BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 12
Obama's nuclear diplomacy
22 April 2009
Chris Lindborg, BASIC
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
On his first major journey abroad as President
of the United States, Barack Obama called for a world free
of nuclear weapons, on several occasions. He acknowledged
that this vision would likely remain unfulfilled during his
lifetime, yet made clear commitments to further reduce the
number and salience of these weapons during his administration.
The level of the President's continuing engagement with allies
and Russia on nuclear arms control, and the results of posture
reviews back home, could result in significant progress on
the road toward nuclear disarmament.
The President's Euro-trip
President Obama called on fellow global leaders to cooperate
in moves toward a world free of nuclear weapons while in London,
Prague and Ankara. He met Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
on April 1 immediately prior to the G20 Summit in London.
They pledged
to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with "a new emphasis
on arms control and conflict resolution measures." The
two presidents acknowledged that a verifiable and legally-binding
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-up agreement,
on which they requested their staff to report to them by July
2009, would only be a first step in showing their leadership
on reducing arsenals worldwide. They felt that future stages
could usefully involve the other nuclear weapon states, and
agreed to improve their own relationship that had recently
been characterized by mistrust and misunderstanding. They
also promised to improve communication through the NATO-Russia
Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE).
The highlight of President Obama's trip was his speech
to an audience of tens of thousands in Prague's Hradcany Square
on April 5. He communicated the importance of having the long-term
vision of a nuclear weapon-free world, while also noting several
of the critical concrete actions that the United States must
provide in moving toward this goal. In addition to mentioning
the follow-on to START, the President said that these actions
must include:
- the U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT);
- promoting a "new treaty that verifiably ends the
production of fissile materials intended for use in state
nuclear weapons;"
- a strengthening of the NPT; and,
- securing "all vulnerable nuclear material around
the world within four years" as part of an effort to
ensure that "terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon."
Calling the NPT's bargain "sound," the President
highlighted the challenges of Iran and North Korea (the latter
had launched a missile test only hours before his speech).
He called for "more resources and authority to strengthen
international inspections" and "immediate consequences
for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave
the Treaty without cause." He also advocated the building
of "a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including
an international fuel bank," adding that "no approach
will succeed if it is based on the denial of rights to nations
that play by the rules." He expressed an intention to
"turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative
and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into
durable international institutions," and to host a Global
Summit on Nuclear Security within the next year.
Speaking
before Turkey's parliament the following day about the dispute
over Iran's nuclear program, he said:
"No one is served by the spread of nuclear weapons,
least of all Turkey. You live in a difficult region and
a nuclear arm race would not serve the security of this
nation well. This part of the world has known enough violence.
It has known enough hatred. It does not need a race for
an ever-more powerful tool of destruction."
At NATO's front line facing a strategically sensitive area,
Turkey will play a defining role in Middle East nuclear diplomacy,
and in how NATO develops its strategic policies toward the
Middle East, West Asia and Russia. Acknowledging the impact
of President Obama's visit, Turkey's President Abdullah Gul
said
on April 15 in Bahrain that he would push to make the Middle
East into a zone "free of weapons of mass destruction."
Turkey is thought to host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs),
though without aircraft attached to them.
While discussions were of course off the record, there were
no proclamations about a nuclear weapon-free world arising
from the NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. The Declaration
of Alliance Security, intended to serve as the outline
for discussions around a new Strategic Concept, merely stated
that:
"Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear
and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of
our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part
in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional
disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts."
The current Strategic
Concept agreed in 1999, and past communiqués, have
consistently pointed to the importance of nuclear sharing
for Alliance cohesion and the strategic nuclear umbrella as
offering the "supreme guarantee" of NATO's security.
Given President Obama's stance on nuclear weapons and recent
declarations by other European leaders,* the next Strategic
Concept is expected to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons
in Alliance doctrine. To what extent their role is downgraded
will, in great part, depend upon developments in the United
States' own nuclear posture, how negotiations proceed with
Russia, the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010
and how nuclear diplomacy develops elsewhere in the world.
Next steps to watch
The Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture
is expected to release its concluding report in early May.
Its interim
report, released in December 2008, seemed to retain a
central role for nuclear weapons in the strategic posture,
although it also indicated that the Commission would have
a few things to say about moving toward the long-term goal
of a world without nuclear weapons.
The President's Nuclear Posture Review is due by the end
of this year. The last review, conducted by the Bush administration
in 2001, led to reductions in operationally-deployed warheads,
but emphasized a more flexible role for nuclear weapons and
suggested that the United States would need to develop new
ones for new missions. The Posture raised suspicions
that Washington was disinterested in pursuing the disarmament
commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. President
Obama has already said clearly that his administration will
refrain
from seeking new nuclear weapons designs and has entirely
cut
funding for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The administration's
current review could be influenced by a number of factors,
possibly the most important being the support the President's
long-term vision receives among military leaders, which will
involve give-and-take on nuclear weapons policies and planning
throughout the administration's term(s).
President Obama's nuclear arms control agenda will also entail
at least two treaties that will require Senate ratification.
He has assigned Vice President Joseph Biden, a former long-serving
Senator and former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, to push for the Senate's approval of the CTBT.
The last attempt at ratifying this treaty was dogged by political
retaliation against then-President Bill Clinton for issues
unrelated to international security. Although it is unknown
exactly how difficult it will be to secure the 67 votes needed
to ratify the treaty (which will likely involve a number of
deals),
the technological
improvements that have occurred since the last time the treaty
was up for ratification should play strongly in the debate.
START-follow-up negotiations will commence
on April 24 in Rome. Discussion will focus on whether to include
delivery vehicles or only warheads, the future of strategic
missile defense, and overall Russian concerns about the U.S.
conventional
arsenal, but will
not include non-strategic nuclear weapons at this stage.
Of course, political and international security crises, such
as the one in Georgia last August, could stymie negotiations,
but early indications reveal a thaw in relations over arms
control in particular.
Although tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) will not feature
in START talks, the United States and its European allies
may seriously consider reaping the security benefits
from consolidation of the U.S. TNWs still in Europe, or even
their withdrawal. There is increasingly open recognition that
they have little relevance to extended deterrence. German
Foreign Minister and SPD candidate for Chancellor, Frank-Walter
Steinmeier, has been an avid promoter
of NATO's role in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
and recently called for the removal
of U.S. TNWs from Germany. With the election in September,
U.S. TNWs in Germany could become a publicly-contested issue
in the months to come.
Outside of NATO, Japan is the number one ally of concern
when it comes to sensitivities about U.S. guarantees of extended
nuclear deterrence. But on April 13, Japan's Prime Minister,
Taro Aso, said that he will send a letter to President Obama,
declaring his support
for the President's vision of a nuclear weapon-free world.
The announcement comes only a few days after President Obama's
former election opponent, Senator John McCain (Republican-Arizona),
visited Japan and reaffirmed
his continuing support for the long-term vision of working
toward zero.
*For example, see the British Prime Minister's speech
of March 17, 2009 and Italy's placement of nuclear disarmament
on the G8 agenda
on March 3, 2009.
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