulge in
violence, reprisals, looting and ‘ordinary’
crime. As in Kosovo, there will be a judicial vacuum
as the Baathist judges are removed and the criminal
code revised. How does one deal with those who have
been detained by international security forces? How
does one introduce an equitable justice system?
Initially,
it appears that coalition combat commanders will be
responsible for law and order in their sectors.
Presumably this means that suspected criminals will
be held in military detainment centers. But bringing
them to trial is another matter. The eventual
solution in Kosovo was to bring international judges
in to deal with serious cases. But this system was
set up under UN authority, it took a great deal of
time to establish, and it has proven very difficult
to hand over to local authorities. If we choose to
treat these criminals as enemy combatants, or to try
them in military courts there will be an outcry
around the world.
In
Bosnia, the international community finally came up
with a formula for reforming the judicial system on
a fast track, by changing the system of judicial
appointments and purging the system of the corrupt
and politicized. But in Bosnia this has required
robust international intervention.
Humanitarian
assistance
The
exact dimensions of the humanitarian crisis that
will emerge after an invasion of Iraq will depend on
how the war goes. But a number of facts are known
already:
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The
Iraqi population is uniquely vulnerable, given
the consequences of the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf
war of 1991 and the subsequent sanctions. A
million children under five are badly
malnourished. Sixty per cent of the population
is totally dependent on food distributed by the
Iraqi government under the oil for food program,
which requires the import of half a million tons
of food per month.
-
UN
relief agencies now operating in Iraq under the
oil-for-food program will have to be evacuated
before any invasion begins, and getting them
back in will depend both on the security
situation and on a new UN Security Council
resolution restarting oil-for-food.
-
No
matter how hard we try to avoid collateral
damage, war will cause thousands, if not tens of
thousands, of civilian casualties. If WMD are
used, and if there is house-to-house fighting in
major cities, these numbers could increase
greatly.
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The
medical infrastructure is badly degraded, and
stocks of medicines are low. There is hardly any
capacity to deal with victims of WMD.
-
Potable
water supplies could be disastrously affected if
electrical generation cannot be restored
promptly after a war.
-
There
are already over a million internally displaced
persons and refugees, and this number could
double if war comes. Many would try to take
refuge in countries neighboring Iraq, where the
borders may well be closed.
In
his State of the Union address, President Bush said
"we and our coalition partners... will bring to
the Iraqi people food and medicine and supplies; and
freedom." While the effort to operationalize
this commitment is accelerating, it continues to lag
well behind the schedule for going to war.
The
US military has stockpiled relief supplies for the
emergency needs of one million and rations for three
million person/days, but we are counting on UN
agencies and non-governmental organizations to
provide and coordinate humanitarian aid once areas
have been secured. They, in turn, must rely on
funding from governments and on the ability to
coordinate their plans with the military. There are
a number of constraints on this process:
-
The
UN cannot operationalize relief plans without
the endorsement of the Security Council, which
will not be forthcoming until war breaks out.
Meanwhile UN agencies have requested funds to
make contingency preparations, which are slow in
coming. Contacts between the US Defense
Department and UN agencies have so far been
limited.
-
The
UN’s senior humanitarian official in Iraq has
warned that US and UN contingency plans for
relief are "grossly inadequate".
-
NGOs
lack capacity in Iraq. For a variety of reasons,
including the sanctions regime, most have not
been working in areas under Saddam’s control.
At this stage, no substantial funding is
available to these NGOs to make preparations for
a humanitarian crisis; some compare the $2bn
spent on military preparations to about $1m made
available to fund US NGO preparations. NGOs also
claim that so far there have been no meaningful
consultations with the Defense Department about
coordination on the ground.
-
There
is no money in the US budget for a major relief
effort. Congress will be asked to pass an
emergency spending bill to cover both military
and humanitarian costs of war, but the sums may
be much larger than the US public is prepared
for.
-
Funding
for UN operations must come from member states.
If the US has declared the UN ‘irrelevant’
by then, this may be harder to get than we
assume now. Also, to resume the critical
oil-for-food program, a new Security Council
resolution will be required.
-
Providing
security on the ground is key to the relief
operation. Even if Saddam’s regime collapses
quickly, it may be months before secure access
can be provided in some areas.
In
sum, steps are being taken to close the gaps in
preparing for a major humanitarian relief mission,
but we are not yet ready. Our eventual response will
be closely and critically examined by the world
media, particularly in the Muslim world. Failure to
adequately meet the challenge will have a direct
effect on our national security, and on the overall
verdict on the effort to remove Saddam.
Interim
administration
The
planning process for governing Iraq immediately
after Saddam goes seems to rely heavily on trial
balloons.
Initially,
background briefings and leaks seemed to center on
the creation of an Iraqi provisional government made
up of exiles and centered on the Iraqi National
Congress (INC). After opposition figures
inside Iraq denounced this idea, however, US
spokesmen backed away from the idea.
The
second publicly discussed version of interim rule
centered on an American military governor filling
the role played by Generals MacArthur and McCloy in
post-World War II Germany and Japan. This too played
poorly in Iraq and the Muslim world, and has been
replaced by a third variant, that of the American
civilian governor, "an American of stature, a
former US state governor or Ambassador". US
officials speaking on the record denied that any
such final decision has been made. When General
Garner met with UN officials in early March, he
indicated that he would initially be in charge of
civil administration and that after a brief period a
prominent non-American civil administrator would be
sought.
Governance
Our
stated goal is a democratic Iraq within its existing
boundaries, and US officials claim to believe that
such a solution can be attained within two years.
This seems wildly optimistic, given the lack of
democratic institutions or opposition political
parties. The aspirations of Kurds and Shiia for
autonomy and an end to the rule of the Sunni
minority suggest that creating these new
institutions will not be easy. The phrase used by
senior US officials currently is the need for
‘representative’ government, meaning presumably
negotiated power sharing. In fact, there is little
alternative to such an approach, at least until
there have been changes to the Constitution and
basic laws governing elections and the structure of
government. Considerable work has been done on these
issues through the "Future of Iraq"
project, and presumably these ideas will be tried
out on the Iraqi consultative commission that will
be formed from both those outside and inside Iraq.
Based
on the example of democratization efforts in the
Balkans, years will be needed to create an
infrastructure of democracy even after decisions
have been made on key elements of government
structure. Clearly the Iraqi people are as capable
of democracy as the Bosnians, but in Bosnia after
seven years we are still working to train
parliamentarians, reform political parties, refine
the electoral system and recreate local governments.
A no less lengthy process will be required in Iraq,
and to suggest otherwise is disingenuous.
What
seems to be consistent in all this is that for a few
months after the departure of Saddam, while military
operations are still in progress, an American,
probably General Garner, will be in charge of a
civil government that will work closely with the
theater commander, General Franks. As much of the
mechanism of the central government will be retained
as possible, while a process of de-Baathization goes
on at the top level of ministries and local
government, with US and coalition ‘advisers’
providing guidance.
This
kind of operation will lack legitimacy and popular
support, so the choice will be between rapid
turnover to Iraqis or the creation of an
international civil administration as a second
interim step. According to press reports, a small
planning group in the UN has produced a report
proposing something like the situation in
Afghanistan: a UN assistance mission in support of
an Iraqi interim government. The UN group reportedly
excluded a UN civil administration, as in Kosovo or
East Timor, as being beyond the UN's capabilities,
which it no doubt would be.
It
remains to be seen whether such a model would be
acceptable to the US, as it would fall well short of
the stated US goal of transforming Iraqi politics.
Coexistence of a UN assistance mission and a major
US presence could be difficult, especially if the US
has declared the Security Council irrelevant because
of its failure to pass a second Iraq resolution.
Finally, our experience in Afghanistan raises
questions about the effectiveness of such a
minimalist international role.
Another
possibility is an international civil administration
established outside the UN, similar to the Office of
the High Representative in Bosnia. This would
require the ‘coalition of the willing’ to bear
more of the costs of the operation, and EU
participation would be almost essential. Still,
countries that oppose war in Iraq may feel
differently about contributing to the peace effort,
particularly since this could affect their own
economic interests.
Moving
from ‘interim’ international rule to
‘democratic’ Iraqi rule will be a long,
challenging and expensive process. A premature
transition, as in Cambodia, could lead to the
undoing of the work accomplished over years. Staying
too long will make enemies of the forces we want to
promote.
Reconstruction
and oil
The
first point to emphasize is that ‘owning’
post-war Iraq is an economic and political
liability, not an asset. It is simply not true that
Iraqi oil revenues and other assets will be adequate
to pay the bill for reconstruction, at least
initially.
Even
if Saddam does not destroy his country’s oil
infrastructure, the bill for humanitarian aid will
use up much of its oil revenues, which currently
amount to $12-15bn per year. Over the short term,
that could rise to $20bn if oil prices remain high
and production is increased. In addition to
repairing war damage, we will have to repair
Iraq’s general infrastructure that has
deteriorated over the last two decades. By some
estimates, the bill for reconstruction will run to
$250bn. And of course much of the reconstruction aid
must be front-loaded, so that our promises of a
better life to come seem to have some reality.
The
usual first resort in such circumstances is to call
a donors’ conference. In the case of Afghanistan,
where our efforts had broad support, this produced
pledges but little money. The most likely source of
major assistance is the EU, but it remains to be
seen if the French and Germans will be forthcoming.
Of course their companies have interests in Iraq,
and this may override the politics of pique. But at
best EU assistance is slow in materializing. Given
US performance in implementing what the President
called a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan,
skepticism about the sacrifices the Congress and the
Administration will make to rebuild Iraq is
justified.
This
is not a war for oil, as the Iraqi people and the
national oil company will retain control of this
resource. However, civil administrators will have to
deal with a number of conflicting demands:
-
Turkey,
and probably others, are asking for
‘concessions’ to compensate them for the
risks of war.
-
Russia,
France and probably others are demanding
observance of the tentative contracts they have
signed.
-
Allies
and opponents alike are asking the US to ensure
that the debts Iraq owes them are honored. This
raises additional questions such as, for
example, do we try to arrange for supportive
Bulgaria which is owed $1.7bn to enjoy priority
over Russia’s $8bn?
-
And
then there is the question of contracts for
oilfield services and for exploiting new fields.
Will we just leave it to the market to deal with
these problems?
Many
of these questions are ones we will have to deal
with early in the process. UN planners have already
suggested that they do not want to deal with these
issues. We need to think now about how to
‘internationalize’ the response and place the UN
in the role of development coordinator. If we are
not careful, it might appear that oil was more of a
factor in the decision making process than it does
now.
Global
impact
President
Bush and other administration spokesmen argue that
toppling Saddam will help solve other international
problems. If it turns out that we win the peace, it
may have some positive effect. But failure to
produce a unified, democratic Iraq within a
relatively short time frame will more surely have a
negative effect on our posture around the world.
In
his February 26 speech, President Bush claimed that
removing Saddam would pave the way for peace between
Israel and a ‘truly democratic’ Palestinian
state. But at the same time he aligned the US with
the new Sharon government’s policy of continuing
to establish settlements in occupied territories in
the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon offers only to freeze
settlements, not remove them, if the violence stops
and Arafat is replaced. It seems most unlikely that
following a US invasion of Iraq, Palestinian suicide
bombing will stop and the process of democratizing
the PLO will move into high gear. Meanwhile the US
will be providing billions of dollars in loan
guarantees to bolster the Israeli economy. This
will, inter alia, permit the expansion of
settlements.
It
has also been suggested that dealing with Saddam
will have a moderating effect on other members of
the ‘axis of evil’. In fact, it seems more
likely that the effect will be to encourage nuclear
proliferation, as Kim Jong Il and Iranian leaders
conclude that they must deter the US with credible
threats of nuclear retaliation.
It
has been claimed that removing Saddam will weaken al
Qaeda and deter terrorism. But if the peace is
botched, there will be more recruits to terrorist
organizations and our fragile successes, for example
in Afghanistan, may be undone.
If the US goes to war without UN backing, we will
have seriously weakened the UN, NATO, and our
worldwide network of alliances. Even if we do not
need these institutions to wage war, we need them to
maintain a stable world in which US interests can
prosper.
Rethinking
war and peace
President
Bush has raised the bar to an impossible level for
the Security Council, by insisting on both
disarmament and regime change. This suggests that,
lacking nine affirmative votes, the US and the UK
will not call for a vote on their Security Council
resolution but will go to war, sometime around March
14. This approach guarantees minimal international
support for the post-war effort to rebuild and
reform the country.
Because
so much of the Bush Administration’s rationale for
the war is built on wishful thinking, and because
there has been so little discussion of the
sacrifices that would be needed to accomplish the
goals we have set, there is no sense of commitment
among the US and UK publics to the long haul. At
best, the outcome will fall well short of the rosy
picture that has been described. At worst, we will
see Iraq turn into a failed state like Afghanistan,
a breeding ground and refuge for terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda. This would be a more
serious threat to the world, and to the people of
Iraq, than Saddam Hussein represents today.
