BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 4
Iran's Missile Program
15 July 2008
Bharath Gopalaswamy, Cornell University
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
Summary
A nuclear weapon program requires not only the production
of fissile material and its weaponization, but also an effective
and credible delivery system with range, accuracy and survivability.
Alongside the US National Intelligence Estimate judgment that
Iran was pursuing a nuclear weaponization program prior to
2003, this suggests a possible Iranian strategy of currently
focusing its energies on developing the essential but ambiguous
dual-use capabilities for the delivery of nuclear weapons
whilst international attention is trained upon them. However,
Iranian mastery of long-range technology still looks some
way off, so that current US intelligence estimates appear
to be based upon incredible worst-case scenarios. This paper
looks briefly at recent Iranian developments in missile technology
in the light of its recent tests.
Missile test?
Earlier this year Iran announced the launch of its single-staged
rocket called the Explorer-I. The launch, on 4 February, was
timed to coincide with the 29th anniversary of the Iranian
revolution. The test was officially announced a success, though
video footage showing debris falling from the rocket may indicate
otherwise. The modified Shahab-3 launch was part of Iran's
testing program for the launch of its first domestically-built
satellite, the Omid (Hope), though some have suggested there
were military motives. Iran's first satellite, Sinah-1 was
built and launched in Russia in October 2005. Jane's Intelligence
Review has obtained satellite images of sites south east
of Semnan city showing high levels of security and recent
construction activity. One stands out as displaying unique
features consistent with those in the launch video shown on
Iranian television, and was probably an upgraded facility
previously used for SCUD-type launches.
This launch was followed by recent Iranian missile tests
carried out last week. Iranian officials claimed the tests
demonstrated a new variant of a Shahab missile that had a
range of 1,250 miles. Such a missile would put much of the
Middle East in striking distance, including Israel - as close
as 650 miles from Iran - as well as Turkey, Pakistan and the
Arabian peninsula. In addition, an Iranian government photograph
showing a cluster of missile launches was apparently doctored
to add a fourth missile lifting off from a desert range. These
tests must be viewed with a fair degree of skepticism since
Iran has a rich tradition of exaggerating its capability of
missiles. These tests came just after a day when the United
States and the Czech Republic signed an accord to allow the
Pentagon a part of its contentious missile defense system.
Furthermore, it could also be speculated that these tests
are in response to the Israelis, whose air force last month
practiced what American intelligence officials called a rehearsal
for a possible strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities.
International concern over Iran's strategic intentions have
been high ever since Alireza Jafarzadeh, a prominent Iranian
dissident, exposed nuclear-related developments at Natanz
and Arak in 2002. Iran's face-down of demands to cease its
fuel-cycle activities have deepened suspicions of its military
intent, particularly as it is easy to comprehend why Iran
might view the acquisition of nuclear weapons to be in its
strategic interest, and because nuclear weapons continue to
be seen by the major powers as instruments of security and
status.
No country has yet developed long-range missiles simply to
deliver conventional warheads. The expense of ballistic missile
development and deployment can only be justified if they inflict
the level of strategic blow related to a nuclear weapon. Questions
still linger around evidence supplied to IAEA inspectors that
suggest design studies for mounting nuclear warheads on long-range
missiles prior to 2004, questions that lead many to speculate
that Iran's rocket program has primarily military, and therefore
nuclear weapon applications.
The National Intelligence Estimates of 1999 and 2001 proposed
that Iran could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015. This
worst-case timeline currently still stands officially, and
forms the essential justification behind the proposed but
untested US missile defense system in Europe; which in turn
has harmed US-Russian relations and undermined cooperation
under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The evidence
behind such a proposition is somewhat suspect. Iran largely
depends upon North Korea for its missile technology currently,
and they have yet to indicate their mastery of accurate intermediate,
let alone long-range missiles.
Possible motives
So why would Iran want long-range missiles? First, status.
Iran's self-image as a regional power derived from potent
stories of empire is a powerful driver, and explains its need
for a large military force and symbols of political power.
Missiles have come to symbolize power and coercion in international
relations. They have been used as tools of political intimidation
and coercion.
Second, deterrence. Iran's leaders view an increasingly hostile
world around them, and not without justification. Although
the US invasion eliminated the Iraqi threat, this came at
the expense of encirclement by US forces in number, deployed
in twelve neighbouring countries: in Iraq, Afghanistan, the
new Central Asian republics and in the Persian Gulf. And the
United States is regarded as the supreme enemy. But does this
deterrence require ICBMs? Possibly, if deterrence directly
against US forces or regional allies is deemed insufficient
for this purpose. Iran's efforts to build next generation
Shahab-4, Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 missiles with reported ranges
of around 4,000-5,000 kilometres is frequently portrayed as
threatening to Western Europe, and these may be the final
steps to constructing an ICBM that will ultimately threaten
the United States.
Sources of technology
Over the past decade, Iran has made modest, steady, and gradual
advances in its rocket and missile development, through international
cooperation, purchases and indigenous development. Its program
appears to have been heavily influenced by extensive assistance
from North Korea, Russia and China. Several diverse reports
suggest the following elements:
• Russia supplied
materials, equipment and training: Russia
has allegedly transferred guidance and propulsion systems
and their components, high-strength steels and special alloys,
as well as manufacturing and testing equipment. Specialists
from two Russian defense firms are known to have visited Iran,
and Iranian students have received training in missile technologies
at Russian institutes. Russia has helped Iran with wind-tunnel
testing of missile nose cones. However, in recent years, technology
transfer from both Russia and China has been limited by tightening
controls initiated under the MTCR.
• North Korea furnished the basic
hardware for liquid-fuelled rocket propulsion: In November
1999, Iran imported twelve Nodong missile motors; in 2001
missile airframes, rocket motors and ballistic launchers;
and in 2002 SCUD engine clustering and stage-adding technology.
Features of the Taepodong-1 rocket motor appear in Iran's
Shahab-3. Iran was reported to have acquired Nodong-B missiles
in 2005, and to have attended missile tests in North Korea
in 2006, though this has not been confirmed. North Koreans
also appear to have helped Iran develop missile test facilities
around the Shahroud region and in Tabas.
• China supplied help with guidance
and solid-fuelled rocket propulsion: In 1987 Chinese engineers
built a second missile production plant in Semnan, and the
Bandar Abbas facility for testing, assembling, manufacturing
and upgrading Chinese cruise missiles.
Cutting off the supply
In early March this year, nearly a year after its last sanctions
on Iran, the United Nations Security Council approved a moderate
step-up in measures intended to pressure Iran into suspending
its fuel enrichment-related activities as demanded on previous
occasions, including sanctions on missile-related activities.
Resolution 1803 calls for freezing assets linked to companies
and individuals-almost about a dozen, which have alleged links
to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. It also calls
for a ban on items, which have "dual-use" application to these
programs.
The Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) is responsible for
developing the Shahab-3 missile and has hosted Chinese and
North Korean experts. It took ten years for SHIG to develop
the Shahab-3 and no credible reports of any follow-ons have
been successfully tested. The Lavizan Technical and Engineering
complex comprises several assembly and metallurgy plants and
in 2003 opened a solid fuel production facility. While intermediate-range
missiles are likely to be within reach in the next few years,
there are several technologies critical to the development
of longer range missiles that remain elusive to Iranian scientists;
an ICBM will remain out of reach for some years unless North
Korea successfully tests such a missile and transfers it to
Iran.
Any indigenous missile program would have to develop and
perfect key capabilities such as flight stability and control,
guidance and staging. A critical challenge lies in reliability,
particularly in reducing the risk of launch failure to as
low as 2-5%. High failure rates are costly, and would likely
delay Iranian missile development way beyond 2015.
A key to slowing Iran's missile development, therefore, is
in hampering international assistance. Such a strategy could
involve MTCR states tightening loop-holes in multilateral
and national export controls, with particular focus on Russia
and China; and the establishment of new regional inclusive
missile control frameworks. In the longer-term, the Iranian
missile threat can only be avoided by developing a broader
relationship and strategic dialogue involving other important
regional members. However, this would also demand an interlocutor
in Tehran who would be receptive to the demands of the West.
Bharath Gopalaswamy has a PhD in numerical acoustics and
is a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University's Peace
Studies Program. He can be reached at his email address: bg265
at cornell.edu.
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