BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 5
Preventing a new age of nuclear insecurity?
Analysis of William Hague's July Address
to the IISS
29 July 2008
Jamie Wheeler, BASIC
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
In a speech delivered to an audience at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in July 2008, William Hague
discussed how he believed the vision of a nuclear weapons-free
world could be realised. Part of a growing tide and following
a talk exactly two years earlier, Hague reflected previous
statements made by former Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett,
the Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Minister of Defence Des Browne
and a London Times op-ed written by a trio of former British
foreign secretaries and a former NATO Secretary-General.
This short paper will broadly outline key aspects of the
address, focusing on what specific events, policies or plans
Hague believes are needed for nuclear disarmament to take
place, and what pitfalls should be avoided. This will be followed
by a critical response: does the speech go far enough? Are
there proposals which are flawed or unlikely to be possible
in today's current international climate? It concludes with
an assessment of its contribution to the current debate, as
well as the next steps that must be undertaken by the international
community or the UK government.
Hague's argument
Welcoming the increased international support for the vision
of a nuclear weapons-free world, William Hague was critical
of the current practice of dealing with proliferating or possibly
proliferating states on a case by case basis. By failing to
pick up on the common themes that facilitate proliferation
- technology has been acquired rather than developed, activities
have been hidden for substantial periods of time, and the
international response has been delayed and indecisive - the
international community is caught unprepared, the response
is insufficiently urgent, and the danger of regional spread
is magnified.
Citing the example of Iran, Hague argues that irrespective
of the extent of nuclear disarmament in the United Kingdom,
Russia and the United States, some countries will always see
it in their national interests to develop nuclear weapons.
As a result, Hague warns against unilateral and multilateral
disarmaments which are not coupled with increased non-proliferation
and counter-proliferation efforts:
"However no amount of nuclear disarmament will protect
us from the dangers of nuclear weapons without a more comprehensive
approach to nuclear proliferation, which is by far the biggest
challenge we face today. There is an urgent need for a concerted
effort to put the brakes on nuclear proliferation, without
which steps towards reducing nuclear stockpiles worldwide
will have little effect."
Today's geopolitical climate makes nuclear proliferation
a greater threat than during the Cold War. Hague believes
"the barriers to becoming a nuclear weapons power are considerably
lower than they were in the past", and that the dangers from
proliferation have magnified for the following reasons:
- Suppliers: "A thriving black market exists operating
as a one-stop shop for would-be nuclear powers, so that
even those countries such as Libya which did not have the
indigenous base for a nuclear weapons programme were able
to import it from abroad"
- Non-state actors: "It is no longer beyond the
power of terrorist groups to acquire the nuclear material
necessary to detonate a nuclear device in one of our cities"
- Spread of dual-use nuclear technology: "We have
to grapple with the dangers of the nuclear fuel cycle. Once
a country knows how to produce enriched uranium for a civilian
power programme, it has overcome one of the greatest hurdles
to acquiring a nuclear weapon"
- A break-down of trust: "The absence of effective
control of proliferation has contributed to the reluctance
by nuclear weapons powers to assist with the transfer of
peaceful nuclear technology to states who want it"
In light of these loopholes in the non-proliferation regime,
Hague highlighted eight proposals which the British government
should adopt and advocate immediately:
1. There needs to be a conference of 'strategic dialogue'
between the Permanent Five before the next NPT Review Conference
in 2010, to discuss further reductions in stockpiles, and
how to reduce the risk of confrontational or accidental
nuclear war.
2. We need to listen to states with the capabilities but
not the desire to have a nuclear weapons program (for example,
Brazil and Japan) and bring on board the non-signees, including
Israel, Pakistan and India.
3. The loopholes in the NPT, which allow states to develop
nuclear technology and then withdraw without facing a determined
punishment, should be closed immediately. The international
community should determine a default response for any state
leaving the NPT, including immediate referral to the UN
Security Council.
4. The uranium fuel cycle needs to be taken under international
control - with more states wanting to acquire nuclear technology,
the international community should regulate the cycle through
partnerships, or 'fuel banks'.
5. The IAEA should be strengthened by increasing its inspectional
powers, by making the Additional Protocol mandatory from
2010, and by substantially increasing its funding.
6. Attempts should be made to improve the international
community's ability to disrupt the black market for nuclear
weapons and related technology, and to increase the power
of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and encourage
important states to sign up to it (for example, Malaysia,
China and Pakistan).
7. The financial networks that support nuclear proliferation
should be disrupted. Suspect banking activity should be
blocked and money-laundering banks isolated. International
assistance should be provided to states to establish domestic
laws and controls against nuclear proliferation.
8. Learning from the examples of North Korea and Libya,
there should be a 'step change' in how the international
community deals with would-be nuclear weapons states, such
as Iran. This should include more European 'sticks' to go
alongside American 'carrots' as well as gathering international
support for more sanctions.
Finally, Hague argues that the specific challenges of nuclear
proliferation must be understood alongside the other global
problems of climate change and energy security. There is a
need for greater urgency and a 'galvanising moment' to bring
together the international community. The United Kingdom should
also act quickly in forming a common approach with the new
US President in 2009.
Analysing Hague's address
Given his position as official representative of Conservative
Party policy in this area, there is much in William Hague's
speech to welcome. First and foremost, Hague highlights the
urgency of the situation, and the need to secure nuclear stockpiles
to prevent nuclear material getting into the wrong hands.
Increasing international awareness and support for initiatives
such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program will
increase their scope and effectiveness.
Nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation are global threats,
not just limited to either those states that have nuclear
weapons now, or those that want to acquire weapons in the
future. William Hague appears to recognise that the broader
international regime governing non-proliferation needs to
include all nations and not just the select few that make
the international headlines, and would ensure that other powers,
such as Brazil and Japan, will be able to have a voice in
the debate. Success depends upon maintaining the consensus
at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but equally,
it does not have to be static and inflexible to changing times.
On the other hand, Mr Hague's advocacy of a universal posture
towards would-be proliferators, and the requirement to involve
the UN Security Council in establishing general principles
to apply to every situation may be over-stated. The Six Party
Talks are criticised by Hague as being a non-uniform approach,
but by including the immediate neighbours in talks, those
most closely affected and likely to respond in ways that affect
international security, the situation is contained and controlled.
Perhaps only after these talks break down should the Security
Council become more substantially involved.
Hague believes that states which opt out of the NPT or violate
its provisions should be immediately referred to the Security
Council. But the Council is not some mystical silver bullet
- the case of Iran has shown that consensus and agreement
within the Council is not always easy to reach. Reaching some
prior agreement in principle on the type of response would
inevitably be illusive, because Council members would not
limit their freedom of action in advance and some would fear
abuse by other members.
Hague clearly believes that disarmament is desirable in its
own right and also to shore up the NPT consensus, he also
believes that certain states will pursue a nuclear weapons
programme irrespective of such moves by the nuclear powers.
He cites Iran, arguing that its "relative weakness in conventional
forces, its perception of being militarily encircled and its
desire to ensure the survival of the Revolution" will ensure
domestic support for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
But Hague fails to discuss how the international community
should address these systemic causal motivations behind Iran's
suspected nuclear weapons programme. His approach risks focusing
on punishment of non-confirming states to the exclusion of
attempts to overcome these factors driving proliferation.
Too often security between states is seen to be zero-sum,
so that policy prescriptions fall into the category of winning
over against others. Such an approach will create resistance
and animosity in the future, and in the long term will end
in failure.
Hague's approach in prioritising non-proliferation over disarmament
also risks strengthening the perception amongst some non-nuclear
weapon states that the declared nuclear powers still dictate
the global response without holding up to their side of the
original bargain. Nations such as South Africa have frequently
argued that it is lack of progress in the disarmament pillar
of the NPT which is undermining confidence in the treaty and
indirectly leading to proliferation.
On the renaissance in nuclear power, which he broadly welcomes,
Hague states that the "dilemma of the fuel cycle is one which
will only get worse. As things stand, we do not have an answer".
NPT signatories can legally develop nuclear enrichment programmes
under the auspices of a civilian nuclear programme and then
once the dual-use technology is acquired, withdraw from the
NPT. In this context, Hague supports international enrichment
partnerships and 'fuel banks' implicitly supporting measures
to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from developing their
own full-cycle enrichment processes. Agreement to such arrangements
is only likely if they are non-discriminatory, and states
currently with enrichment facilities agree to give up national
control and internationalise them. Perhaps Hague's 'galvanizing'
moment, that brings the international community together,
will be most necessary in this regard.
The need to strengthen the inspectorial power and finances
of the IAEA is not in doubt. If additional powers and responsibilities
are to be bestowed upon the Agency, it is important that its
recommendations are listened to by members of the Security
Council, rather than being used as a rubber-stamp for predetermined
policies. Similarly, Hague is correct in stating that the
Additional Protocols will increase the effectiveness of monitoring.
Increased international efforts should be made to encourage
more than the current 88 states to bring into force the enhanced
safeguards agreements. This will not be successful until some
white elephants are addressed - notably the nuclear states
outside the NPT as well as further nuclear disarmament by
the nuclear weapons states.
Going forward
William Hague's speech is a welcome addition to the growing
international movement that supports the vision of zero nuclear
weapons. He insightfully touches upon some of the issues which
will be contentious in the future, but necessary to resolve
if significant improvements are to be made. It is highly encouraging
that there appears to be significant agreement between the
two major British political parties, that will ensure sustained
movement in the right direction, will bolster the current
Labour government's resolve to move on this agenda, and confidence
within Washington that moves towards disarmament will be supported
by their closest ally before and after any elections.
Even though the Conservative Party has recently come far
in realising that nuclear disarmament is both preferential
and possible, Hague's speech highlights that a more complex
understanding of the perceptions of the wider international
community is needed. Additional care must be taken in order
to act towards the non-nuclear weapons states with respect
and greater equality. In particular, Hague's support for the
US-India nuclear deal sends an unsatisfactory message to states
which chose to abide by international standards and refrained
from developing their own nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, his
proposal to include Israel, Pakistan and India in non-proliferation
talks as de facto nuclear weapon states will be seen as highly
controversial by certain countries. This shows the fine line
that any government must tread - the need to include all states
within an international agreement and the necessity of deterring
states from disregarding their obligations under the NPT.
An adequate solution to this dilemma will be crucial for the
zero nuclear weapons vision to come into reality.
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