www. iraqconflict. org

November 11, 2003

CONTENTS ... a collection of reflections on the Conflict

EDITORIAL

This is the twenty-fifth and final Conflict in Iraq Bulletin published by BASIC, ISIS and Saferworld. Over the past nine months these bulletins have been an integral part of a project aimed at contributing to international consideration of the political, military and economic dynamics of the Iraq conflict.

It has become increasingly clear during the course of the project that the military invasion was based on a false prospectus. The failure to find any weapons of mass destruction to date strongly suggests that the level of Iraqi capability, if it existed at all, was negligible. It certainly fell far short of constituting the "current and serious" threat claimed by the US and UK governments.

The reluctance of the US to pursue the UN route, either before or after the war, has undermined the basis upon which international relations should be conducted. It has also made the task of rebuilding Iraq that much more difficult. It is perhaps too early to judge whether or not Iraq can grow into a healthy society. What is beyond doubt, however, is that the Iraqi people themselves are the only ones likely to succeed in achieving that goal, and that significant international support will be needed over the long term.

Our last bulletin includes a series of individual reflections from a range of authors who have either been part of the project or who have made other important contributions to the debate on Iraq. We thank them and all the others who have contributed their views. We very much hope that the project did act as an authoritative source of information and critical policy analysis.

From the ashes of this work the three sponsoring organizations - also to be joined by VERTIC - intend to begin a new project entitled 'In Defence of Multilateralism'. Building on the proven success of these Iraq bulletins the aim now is to broaden our analysis to consider the wider benefits of following the collective path to peace and security in accordance with humanitarian principles and international law. We believe this to be a key lesson of the Iraq conflict.

Ian Davis, Director BASIC
Paul Eavis, Director Saferworld
Stephen Pullinger, Director ISIS

WHERE NOW?... REBUILDING IRAQ
Cooperation needed to hand power swiftly over to the Iraqis

Tim Garden
former Air Vice Marshal, Visiting Professor at the Centre for Defence Studies at Kings College, London, and former Director Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House.

When the iraqconflict website was set up at the beginning of the year, I contributed one of the first articles as UK troops were being deployed to the Gulf. Now with the benefit of hindsight, there is little in that piece that I would change. I said then that "the consequences of war are always unpredictable, and usually less benign than has been hoped". Much of the disorder and violence in post-conflict Iraq stems from lack of planning for the challenges of rebuilding that ravaged country. The way forward is clear, just as the optimum strategy, working with the international system, was clear in January. But the war took place, and we are where we are.

Now American, British, Polish and other military forces are needed, and possibly in greater numbers, to provide a modest level of security for the proper political process.That process must be seen to be legitimate. The UN needs to take charge of the process of interim government, constitutional development, eventual elections and administration of Iraq's resources for the direct benefit of its people. So long as the Coalition Provisional Authority acts as the ultimate arbiter of every facet of this process, there will be slow progress in stabilising the country.

New milestones of the Iraq conflict are marked almost daily by fresh tombstones. More US forces have died in combat since the end of the war-fighting phase than during the war. Over 1000 Iraqi children have been injured in the same period by unexploded munitions. Iraqi civilians get caught in the crossfire daily. Welcome to the messy business of clearing up after a war. Whatever our personal beliefs about the wisdom of intervening in the first place, we all need to work at bringing Iraq back to life in the international community. This will need international cooperation, money and also a handing over of power to Iraqis as quickly as can be achieved safely. When we finish that job, perhaps we should go back and fulfill the similar promises that we made to Afghanistan.

Options for progress are limited and must be realistic

Bob Barry
Senior Associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, member of the British American Security Information Council, and former head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January 1998 to June 2001.

In Iraq we are fighting the wrong war at the wrong time for the wrong reasons. Like many, I opposed going to war last Spring because I did not think Iraq presented an imminent danger, to the US or to its neighbours. More importantly, I did not think we had planned adequately for the post war period, or that we had faced up to the costs, in resources or lives, of occupying Iraq.

As it turns out, we had plenty of time to wait for a consensus to develop in favour of a multilateral effort. A few more weeks of diplomacy would have probably produced a Security Council resolution in support of regime change, and a far greater degree of international support. Many opponents of the war predicted that if we went ahead without a clear warrant from the UN, we would end up owning the problem and bearing the burden pretty much alone.

That is where we are today, and Americans should face the issue squarely. We have no choice but to bear the burden we created, for there is no backing out. The cost in American lives lost during the occupation has now exceeded the numbers killed during the combat phase, and no end is in sight. The cost of the war, the occupation and the reconstructionwill cost US taxpayers over $160 billion, with more to come. There is little hope that US forces can be drawn down any time soon.

In fact, Iraq holds the promise of becoming a much better place after Saddam, as long as the US is prepared to stay the course. But Democratic hopefuls and critics of the war should recognise that their proposed remedies or palliatives have no hope of success. At the same time, the Bush Administration should abandon the illusion that the cost of the war can be passed on to future generations. This war was fought in the name of the rich, so the bill should be presented to them in the form of foregone tax reductions.

Those who advocate turning the problem over to the UN should recognise that this was never a possibility, even with complete support from the Security Council. The organisation simply lacks the capacity to take responsibility for security or civil administration in a country the size and volatility of Iraq. As pointed out by Martti Ahtisaari the UN was incapable of securing its own headquarters, and it will no doubt be months before even a core of international staff will return to Baghdad.

The idea that Iraq could pay for its own reconstruction with its oil revenues was always wishful thinking, as should have been evident to anyone who read the State Department's "Future of Iraq" study . And the idea that US reconstruction funding can be in the form of loans rather than grants ignores both international law and the capacity of Iraq to deal with its crushing debt.

Many have suggested "Iraqisation", which in its crudest form translates into turning sovereignty over to the nearest Iraqi and heading for the door. That is a certain recipe for leaving Iraq in worse shape than under Saddam, as it would leave the future of the country to the mercy of warring tribes and religions. Pushing the Iraqi military into the foreground to deal with security issues may provide some breathing space for the US Army, but it could also backfire. We need to remember why we were in such a hurry to disband the Iraqi army in the first place.

With the centralisation of post-war planning shifting to the NSC and the Coalition Provisional Authority gaining traction, the US is adopting a more realistic approach to dealing with the huge problem which we now own. Some headway is being made, despite intensification of attacks on US and coalition forces and cooperating Iraqis. Let's face the long slog ahead squarely and get on with it.

Necessary conditions for reconstruction

Robert Springborg
Professor and Director, London Middle East Institute, SOAS.

The present strategy for political reconstruction is unlikely to succeed because it is too ambitious and is not provided adequate nurturing and support by the Occupying Powers or any other third party. The targets of a ratified constitution, free and fair elections, and a functioning, democratic government within a little more than one year would be ambitious even for a war-shattered country with a long tradition of constitutional, democratic governance. Alas, Iraq has no such tradition and is beset with religious and ethnic cleavages. To shift from authoritarian, centralised control to democratic pluralism is a huge undertaking, especially when trust between the various communities has not been built up through a protracted process of political interaction within a tolerant environment.

The drafting and ratification of a constitution that commits citizens to share their political fates is pre-eminently an act of political trust. Many in Iraq are hesitant to make such a commitment, to say nothing of disagreeing over the actual rules by which the political game should be played. It would, therefore, be more realistic to aim for interim agreements with the date for the final drafting and ratification of a constitution to be set well into the future. The peace treaty in Sudan, for example, calls for more than six years of experimentation with the draft "constitution" before a final decision has to be made on whether the North and South will indeed even remain in a single state.

As for nurturing and support, the leaders of the CPA, in the absence of the UN, should be actively involved in facilitating as much communication as possible between the various Iraqi parties, helping them to address and work through the huge number of issues that need to be resolved before a functioning, representative government can emerge. This facilitative role disappeared when the UN Special Representative was killed and has not been re-established. Unless and until it is, little real progress will be made in fostering political trust, the first step on the path to building a new state.

Cooperating to ensure a future for Iraq

Alistair Millar
Vice President and Director of the Washington, D.C. office of the Fourth Freedom Forum.

President Bush's poll numbers are slipping as more troops and civilians die each day in Iraq. Far from helping to win the war against terror, the US presence in Iraq has helped to become a recruiting sergeant for more terrorists.Serious deceptions about the urgency of the pre-war threat coupled with woefully inadequate planning have put the US coalition, the taxpayers that pay for it, and those on the ground in Iraq in a troubling position.It is not yet too late for the US to correct its current policy failures.

The challenge before the Bush administration is to provide the visionary leadership needed to harness an international consensus that produces real resources for change on the ground in Iraq. A strategy must be implemented for quickly transferring authority to Iraqis in a way that brings stable self-rule.This will require an interim Iraqi government, established by incorporating the current governing council into a larger and more representative body separate from US control. As the occupying power, the US are bound by international law to guarantee the security and well being of the Iraqi people. Coalition forces would therefore not leave abruptly, but would withdraw gradually as an Iraqi interim government and reconstituted army take charge. The US would also be responsible for helping finance humanitarian relief and economic reconstruction. The United Nations is more experienced and far better placed to help, as it did in Afghanistan, to oversee the selection of additional delegates representing all of Iraq's regions and major constituencies. The UN can more effectively manage the political transition process, create a genuine "transitional government" with substantial authority to manage Iraqi affairs during the transition, set priorities for a UN-authorised international security force, administer oil revenues and economic reconstruction, and accelerate the creation of an indigenous Iraqi police force and Iraqi armed forces.

Whatever their prewar disagreements, many nations, and the UN itself, support the same ends as US policy: an independent, safe, democratic, and prosperous Iraq. When more funds and troops are needed next year Congress and the White House will be forced to make a decision: engage and encourage international support or watch the polls slide further as election day approaches.

Divide and Rule will only feed the hate

Mark Lattimer
Director of Minority Rights Group International. MRG's recent report 'Building Democracy in Iraq' is available from www.minorityrights.org.

Strategists in Washington prosecuting the 'war against terror' all agree that there are few greater long-term threats than that posed by failed states, which provide a base for international militants to grow and train their organisations and plan their operations. Yet they are currently looking at the nightmare scenario of the US itself having created a failed state, bordering Saudi Arabia, right in the heart of the Middle East.

The need to avoid that scenario in Iraq makes the emergence of a legitimate Iraqi leadership based on a new constitutional settlement the number one political priority. To work, Iraq's democracy needs to facilitate cooperation between the country's different ethnic and religious groups, instead of placing them in competition. It would be a grave mistake to ignore the enduring legacy of the Ba'athist regime. Both in his genocidal campaigns and in his extensive use of tribal and ethnic networks of patronage, Saddam Hussein deliberately exploited communal differences to shore up his power or to destroy those he saw as enemies. Yet in recent months coalition forces have found themselves turning to those very same tribal commanders to deliver security and too often the US looks as if it is benefiting from communal differences in the representation of the Iraqi Governing Council - a by default policy of divide and rule.

For Iraq to stand a chance of building a stable, multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy, minority rights concerns therefore have to be central to the process of forging a new constitution. All Iraq's varied peoples need to be protected and to have a voice in central government, while enabling appropriate regional autonomy and taking account of the long-held aspirations of the Kurds for regional self-government. The tender of reconstruction contracts, the management of oil revenues and the food distribution network, and the reintegration of refugees and internally-displaced people all need to observe the principles of fair representation and non-discrimination. The mechanisms for delivering reconstruction need to match, and be seen to match, the vision of an inclusive Iraqi society, run by Iraqis.

Iraqi economic development and the US dilemma

Colin Rowat
Department of Economics, Birmingham University.

Debate on Iraq's post-war economy centres on a word with no economic meaning: reconstruction. The twin towers will not be rebuilt in Manhattan; Iraq will not be restored to some status quo ante state. The centre should be economic development, allowing application of decades of practice and research into how poor countries - like Iraq - become less so. This change in focus would shift attention away from aid. International comparisons show aid inflows to be uncorrelated with investment inflows; there are no modern examples of sustained aid-driven growth. Instead, the focus should be on policy incentives. This is increasingly understood in official conditional aid agreements, including debt relief initiatives.

The Bush administration's 2002 development strategy adopts this analytical framework, linking "greater contributions from developed nations" to "greater responsibility from developing nations". It operationalises the concept of responsible nations via fourteen performance indicators in three categories. Countries performing above the median in their income category "on half of the indicators in each of the three policy areas" are deemed high performers, and eligible for Millennium Challenge funding. Perversely, US occupation of Iraq probably precludes high performance. Of the six governance indicators (one of the policy categories) political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, the rule of law, and the control of corruption likely remain very low; the last three may even have deteriorated.

Hence the dilemma: economic development, by the Bush administration's own standards, requires democracy in Iraq; protecting democratic institutions in Iraq requires strong law enforcement, which only the US (after dissolving the Iraqi army) seems in a position to provide; yet a democratic Iraq is unlikely to be strongly pro-US.

COSTS OR WAR AND PEACE
Cashing in on Iraq. What is cost of peace?

Christoph Wilcke
Middle East Research and Advocacy Officer, Save the Children Fund UK and adviser to the Iraqconflict Project

In 1991, President Bush Sr. looked to his accountants to ensure his allies covered the cost of ousting Saddam from Kuwait. Kuwaitis and others now look set to cash in on $88bn awarded in war reparations for the six months of Iraqi occupation in 1990. Perhaps Saddam should have listened to his accountants before launching that war. President Bush, Jr., too, counting the rising costs six months into the occupation of Iraq, would have done well to rehearse his arithmetic in advance of invasion.

The US elsewhere is a master of financial persuasion. Here's what the US could have done before the war: offer the Iraqi people a gift of $55bn (estimated reconstructions costs) through UN agencies, lift sanctions and enter into a non-aggression pact. In return, Iraq would make good on its offer for CIA and Congressional inspectors in addition to ongoing UN inspections. Without a war, Iraq, too, would have earned at least $4bn of oil revenue. Instead, the US will now spend around $150bn in 2003 and 2004 alone on Iraq. All other donors at Madrid scraped together another $13bn until 2007. The UN said it needed $2.2bn over six months for humanitarian operations and $36bn over 4 years for reconstruction.

It is time to bring out the accountants to ensure that US and UN reconstruction money, to bring stability, ends up in Iraqi pockets. Reconstruction agencies should abide by the aid agencies standard 10% agency overheads benchmark. Taxpayers, too, should demand accountability to prevent their Iraq reconstruction monies ending up as subsidies to big industry.

Counting the cost of War - A View from Capitol Hill

Bridget Moix
Legislative Secretary on Iraq issues, Friends Committee on National Legislation.

The costs of the Administration's so-called "preemptive" war are hard to ignore. The Administration has now requested and received a total of over $165 billion in supplemental war funding from Congress, above and beyond the regular $400 billion US military budget. Over 380 US troops have been reported killed, more than were lost in the 1991 Gulf War. An accurate count of Iraqis killed cannot be made, but runs in the thousands. International polls show a persistent decline in US standing in the world, growing fear and resentment toward the world's lone superpower, and an increase in recruitment by terrorist groups. National polls show declining support for the Administration's handling of Iraq and US foreign policy.

It is hard to believe that many in the White House and on Capitol Hill are declaring US policy in Iraq a success… we are succeeding, it will be a long, hard slog, and we will stay the course. But ideologically-driven determination to persist in a failed policy will do little to address the reality of continued violence and instability in Iraq. Instead, the US should start a viable, internationally legitimate political transition. Public safety must be established in Iraq, Iraqis must be given greater decision-making power in their own future, and the international community must be treated as a partner rather than a subordinate.

FCNL began its work to oppose the Administration's war against Iraq with one clear message: War is not the answer. More than a year later, that message seems as relevant as ever.

Health of Iraqi people is worse following war

New report to be released by Medact November 11th

The war in Iraq was declared officially at an end six months ago, but the health and environmental costs of the conflict continue. Drawing on sources within and outside Iraq, Medact believes the health consequences of the 2003 war on Iraq will be felt by its people for years, maybe generations. The report, Continuing Collateral Damage: The health and environmental costs of war on Iraq 2003, will be released on November 11 in London and 13 other countries. It follows Medact's initial report on Iraq, 'Collateral Damage', which was published in November 2002, prior to the war.

The findings have emerged from a comprehensive independent survey by an international team of authors and advisers assessing the health and environmental impact of the war undertaken by Medact since March 2003. More than 20,000 Iraqis have died between the start of hostilities and when the report was finalised late last month, and the situation is deteriorating. Because of the continuing insecurity and alarming deterioration in the health of Iraqi people since the war, Medact is calling on the occupying forces and UN agencies to:

• Further investigate the current and long-term health impacts of the war.

• Ensure that all reconstruction of public services including health is fully funded

Carry out their obligation under the Geneva Convention to maintain law and order and to protect hospitals, health professionals and those who provide humanitarian aid.

Lessons for the future
Advice on intervention from a former defence ministry policy man

Bill Hopkinson
former Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy), MoD and former Deputy Director and Director of Studies, Royal Institute for International Affairs.

The old saying was that if you wanted peace you should prepare for war. Now, if you go to war you should plan first for peace, since you go to (elective) war to win the peace. That not having been done, this conflict has augmented, at least in the short term, rather than reduced the security threats to the West. Moreover, ultimate objectives were not publicly and clearly defined.

The coalition forces fought an excellent military campaign; the logistics performance of the US was enormously impressive. Technical innovation and connectivity allow almost any non-US forces to be outclassed in conventional combat by inferior numbers. However, more is required. Rebuilding societies calls for more than a few civil affairs officers tacked on to the military. It needs colonial administrators, even if none dares speak the name, and effective gendarmes. Both will require cultural understanding and intelligence skills. Start thinking now how you will find them.

Intelligence is a matter of judgement not certainty. Great caution has to be exercised in thinking around pre-emptive warfare, and better thinking is needed about where and how action initiated will end up. We also need more personnel of the right sort on the ground; by all means develop Network Centric Warfare, but also realise that the requirements for success go far beyond the military-technical. Organise the war if you can, and certainly the aftermath, so as to engage a wide body of international opinion. You will need their men, their money, and their voice as you build a functioning society. You will need their cooperation on a wide range of other threats. Keep overall strategies and the direction of nation-building out of the hands of defence ministries.

The importance of a united Europe

Glenys Kinnock MEP
Member of the European Parliament for Wales since 1994.

Iraqi, British and US citizens continue to die in a situation of unrest and uncertainty. President Bush triumphantly announced the end of the war, but violence and insecurity continue and grow. Hatred, resentment and alienation is spiralling in Iraq, and in the wider Arab world. Those of us who opposed the war never denied that Saddam Hussain was a vile despot; but the war was not fought to break Iraq's appalling human rights record. We searched in vain for arguments that would convince us that re-emptive military action was justified. So little thought went into what would happen when war ended. Discussions on funding for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq are simply a waste of time until there is stability, and the space to build democracy and opportunity for the people of Iraq.

These have been testing times for EU-US relations. There is a clear difference of approach. America watches anxiously when a EU Common Foreign Security Policy is on the cards. Yet the US should understand that relationships would be easier if Europe was more coherent within the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. Lessons have been learned since the failure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in advance of the invasion of Iraq. The value of the EU's potential unity was demonstrated in its recent "conditional engagement" with Iran. Needing a closer economic relationship with Europe, Iran has expressed a willingness to improve its human rights record and agreed to nuclear inspections. This is in stark contrast to the US with its "axis of evil" approach, where no rapprochement is anticipated. When next May, we become a Union of 25, it will be necessary to extend Qualified Majority Voting to all areas of external relations - except defence, and to build a proper respect for the UN and its role in peace building and peace making.

EU - Conscientious Objector

Karel Koster
AMOK, Netherlands

Napoleon Bonaparte once declared that one can do a lot with bayonets, except sit on them. The limitations of military force are especially acute in an opposed occupation. Europeans have learned this lesson in their mutual wars and as colonial powers. The war on Iraq is commonly seen across Europe as a unilateralist adventure, initiated by the present US administration and supported by the British government. It undermined the UN's multilateral decision-making process and created a dangerous precedent for other countries.

The majority European view is that true Atlanticists consider present US policies ill advised and essentially the consequence of the neo-conservative project. This view is divided between those (largely French) that promote an independent European foreign and therefore security policy, separately from NATO (which is simply regarded as a codeword for the US), and those that see Atlantic relations as an all-encompassing framework within which a stronger Europe should be built.

The collective memories of the history of the European continent play a defining role. New European policies will not necessarily be peaceful, but they will tend to emphasise the importance of multilateral political and diplomatic solutions to crises. The rift with the US neo-conservative view was brought into the open by the events of September 11th and the wars fought in their aftermath. As a result, the majority of the EU will not participate in the unilateralist policies of the present US government.

Investment in international policing is crucial

Peter H. Gantz
Peacekeeping Associate at Refugees International, and Coordinator of the Partnership for Effective Peace Operations.

The US military engagement in Iraq has illustrated a lack of capacity to deal with post-conflict security problems. The assertion by US officials that looting and other post-conflict lawlessness in Iraq was a surprise is hardly believable. In every military intervention the US has been involved with during the past two decades, widespread looting and a collapse of public order followed once combat was over. With a relatively minor investment in civilian policing capacity, whether under the auspices of the US or the United Nations, critical progress towards stabilising post-conflict countries could be achieved.

The Clinton administration Presidential Decision Directive 71 sought to improve US capacity to conduct civilian police activities in peace operations and rebuild foreign judicial systems. The UN's Brahimi Panel, convened to take a hard look at the UN peace operations system and make recommendations for improvements, suggested various reforms of the UN civilian policing capacity. It is time for the Bush administration and Congress to take a public leadership role in supporting the enhancement of US and UN capacities for civilian policing and post-conflict security.

Lessons from UNMOVIC

Trevor Findlay
Executive Director, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

Although its inspectors were present in Iraq for barely three months, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) demonstrated that an international inspection body can perform highly creditably in forbidding political and operational circumstances. It prepared itself well, deployed quickly, used technology skilfully, organised itself efficiently in the field, maintained its impartiality and produced sober, balanced reports of a high technical standard. It was also able to successfully follow intelligence leads and reach quick and decisive conclusions. Unlike its predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), it successfully avoided being manipulated by any UN member state, did not unnecessarily offend Iraqi sensibilities and succeeded in parlaying strong Security Council support into Iraqi co-operation, if not proactive engagement and full compliance.

The UNMOVIC experience demonstrated once more that the full support of the Security Council, or at least of its permanent membership, backed by the threat or actuality of sanctions, including if necessary the use of force, is essential for a multilateral verification endeavour of this nature to succeed. That UNMOVIC ultimately failed to fulfil its mandate was not because of any shortcomings of its own, but because the United States, backed by the United Kingdom, failed to give it a chance. The US played a cynical game, initially providing strong political support and technical assistance, but later withholding and delaying crucial intelligence information and tolerating carping from within the Administration designed to undermine UNMOVIC's credibility. The Administration's clear preference for military action, in accordance with a pre-determined timetable, regardless of what Iraq or UNMOVIC did, makes its professed impatience with the pace and quality of UNMOVIC inspections look, in retrospect, feigned. The US and UK knew all along that good verification takes time, as evidenced by their subsequent plea for patience with the work of their Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

It would be a great pity if UNMOVIC's expertise and experience were now lost. Whether a permanent UNMOVIC, as a standby mechanism for future non-compliance cases, is feasible, remains to be seen. It would be expensive to maintain and its relationship to other verification organisa­tions and arrange­ments needs careful consideration. Perhaps most important of all, as the cases of Iran, Iraq and North Korea show, solutions to non-compliance problems tend to be unique, not generic. The UNMOVIC experience itself further demonstrates-in political, operational and technical terms-both the exciting possibilities of, and the potentially daunting constraints on, multilateral verification endeavours.

Lessons from the Iraq conflict for future non-proliferation and inspection regimes

Greg Thielmann
Former Director (2000-2002), Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Greg received the 2003 "Citizen Watchdog" Award of the Center for Investigative Reporting (for his "willingness to come forward with information countering administration claims about Iraqi weapons capabilities").

One of the most obvious demonstrations from the Iraq conflict is the power that the international community can exercise when it is working together toward nonproliferation objectives, and its weakness when it cannot sustain solidarity. Just as the deep divisions in its ranks allowed Iraq to force UN inspectors out in 1998, the unanimous vote of the UN Security Council in November 2002 and the willingness to use force as a last resort permitted their return. Without a continued credible threat to employ military forces, it is doubtful that the UN inspectors would have made progress in their activities on the ground.

Whatever mistakes the IAEA may have made in assessing Iraq's nuclear weapons program prior to 1990, this agency, as well as the other components of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC did an excellent job exposing and dismantling Saddam's unconventional weapons programs. The UN inspector's inability expeditiously to "close the books" on Iraq's CW and BW programs should not detract from their successful containment of the international security threat. Moreover, the precise judgments rendered by UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix during a period of intense political pressure from several different directions stand as a model of probity. That Blix and IAEA Director ElBaradei established a more accurate record of reporting and analysis in public than produced in secret by the United States is as impressive an accomplishment for them as it is a matter of dismay and embarrassment for the US intelligence community.

The modus vivendi for the vital interface between national intelligence agencies and UN inspectors must be improved for the success of future non-proliferation and inspection regimes. Likewise the intelligence agencies must initiate reforms to improve the quality of their product, and dishonest renderings of intelligence estimates must not be tolerated.

Iraq and the proliferation of WMD

Malcolm K Savidge MP
Member for Aberdeeen and founder and chair of the all-party parliamentary group on global security and non-proliferation.

WMD was the reason given for the War… even in the US; Paul Wolfowitz admitted that for bureaucratic reasons they "settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction … [that] everyone could agree on". The United Nations and arms control and disarmament treaties form the basis of a regime that has been fairly successful, so far; there has not been nuclear war and far fewer countries have nuclear weapons than was predicted. The alternative policy of "counter-proliferation" depends primarily on military aggression to control WMD including interception of suspect cargoes, pre-emptive strikes and pre-emptive wars.

Iraq cheated on treaties and was defiant. It was portrayed as such an immediate threat to the US, either through direct attack or collaboration with terrorists, that the Bush administration was not prepared to wait months (for UN inspections) or even three weeks (as Chile proposed) before launching pre-emptive war.

Evidence is lacking for the vast infrastructure of long-range missiles and UAVs described in Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council on 6 February. It is questionable that Saddam had any recent nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programmes or even retained his previous stocks of such materials. But what of Saddam's potential to develop WMD and relations with terrorists in the future? The danger of using such argument to justify pre-emptive war is that it could give carte blanche for any state to attack any other.

The Bush administration's belligerent policies and abandoning its security assurances given to non-nuclear weapons states encourages nuclear proliferation. North Korea 's response was to claim it had successfully developed nuclear weapons, presumably believing this would deter a similar attack on itself. The neo-conservative agenda selectively imposes non-proliferation by military might, while ignoring breaches by its allies. It is breaking many of the undertakings it gave under the Treaty in 2000.

The proper basis for future stability must be in restoring and reforming the United Nations and in strengthening, not flouting, disarmament treaties. Britain should work more closely with European and other allies to seek to impress this reality on the Bush administration.

Security depends upon global cooperation and justice

Frank Judd
Labour Peer and former Director of Oxfam and UK Defence Minister.

Predictably - hopefully not too late - we have arrived back at multilateralism and the UN. It is disturbing that so little thought was evidently given at the planning stage to the aftermath of the war and to the immense task of reconstruction.

The worldwide implications of an invasion of Iraq were always going to be so great that it would be dangerous to act without maximum global endorsement, represented at the least by a Security Council resolution beforehand. Whatever the divisions within the Islamic world, there are wider strategic divisions opening up between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds as well as between the powerful rich world and the majority world, as seen at Cancun . The handling of this episode in Iraq has almost certainly aggravated those divides.

Blix seems to have been vindicated. His analysis was apparently more professional and sound than others under pressure from the prosecution. What is beyond doubt is that the UN inspectors should have been allowed to finish the job.

Arguably the world is in a classic pre-revolutionary situation. Increasingly the excluded are better educated and include wealthy individuals who resent their exclusion from the power centres of the world. If there is to be any chance of stability there has to be a global redistribution of power within global institutions such as the WTO, IMF, the World Bank, the UN Security Council, and much else besides. Moreover, those with power must demonstrate a relentless and transparent commitment to human rights in their domestic and foreign policies. To erode that commitment will inevitably be used by extremists as vindication for their cause.

The US leadership must now recognise that it is every bit as much in the interests of the people of the US as everywhere else that there are strong multilateral institutions. The US cannot produce security for itself, let alone the world, without maximum international cooperation. The grandchildren of the present leaders may well ask "But what did you do with your supreme power while you had it? Why did you dissipate it on ideological and cultural unilateralism instead of investing it in the cause of effective multilateralism?"

Iraq, the UN, and the Fork in the Road

Don Kraus and Alexandra Holland
DK is Executive Director of the Campaign for UN Reform and the co-chair of the Partnership for Effective Peace Operations. AH is a Research Associate at the Campaign for UN Reform.

In his September General Assembly address Secretary General Kofi Annan warned that the UN was at "a fork in the road" and called for "radical reform" of the organisation. Perhaps it was last March when the UN inspectors pulled out to make way for US and British forces. Or maybe it was with the bombing of the UN's headquarters in Baghdad and the death of Sergio de Mello. Possibly it was in October with the unanimous passage of another toothless Security Council resolution. The fate of the organisation now relies on reaching a global consensus on both the mistakes made in Iraq and the means to ensure that those mistakes will never be repeated.

From Wall Street to Main Street, the future of the UN has been the object of public speculation. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have ignored the Security Council and then gain its post-war acquiesce. World powers are scorching the UN's legitimacy. The UN is unable to do its job without consensus among members. Many had hoped that the October 2002 resolution would in some way chastise the "go-it-alone" tendencies of the American and British governments while fortifying UN principles; however, it did little to achieve this end. UN member states must urgently define when the international community shall use legitimate coercive force to intervene in the affairs of nations, and then consistently apply this principle.

Fortunately, time has not yet run out for UN reform.With many decisions about Iraq left on the table, the international community can still empower the UN to take a central role in establishing collective global security. But to muster the political will to accomplish this, the public voice - NGOs, activists, and civil society - must assert more than just a need to "work through" and "support" the UN.Rather, it is time to lock arms with Secretary General Annan and reinvent a United Nations that can achieve peace and security in the 21st Century.

Political will in the UN is required

Nathaniel Hurd
NGO Consultant on UN Iraq Policy.

The past 12 years of the Iraq crisis have demonstrated that UN obligations, based on principles of humanitarianism and human rights, can only have positive practical value for civilians if Security Council members, the Secretary-General, UN specialised agencies, and other relevant entities are actually willing to guard and abide by the UN's on-paper principles and multilateralism in practice. The UN's primary role in perpetuating Iraq's humanitarian crisis through economic sanctions stemmed in part from structural UN problems.

Even within the existing structure, however, there are mechanisms and opportunities for the organisation to act as a guardian of civilians, multilateralism and its own principles. Five Security Council member States possess veto powers they can individually wield to bring an issue to a head. The Secretary-General commands more international attention than all but a few world leaders. In addition, many UN entities and specialised agencies can publicly invoke their mandates to assert umanitarian and human rights principles as fundamental to UN policy formulation and implementation. These mandates also allow for investigating and reporting the humanitarian and/or human rights consequences of policy. All UN actors have means (however imperfect and difficult to implement) at their disposal to insist UN policy must conform to internationally-codified humanitarian and human rights standards. Thus the problem is also one of political, individual and institutional will. There can be no guarantees against another humanitarian disaster as long as State-parties themselves are willing to sacrifice UN principles and multilateralism.

Lessons for UK coverage of war

Jake Lynch
co-director of Reporting the World, and freelance journalist for the BBC and recently Sky News.

Though reporting of this conflict will in hindsight be compared favourably, in general terms, with reporting around the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, or Nato's bombing of Yugoslavia, the broadcast media still failed to provide viewers and listeners with 'an intelligent and informed account of issues that enables them to form their own views'. One major lesson learned by journalists must surely be to question the 'official line' before repeating it as having credibility simply because of the source.

From the BBC's supplementary War Guidelines, issued to journalists in January 2003: 'All views should be reflected in due proportion to mirror the depth and spread of opinion. We must reflect the significant opposition in the UK (and elsewhere) to the military conflict and allow the arguments to be heard and tested.'

Questions over the claims that Iraq possessed a credible threat with WMD only really surfaced seriously after the conclusion of major hostilities. Stories about pilotless drones and 10,000 litres of unaccounted anthrax were allowed to determine perceptions, despite the evidence that they did not represent a significant and present threat. There were many suggestions being made for non-military ways to bring about regime change, but this exchange took place almost entirely below the radar of journalists in mainstream news. It is strange, on the face of it, that the single most successful example of 'regime change' in our lifetimes - in former Communist eastern Europe - should not be seen as an obvious fund of insights in debates about how to oust other oppressive regimes.

Further lessons on media coverage can be found in a recent Discussion Paper by Jake Lynch.

A note from the funders of the project (JRCT)

Last year, it slowly became clear to the world that the US and UK were heading towards war in Iraq. Discussion, in the media but also in workplaces and buses and pubs, became serious. There was a growing unease that the debate was poorly informed. In a fast-moving situation, the resources of those who could contribute information and critical analysis were stretched to the limit.

Three NGOs - BASIC, ISIS and Saferworld - spotted the need, secured some funding, and responded. The result was a Bulletin which has been sent to about 2,500 opinion shapers and decision makers, and which has offered both authoritative information and critical analysis. The evidence is that this initiative has been valuable. The project developed an impressive record of media coverage. Unsolicited feedback to the editor called it 'extremely helpful', an 'excellent resource', and even 'fantastic'. When violent conflict broke out, the Bulletin was refocused to include issues such as post-conflict reconstruction and the international legal dimensions of the conflict. As war continued and then the Hussein regime fell, the Bulletin continued to evolve to reflect the changing nature of the conflict. The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust was pleased to fund this project, which Trustees recognised as extremely important. At times of crisis, it is particularly essential that civil society is vibrant and active. Yet, it is just at such times that NGOs are under most pressure.

The Iraq conflict has highlighted the need to defend the principles of multilateralism and international law in global affairs. The Bulletin group recognises this, and - with still-limited resources - is now moving on to new work. JRCT wishes them well in this important task.

We welcome any comments or feedback.

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