BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 6
The US-India Agreement and its Impact on
the Nonproliferation Regime
18 August 2008
Philip Maxon, BASIC
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
Introduction
After a hard and bitter internal debate in the Indian Parliament,
India finally agreed
on a deal that would allow the United States to trade nuclear
material, including fuel and information.[1] The deal moved to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) where the Board of Governors approved of a safeguards
agreement on India's nuclear facilities. Now the agreement
moves to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which is expected
in early September to sign off on nuclear supplier states
selling material to India before the deal can come into effect.
However, in its current form, the agreement has serious implications
for the nonproliferation regime, which includes the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA safeguards, and the NSG.
How would the agreement impact the regime? What questions
need to be answered in order to eliminate the risks posed
by the agreement?
IAEA Safeguards
The IAEA Board of Governors approved India-specific safeguards
on August 1. Although the full text is known only to India
and the IAEA, the safeguards
agreement apparently sets forth an "umbrella agreement"
which means that 14 out of India's 22 reactors, and any future
reactors, would be regulated by the IAEA.[2] Addressing concerns about possible termination
of the safeguards agreement by India, IAEA Director General
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei stated, "There are no conditions for
the discontinuation of safeguards other than those provided
by the safeguards agreement itself." In addition he said,
"The 'umbrella' nature of this agreement provides a more efficient
mechanism for ensuring that safeguards requirements can be
met. It satisfies India´s needs while maintaining all the
Agency´s legal requirements."[3]
However, questions still remain regarding the safeguards
agreement. The biggest question is: which facilities are safeguarded?
That is unknown at the moment and will be determined by India
and the IAEA. Another question is: will India be allowed to
switch which sites are safeguarded and which are not, or switch
the fuel from one facility to another? The IAEA has not made
this information public. The agreement is particularly worrisome
because it requires safeguards for just over half of India's
facilities. At a recent event that focused on the agreement,
Daryl Kimball (Arms Control Association) Sharon Squassoni,
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and Ambassador
Robert J. Grey Jr. said
that failure to arrange for safeguarding all of the sites
is unprecedented.[4]
What would happen if India tested a nuclear device again?
The agreement is vague on this issue. Would the IAEA call
for the return of all delivered nuclear fuel and the cessation
of fuel shipments? These questions appear to have been left
to the NSG.
Also unclear is whether India would be allowed to nullify
the safeguards agreement. The IAEA asserted
that safeguards termination could come only from those parties
listed in the agreement itself.[5] India has asserted that it would have the right
to abrogate the safeguards agreement if fuel shipments are
stopped for any reason. This is another question left unanswered
by both the agreement and the IAEA's proceedings.
Concerns also center on the likelihood of India receipt of
nuclear fuel for energy reactors freeing-up domestically manufactured
fissile material for weapons purposes. Then, when India so
chooses, it could terminate the safeguards agreement, resume
nuclear tests and expand its nuclear weapons program, simply
at the risk of forfeiting future deliveries.
Nuclear Suppliers Group
With the approval of the IAEA, the agreement now moves on
to the 45-member NSG, where India will seek unanimous approval
to accept nuclear technology and fuel from other states. The
NSG operates on the basis of consensus, and dictates whether
nuclear supplier states can trade with non-nuclear states.
Under the Deal India would
be technically classified as a non-nuclear state, and
suppliers would not be limited to the US. France and Russia
in particular are awaiting a positive response for possible
new supply agreements with India.[6]
It appears unlikely that India will get everything it wants
from the NSG, especially, the ability to test a nuclear device
without any consequences. The United
States Hyde Act[7] and NSG
Guidelines[8] stipulate that if any state tests a nuclear weapons
device, then that state should face consequences, and retracting
fuel shipments will be a minimum response in this case. The
NSG must continue to enforce its guidelines or else they will
be seen to be discredited, so as bad, applied using double-standards,
and the world may face potential proliferation problems down
the road.
The NSG must also ensure that measures are in place to prevent
the transfer of cutting-edge dual-use enrichment or reprocessing
technology, whether intentional or unintentional. Article
I of the NPT stipulates that a nuclear weapons state cannot
intentionally or unintentionally assist a non-nuclear weapons
state develop a nuclear weapons program - the Deal must not
undermine this clear prohibition.[9]
The Nonproliferation Regime
Ambassador Robert Grey has argued
that the U.S. India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is counterproductive
to the nonproliferation regime.[10] He believes that the United States essentially
gave India a blank check and now India wants to cash the whole
thing. India is looking for official recognition as a nuclear
weapons state, even though they have not signed any international
arms control or nonproliferation agreement, and would be barred
from joining the NPT in such a capacity. The deal itself does
not recommend that India sign any of the international arms
control and nonproliferation treaties. The fear is that it
could start a precedent leading other states leave the NPT
and follow India's example.
For instance, what is stopping China or Russia from initiating
a similar agreement with Pakistan, or Israel? Even non-nuclear
NPT states like Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Canada may
seek special exemptions from the NSG on the back of the US-India
deal, leading to an alarming proliferation of technology and
fissile material.
Conclusion
The agreement is a disaster
for the nonproliferation regime.[11] It rewards a non-member the rights and privileges
of nuclear states without any pressure on India to sign the
NPT or CTBT, reduce its current stockpile, or cease fissile
materials production. This could encourage other states to
follow the same path. Pakistan's leadership has
already indicated that they expect similar treatment by the
IAEA in the future.[12]
The NSG has to be clear what would happen if India tests
a nuclear device, and to set firm guidelines regarding the
security of information to ensure that India does not obtain
the latest enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Any agreement
that passes through the NSG will open Pandora's box for other
states, a blow for the regime, and the goal of a nuclear weapon
free world.
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect
those of BASIC
Notes
[1] Jonathan Manthorpe.
“Amid uproar, India gets its nuclear deal back on track” The
Vancouver Sun. July 23, 2008. http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/
story.html?id=af0ce192-1003-4752-a796-4292530486b3
[2] “IAEA Approves
Deal For India's Nuclear Inspection” Associated Press. August
4, 2008. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/04/ap/asia/main4318682.shtml
[3] IAEA
Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. “Introductory Statement
to the Board of Governors.” August 1, 2008. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n006.html
[4] Transcript of Opening
Presentations for “The Future of the Indian Nuclear Deal:
Key Issues before the IAEA, NSG and US Congress” Arms Control
Association. July 30, 2008. http://armscontrol.org/node/3221
[5] See note 3
[6] Transcript of Opening
Presentations (see note 4)
[7] “H.R. 5682. Henry
J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act of 2006,.” 109th Congress. December 18th, 2006. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf
[8] “The Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) at a Glance.” Arms Control Association. May, 2006.
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG
[9] “The Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” Department
for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. 2000. http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html
[10] See note 4
[11] Jayantha Dhanapala
and Daryl G. Kimball. “A Nonproliferation Disaster.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. July 18, 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=20292&prog=zgp&proj=znpp,zsa
[12] Siddharth Varadarajan.
“IAEA approves Indian safeguards agreement.” The Hindu.
August 1, 2008. http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/000200808011552.htm
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