BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 9
NATO Nuclear Sharing: Opportunity for Change?
1 October 2008
Jeff King, Chris Lindborg, Philip Maxon -
BASIC
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Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) long-standing
policy of "nuclear sharing," in which the United States maintains
tactical nuclear weapons with its allies in Europe, has been
subjected to increased scrutiny since the end of the Cold
War. These out-dated weapons offer no additional deterrent
capability to the strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the
United States, France and United Kingdom. In the European
states that host these weapons, public
opinion is in favor of moving towards a nuclear-free Europe.
[1] Moreover, the legality of the arrangements under
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly
contested. These developments have led to increased pressure
on the United States and NATO to remove tactical nuclear weapons
from Europe. The Alliance's summit in April of 2009, where
plans are afoot to open the Strategic Concept for revision,
could see serious discussion about the future of NATO nuclear
weapons and a potential opportunity for change. Recent developments
in the relationship with Russia may tempt policymakers to
resist revision to NATO's nuclear policy. That would be a
serious mistake.
Background and security considerations
Nuclear weapons literature contains multiple definitions of
what constitutes a "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapon
(often referred to as TNW or NSNW), taking into account such
criteria as yield, delivery system and weapon objectives. For
our purposes the definition is not complex, as we are talking
of a specific class of warhead - the air-deployable B-61 gravity
bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey.
According to the Alliance's last Strategic Concept (1999), these
weapons remain in Europe to bolster NATO's deterrent: "by ensuring
uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of
the Allies' response to military aggression."[2] As of summer 2008, it is estimated
that 150-240 of these tactical nuclear weapons are still in
Europe. Although the United States maintains control of these
weapons during peacetime, control would be transferred to allies
for use on their own aircraft in wartime. European allies must
maintain and train with dual-capable aircraft in peacetime to
prepare for this scenario.[3]
The United States started basing tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe in 1954 to counter perceived Soviet aggression,
and NATO doctrine became tied to the threat of using those
nuclear weapons to respond to a massive conventional Soviet
attack.[4] Times have changed dramatically since the end
of the Cold War - these weapons have lost what utility they
may have had, and present a significant terrorism risk.
First, as the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept makes clear, the
"supreme
guarantee" of Allied security remains the independent
strategic nuclear arsenals of certain NATO members (namely
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The presence
of advanced, invulnerable and accurate strategic arsenals
with full range of deliverable options renders redundant the
few hundred remaining vulnerable and aged tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe. Those in favor of keeping the tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe warn that NATO may need them for
unforeseen circumstances, implying that they could serve as
a deterrent against Russia if it becomes much more aggressive,
or against a range of threats from the Middle East. Eckart
von Klaeden, German foreign policy spokesman for conservatives
in the Bundestag, said as recently as June 2008, "Nuclear
weaponry has to be part of German security policy. We have
to protect ourselves against being taken hostage someday from
a country like Iran."[5] Such scenarios do not withstand scrutiny. NATO
itself justifies these nuclear forces as "now fundamentally
political, and they are no longer directed towards a particular
threat."[6]
Second, when compared to strategic weapons, the usual pre-delegation
of authority over tactical nuclear weapons to lower members
of the chain of command, and the weapons' smaller size, may
make the weapons more vulnerable to illicit acquisition and
use.[7] Recent revelations about the inadequate
security surrounding bomb sites in the nuclear sharing countries,
clearly adds to these concerns. According to a government
'blue-ribbon' report obtained by security expert Hans M. Kristensen
of the Federation of American Scientists, most sites require
"significant additional resources to meet DoD [U.S. Defense
Department] security requirements."[8] Difficulties, including the short training regimen
for nuclear security teams (in some cases as little as nine
months) and the inability to perform no-notice security checks
as a result of host nation/NATO requirements, create a hazardous
situation in which weapons designed to defend NATO may become
targets of theft to be used against the Alliance.
There seems an awareness in NATO circles that public support
for the continued presence of tactical nuclear weapons in
their respective European countries is low. General James
Jones, NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander, noted back
in 2004 in an address to the Senate in Belgium (where there
has been considerable opposition to the bombs) that "good
news is on the way" and that the United States would reduce
its nuclear weapons in Europe. [9] In recent years, the United States appears to
have followed through on this reassurance, withdrawing tactical
nuclear weapons from Ramstein Airbase in Germany in 2005 and
from Lakenheath in the United Kingdom in 2008.[10]
Explanations for the low-key way in which the United States
has withdrawn the B-61s have been speculated upon elsewhere.
A critical aspect in understanding this process is NATO's
virtual admission that these weapons have taken on a sensitive
political symbolism of their own. By not playing up their
withdrawal, or using them as bargaining chips for the retraction
of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, there is a sense that
these weapons have simply lost their utility and are no longer
worth maintaining at European sites. To have them become bargaining
chips with Russia may have led some Alliance leaders to wonder
whether their own security was being traded away or that Alliance
ties were weakening.
Legal issues
Aside from security, legal issues also surround U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe. In particular, several members of
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have questioned the legal basis
of nuclear sharing pursuant to the guidelines established in
the NPT.[11] The dispute revolves around the right of the
United States, through NATO, to transfer responsibility for
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.
Specifically, at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the Mexican
representative questioned the validity of the nuclear sharing
arrangement with respect to Article I of the NPT, which states:
"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly."[12]
Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey have
all joined the NPT as non-nuclear members.[13] Therefore, NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement
would seem to be a direct contravention of Article I of the
NPT because it transfers "nuclear weapons" and their use during
a conflict to non-nuclear states (e.g., Belgium, Italy, etc.).
Simultaneously, the states receiving control of the weapons
in the nuclear sharing program in NATO would also be in violation
of the NPT, if the same legal standard is applied. Article
II forbids the receipt of nuclear weapons or control thereof
by any non-nuclear state from a nuclear state.
Conversely, NATO (and the United States in particular, to
whom all the weapons in question technically belong) asserts
that its nuclear sharing program conforms to the NPT because
the weapons are strictly under the control of U.S. military
personnel.[14] The only situation in which control of the weapons
would be passed to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) would
be during wartime, at which point the NPT would no longer
be a "controlling" element in the weapons' use.
The Alliance cannot afford to ignore NAM's disquiet. By weakening
faith in the bargain behind the NPT, NATO weakens the cornerstone
of the non-proliferation regime, and harms the security it
claims to defend. By acting now, at a critical point in the
history of the non-proliferation regime, the United States,
with the cooperation of allies, may yet be able to turn this
controversy into some positive diplomatic and security dividends.
Russian position
In a reversal of positions since the end of the Cold War, Russian
Military Doctrine (2000) now sees its own conventional inferiority
and explicitly talks of a first-use scenario for their tactical
nuclear weapons: "if the threat of defeat of our own forces
in a major non-nuclear war appeared." Russia has many more tactical
nuclear weapons than NATO - between 2,000 and 4,000 - though
there is some ambiguity in the Russian figure; arsenal size
is often stated as being a percentage (due to warhead dismantlement
programs) of an unnamed base figure.[15] Without access to more concrete data, however,
it is difficult to speculate on the exact size and state of
readiness of the Russian force. and possibly, these weapons
may pose an even greater terrorism risk than U.S. weapons based
in Europe.[16]
In 1991, Russia and the United States made reciprocal unilateral
pledges to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals
through the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The U.S.
PNI resulted in the removal of thousands of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons, and the Russian PNI may have resulted in
a four-fold reduction (but this is difficult to assess because
the original numbers were less certain).[17] In 1997, even though Russia and the United States
agreed to revisit the issue, reciprocal progress was not forthcoming.
A 2005 discussion ended with Russia demanding that the United
States withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons from
Europe before Russia would agree to discuss further reductions.[18]
Despite the underlying post-Cold War thaw in NATO-Russian
relations, Russia still views NATO's posture, including its
tactical nuclear weapons, with trepidation. They point to
the fact that Russian tactical weapons are incapable of hitting
the United States, while American tactical weapons in Europe
are well within reach of Russia.[19] In the context of an expanding NATO to include
former Soviet states and the establishment of missile defense
sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, many Russians see
their tactical nuclear weapons as an essential balancing capability.
Others see them as an important bargaining tool when Russia
is in a generally weaker bargaining position.
Until recently there may have been some cause for optimism
for a breakthrough agreement to eradicate tactical nuclear
weapons within Europe. Russia may be maintaining its arsenal
not in the expectation of future conflict, but in the hope
that it may be able to trade its tactical weapons for the
end of nuclear sharing in Europe (or other potential dividends).[20] By trading their tactical nuclear weapons for
NATO's, Russia appears to lose on the deal in numbers. But
this may have been deemed worthwhile to see the end of NATO
nuclear sharing.
Any negotiations on this are likely to prove tough. Even
before the recent deterioration of the relationship, some
Russian policymakers expressed their belief that relations
with NATO were a "zero-sum" game, with any gain of influence
(or of former satellites) by NATO being perceived a direct
affront to Russia's power.[21] Although Russia received a voice in Alliance
developments through the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002,
recent events have queried the pitch:
- rapid NATO enlargement eastward;
- U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty;
- U.S. proposals to station radar and missile interceptors
in Poland and the Czech Republic;
- NATO support for the independence of Kosovo;
- Russian suspension of its participation in the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty; and
- the dispute over territory in Georgia.
Nevertheless, there remain opportunities if the two sides
were able to see past the fog of current events.
NATO's next summit and the way forward
NATO will hold its 60th Anniversary Summit in April 2009 and
is expected to start a review of its Strategic Concept. As part
of this review, NATO will consider the role of nuclear weapons
in its planning. This presents an opportunity for NATO to consider
the means of expressing solidarity and "common commitment" to
security in ways that do not rely upon expensive and out-dated
measures that harm its own security.[22] Tactical nuclear weapons have no utility in
future NATO operations, and present an opportunity cost to more
critical requirements. European host countries are soon to face
procurement decisions involving billions of dollars for the
next generation of dual-capable aircraft, at a time of increasing
US demands for greater European contributions to collective
military operations and poor economic outlook.[23]
NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe today are legacies
from a past overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority and
the threat of a massive invasion that no longer exists and
shows no sign of returning. They simply serve to increase
Russia's sense of threat without contributing to NATO's own
security. It would be irrational to simply hold on to these
weapons to punish Russia's 'intransigence'. At the very least,
the removal of these weapons will take away a crucial self-justification
for Russia's own tactical arsenal, improve the possibilities
of a follow-up to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
NATO states could rid themselves of this extra resource burden,
reduce the risk of nuclear theft, and achieve a crucial diplomatic
non-proliferation goal by implicitly tying the removal of
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the expectation of clear
reductions in Russia's tactical arsenal.
Perhaps most importantly, the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe would signal the sincerity of individual
NATO members' commitments to nuclear disarmament under Article
VI of the NPT. The withdrawal of the weapons would also reassure
NAM states that NATO members honor their international obligations
under NPT Articles I and II, and improve prospects for the
2010 NPT Review Conference. The removal of these weapons may
also be a symbolic starting point for more bold measures on
the road toward a world free of nuclear weapons, a vision
expressed by the now famous four U.S. statesmen, George Shultz,
William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn.[24] This vision was more recently endorsed by four
prominent U.K. statesmen, a group which includes former NATO
Secretary General, Lord George Robertson.[25]
U.S. Presidential candidates John McCain
and Barack Obama have both made
clear their desire to move forward on this agenda.[26] Senator McCain has specifically said
that he would seek to work with Russia to remove all tactical
nuclear weapons from Europe as a prelude to further disarmament
efforts.[27] Senator Obama has strongly endorsed
the long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons.[28] Whichever candidate wins will inherit the difficult
assignment of working with Russia and NATO allies on significant
issues. Tactical nuclear weapons present an important opportunity
to reduce the nuclear dangers and improve a relationship that
is critical to global security.
Endnotes
[1] Almost 70 percent
of respondents said that they want Europe to be free of nuclear
weapons. About 25 percent said that they oppose a nuclear
weapon-free Europe. "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Survey Results
in Six European Countries," Poll sponsored by Greenpeace International
and conducted by Strategic Communications in April and May
2006. Poll results and background available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/
reports/nuclear-weapons-in-europe-survey.pdf, accessed
17 September 2008.
[2] NATO, The Alliance's
Strategic Concept, April 1999. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm,
accessed 15 September 2008; Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov,
Timor Kadyshev, "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of
Control and Reduction," Center for Arms Control, Energy
and Environmental Studies at MIPT (Moscow, 2004), p. 37.
[3] Hugh Beach, "Tactical
Nuclear Weapons: Europe's Redundant WMD," Disarmament Diplomacy,
May/June 2004. Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77hb.htm,
accessed 15 September 2008.
[4] The deployment
of all types of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil reached
its peak in 1971 with about 7,300 warheads (Hans M. Kristensen,
NRDC, 2005, p. 24).
[5] Judy Dempsey, "German
parties press U.S. to withdraw nuclear arms," International
Herald Tribune, 23 June 2008.
[6] NATO, "NATO's Nuclear
Forces," 1 July 2008, available at: http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/index.html,
last accessed on 15 September 2008.
[7] William Potter
and Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of
the Problem," CNS Reports, 4 January 2001.
[8] Hans M. Kristensen,
"USAF Report: 'Most' nuclear weapon sites in Europe do not
meet US security requirements," 19 June 2008, p. 2. Available
at: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/
usaf-report-%E2%80%9C most%E2%80%9D-nuclear
-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-
us-security-requirements.php. Internet; accessed 9 September
2008.
[9] As quoted in: Karel
Koster, NATO Nuclear Doctrine and the NPT, BASIC Briefing,
29 June 2004, available at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/20040629NATO-nuclear-Koster.htm
[10] Hans Kristensen,
"U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the United Kingdom,"
FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 26, 2008, available at:
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/
us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-kingdom.php,
accessed 15 September 2008.
[11] "Working Paper
Presented by the Members Of Non-Aligned Countries Party to
the Treaty," 28 April 1998. Available at: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1998prepcom/98namwp.htm,
accessed 11 September 2008.
[12] "Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," signed at Washington,
London, and Moscow on 1 July 1968. Available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm,
accessed 11 September 2008.
[13] For a full list
of NPT members, see: "Signatories and Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," available on
the Website of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 3 December
1998, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/fulltext/treaties/npt/parties.htm,
accessed on 15 September 2008.
[14] Matthew Martin,
"NATO Nuclear Weapons: The International Face of US Nuclear
Policy," A paper for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's 2006
International Law Symposium (February, 2006), p. 3.
[15] Brian Alexander
and Alistair Miller, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent
Threats in an Evolving Security Environment (Dulles: Brassey's,
Inc., 2003), p. 157.
[16] William Potter
and Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of
the Problem," CNS Reports, 4 January 2001.
[17] "The Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons at
a Glance," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, May 2006,
available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance,
accessed on 15 September 2008.
[18] "The Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons at
a Glance," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, May 2006,
available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance,
accessed on 15 September 2008.
[19] Arbman and Thornton
(2003), p. 40.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Gunnar Arbman,
Charles Thornton, "Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part
I: Background and Policy Issues," Swedish Defense Research
Agency (November, 2003), p. 39.
[22] NATO Alliance
Strategic Concept, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999,
quoted in Diakov et al (2004), p. 37.
[23] Olivier Meier,
"News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in
Europe?" Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, available
at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/NewsAnalysis,
accessed on 15 September 2008.
[24] Former U.S. Secretary
of State George Shultz, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Perry, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and
former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam
Nunn, wrote two Op-eds in the Wall Street Journal,
in January 2007, calling for "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,"
and in January 2008, for "Toward A Nuclear-Free World," on
15 January 2008.
[25] Sir Malcolm Rifkind
(Conservative), Lord David Owen (Crossbencher), Lord Douglas
Hurd (Conservative), and Lord George Robertson (Labour), "Start
worrying and learn to ditch the bomb," Op-ed in the Times
(London), 30 June 2008. For additional context, see: BASIC,
"Another milestone to Zero: UK Statesmen call for a World
without Nuclear Weapons," Special Getting to Zero Update,
20 June 2008, available at:
http://www.basicint.org/update/zero080630.htm
[26] Amitabh Pal, "Obama
and McCain Take Steps against Nuclear War," The Progressive,
17 July 2008. Available http://www.progressive.org/mag/wxap071708,
accessed 12 September 2008.
[27] Heather Maher,
"U.S.: McCain Pledges to Work with Russia on Disarmament Issues,"
Radio Free Europe, 28 May 2008. Available http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/
2008/05/ 6814774d-3c49-4d4d-96ff-5b877152e47c.html. Internet;
accessed 12 September 2008.
[28]
Alexander Mooney, "Obama says time to rid world of nuclear
weapons," CNN.com, 16 July 2008, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/16/obama.speech/,
accessed on 15 September 2008.
*Thank you to Zachary Ferguson,
who provided assistance with this paper.
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