BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 1
This paper was first presented at a meeting held alongside
the NPT Preparatory Committee,
2nd session, Geneva, on 8 May 2008
Taking Responsibility
what can NPT states realistically do to
build on
today's momentum behind nuclear disarmament?
15 July 2008
Paul Ingram, Executive Director, BASIC
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
Stages of maturity
We have heard many analogies for the effort required for
states to move towards nuclear disarmament, most involving
mountains. All emphasise the undeniable challenge. But in
a way it is no more than states passing through a stage of
maturity accepting their international responsibilities, just
as we all as individuals pass through stages of adult development
recognising our complex relationships and playing more sophisticated
strategies within society. As we go through life we may look
back at our youth with fond memories, but most of us think
we could have had a better time of it if we had had our mature
heads on. We look on those who display immature behaviour
with contempt. To shirk the responsibility of navigating the
complexity of disarmament is to display extreme anti-social
behaviour and to be profoundly reckless with our world's future.
Nuclear weapon states (NWS) have engaged in significant disarmament
since Reykjavik in 1986, and this continues today. Presentations
made at the 2008 Preparatory Committee have demonstrated the
continued trend in a positive direction. But while this is
certainly to be welcomed, it is clearly insufficient to pacify
the critics. Some treat these developments with caution, believing
that they are down to weapon redundancy and the dynamics between
the NWS rather than any globally-responsible commitment under
the NPT, and that these states are just as far as ever from
contemplating life without their security blanket. This is
not entirely fair, but I will come to that later.
There has also been a strong suspicion that while the vast
majority of states have made clear commitments not to develop
nuclear weapons, for most this is not so much a sign of maturity
as a lack of means, or fear of the repercussions. In such
a climate, it is no wonder that the NPT committees and review
conferences receive less attention in the global media than
they deserve.
But increasingly elite opinion is waking up to the growing
dangers, which include leakage of sensitive technologies and
capabilities. If states and their representatives cling to
their current strategies proliferation is inevitable - sooner
or later.
Faith in non-proliferation multilateralism
There is unfortunately, and for a variety of reasons, a lack
of faith displayed by key actors in the non-proliferation
regime. Some already believe that proliferation is inevitable,
and resort in the first instance to sanction, threat and military
action as a means to slow it down. Such lack of faith in the
institutions of the non-proliferation regime corrodes the
ability of the international community to work together. The
pessimism is self-fulfilling, because proliferation of technologies
and military capabilities is the natural state of international
relations. In such a world it is only a matter of time before
more states, possibly non-state actors, possess the technologies
and choose to use them.
But it is too simply realist to see this as inevitable under
a force of nature. We can build upon some of the bizarre systemic
features of the international system that work against nuclear
proliferation. Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) generally
recognise that their acquisition of nuclear weapons would
likely cause a regional proliferatory domino effect, reducing
security for all, including themselves. This is possibly the
strongest disincentive in operation. The acquisition of nuclear
weapons also means the possessor moves up a league, and while
it may feel glorious, it is also uncomfortable being out of
your league. Overnight a state that acquires nuclear weapons
becomes a nuclear target for existing NWS, and their security
is thereby eroded.
While the naysayers spread gloom about our ability to take
control, they must also recognise that we have come a long
way from Hobbes' state of nature. And our maturity happens
in non-linear spurts, sometimes with breathtaking speed. The
rise of the European Union out of the ashes of the Second
World War is a clear example. The NPT itself is a heroic international
attempt to assert cooperative control of the states of nature.
But again, we have to be willing to reflect on where we have
come from and where we are going. A static legalistic approach
to non-proliferation at the best of times leads to complacency
and encourages a stretching of the boundaries. In contrast,
a collaborative political dynamic approach with ever-strengthening
commitments and confidence in the regime, and a move to universality
and equality, holds much greater chances of success.
Because there is a strong pessimism around negotiating any
new universal framework and a fear that if the current bargain
were questioned it might unravel, there is hostility towards
revisiting the fundamentals. As a result, scepticism within
many states over the bargain is left unchallenged and the
respect for it weakens within many states, particularly in
those with an existing scepticism towards multilateralism
and a predisposition to resort to threat or force.
The link between disarmament and non-proliferation
Some within the NWS seem to believe that there is no link
between disarmament and non-proliferation. Or worse, that
disarmament would give incentive to those states challenging
the international community to see an opportunity to proliferate
with reduced negative consequences, and greater immediate
impact in terms of strategic balance.
There is some basis for this fear. If a state wishes to challenge
the existing status quo, then the acquisition of nuclear weapons
could look attractive, if only as a deterrence for outside
interference. NWS have to recognise, however, that this dynamic
is clearly stronger if the regional power faces hostile forces
with nuclear weapons, particularly if leading politicians
actively threaten nuclear annihilation for electoral gain.
One of the most powerful drivers to acquiring nuclear weapons
for states has been the threat of nuclear use. Russia in the
1940s, China in the 1950s, DPRK in 1990s and later, were responding
to the fear of nuclear blackmail. Aggressive and threatening
counter-proliferation strategies against NNWS suspected of
developing nuclear weapons can therefore be self-defeating,
eliciting a robust response that seeks to further develop
resistant capabilities. The effective international non-proliferation
strategy is to reduce the fear. The United States appears
to have learned this lesson with the DPRK, but some draw the
wrong conclusion from it - there is nothing systemically special
in the nuclear test that forced the change in policy other
than highlighting the failure of the previous strategy of
threat. It was not a nascent nuclear deterrence - no serious
analysts believed DPRK had achieved a realistic, deliverable
nuclear deterrent capability. A key move to reducing the fear
is to take nuclear weapons out of the strategic calculus.
Even when there is no strategic relationship between a NWS
and a potential proliferator, the relationship between disarmament
and non-proliferation can still be strong. The rhetoric at
NPT meetings can too quickly be discounted as hot air - it
can reflect the expression of elite and public opinion within
potential proliferating states. As Des Browne acknowledged
here in February, perceptions in proliferating states are
important, for it is there where the potential proliferation
decisions are made. It's worth repeating his words:
"Our chances of eliminating nuclear weapons will be enhanced
immeasurably if the Non-Nuclear Weapon States can see forward
planning, commitment and action toward multilateral nuclear
disarmament by Nuclear Weapon States. Without this, we risk
generating the perception that the Nuclear Weapon States are
failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations and this will
be used by some states as an excuse for their nuclear intransigence."
NWS need to abandon all attachment to their arsenals if we
are to have any hope of preventing proliferation. The rather
fantastic belief that nuclear weapons have been a civilising
force within Europe would surely have even more attraction
in those states that currently suffer from violent conflict,
external threat and strategic inferiority. The belief that
nuclear weapons present a hedge or insurance against future
threat, expressed by the British government in its domestic
debate over the replacement of Trident, demonstrates a lack
of faith in the NPT process to deliver security that undermines
others' commitment to it. The hedge is implicitly directed
against particular states, which encourages a self-fulfilling
mutual suspicion. Even when a NNWS may not currently feel
direct threat from nuclear attack by a NWS, these strategic
relationships are fluid, and few states rely upon current
intent on the part of potential enemies when making long-term
strategic procurement choices.
The continued possession of nuclear weapons heightens the
possibility of leakage of technology - a direct relationship
with proliferation. And nuclear deterrent chain relationships
have a habit of lengthening as more states, under strategic
threat, contemplate the nuclear option when it comes within
their reach.
Last, but not least, the indefinite preservation of status
and power by NWS through possession attracts other states
to the elite club - a global dynamic not affected by particular
strategic relationships. So while strategic relations in some
cases may not be direct, the linkage between disarmament and
non-proliferation is clear.
Beauty and the beast - a proliferation of proposals
Participants in this conference will be familiar with the
elite civil society initiatives in the United States involving
key participants with strong political influence. This has
attracted the attention of governments too. A series of statements
by the British government over the past year, for example,
has picked up the theme, initiated studies, and proposed realistic
collaboration between P5 states. The proposal made by Des
Browne for a technical conference of P5 nuclear labs to discuss
the verification modalities may appear to some to lack the
necessary ambition - but it is undeniably a positive contribution
if we are to develop the necessary mechanisms essential for
confidence in disarmament. President Sarkozy's recent speech
also outlines a programme of action, proposing significant
P5 movement in advance of 2010. Taking the international community
by surprise, this is a milestone in changing the political
atmosphere.
P5 states need to collectively take up Sarkozy's challenge
and consider developing the political commitment necessary
to give faith to others that they believe in the objective,
to achieve progress and to reverse the dynamics driving proliferation.
Sarkozy's list includes:
• Universal ratification of the CTBT
• Transparent dismantling of all test sites
• An immediate moratorium on the production of
fissile materials for military purposes and serious negotiations
within the CD towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
• Greater transparency between the P5
• Negotiations on a treaty to ban short and intermediate
range surface-to-surface missiles, and
• Implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Following Britain's lead in December 2006 when the government
announced its immediate intention to reduce Britain's arsenal
to 160 warheads, Sarkozy announced that France would reduce
their stockpile to under 300.
There are a whole host of additional proposals floating around
that could add to the list of potential measures to reduce
the salience of nuclear weapons in doctrine. These would include
further significant cuts, the abolition of tactical warheads
(most notably NATO's shared-deployed free-fall bombs in Europe
and Russia's tactical warheads), collective P5 declarations
of no-first use, abandoning the policy of launch on warning
and a phase out of their more vulnerable systems - particularly
land-based silos - to facilitate a reduction of readiness,
and mutual restraint on the modernisation of systems that
is perhaps the most controversial of NWS current activities.
Perverse strategic US and Russian doctrines, largely intact
after the end of the Cold War and governed by fewer arms control
treaties, are perhaps the most fruitful place to start. With
over 95% of the global nuclear arsenals in the hands of these
two states, and 1300 US and 2000-odd Russian warheads on high-alert
status, this relationship must surely be a central focus for
immediate attention. The warming of the relationship has been
hampered, and could yet be reversed, by these strategic doctrines
and consequent lack of trust between the two. We must therefore
hope that recent positive initiatives are rapidly consolidated.
If the P5 are serious, they will convene special private
sessions backed up by public statements of intent to hammer
out differences of perspective and approach, with the intention
of sustained negotiation around achievable agreements. At
a later date it may also require occasional invitations to
be extended to the NPT hold-outs.
Some NWS may fear that disarmament will create an unrealistic
expectation of further progress. NWS point to the lack of
appreciation of progress made so far, and the mounting pressure
they are experiencing to take further steps to show good faith.
But what is there to fear from mutual multilateral disarmament?
Unrealistic demands can easily be ignored - NWS have had little
trouble doing exactly this in most disarmament fora up until
now. Much of the current criticism focuses not on the lack
of progress in reducing numbers, which is certainly to be
welcomed, but rather on the modernisation process that increases
capabilities and demonstrates an expectation on the part of
NWS that their possession will continue indefinitely. The
school bully is to be applauded for mending his ways, but
cannot expect rewards if he continues his behaviour in a less
extreme or more subtle manner.
An international political focus on disarmament gives NWS
the platform to publicise the achievements they have made
on the road to disarmament, and gives them grounds for demanding
respective moves on the part of NNWS to live up to their side
of the dynamic bargain and strengthen universal non-proliferation
measures.
Stronger non-proliferation measures
The need for NNWS to take an active role in promoting disarmament
and developing necessary international mechanisms for confidence
in a future nuclear weapon free world should not be underestimated,
particularly in the context of a global expansion in nuclear
power. This responsibility is too often neglected by those
keen to shine the spotlight on the obvious need for NWS to
engage in disarmament.
Confidence that civilian facilities will not be used for
military purposes requires much greater levels of inspection
even than the Additional Protocol, but with only 82 states
operating the Additional Protocol, we are far from the universal
application even of this essential tool. Of course, states
may be more amenable to tighter inspection measures if they
were universal and if NWS engaged in more serious disarmament,
but this should not be an excuse to obstruct progress. The
majority of States parties are expressing a strong desire
for increased support for the IAEA and stronger verification
measures. We need to look on this as a dynamic process - ever-closer
global verification procedures conducted by a growing and
ever-more effective IAEA.
Iran, already under intense scrutiny and the focus of exhaustive
verification procedures, is inadvertently playing a leadership
role in creating the verification building blocks necessary
for a nuclear weapon free world. Iranians have it in their
power to transform the frame of their identity to one of international
leader using proactive cooperation with the Agency
in developing intrusive inspections, rather than reluctant
victim of burdensome verification. This could not
only achieve a breakthrough in the current dispute, neutralise
any threat of military intervention, and exercise their rights
to develop sensitive technologies; it could also create a
model for everyone else to follow. Eventually we will all
need to accept costly intrusive procedures if we are to insist
on our rights to exploit the nuclear energy. We will all also
have to cooperate in internationalising the fuel cycle: to
avoid accusations of discrimination and to genuinely protect
activities from diversion this requires universal involvement
- no exceptions. This will require a move away from the concept
of supplier and recipient at the root of many of the proposals
on the table today.
Of course, just because we have rights does not mean we have
to exercise them - states need to be alive to the alternative
means of ensuring diversified access to clean and safe energy.
Many are more appropriate to their needs though perverse incentives
push decision-takers onto the nuclear route.
The international community will also need a more coherent
and transparently non-discriminatory system of enforcement
in advance of suspected infringements if the legitimacy behind
Security Council decisions is to be sufficiently strong to
elicit adherence. This requires discussion of the principles
of enforcement in such fora as the NPT Review Conference and
the UN General Assembly. While it is clearly tempting for
those with stronger influence in the UN Security Council to
leave debate to the particulars when a crisis occurs, this
will only reduce legitimacy and open them up to accusations
that they use their positions to exert power over others within
the international community, or use their position to promote
other policy objectives. It will also mean that the Security
Council is less likely to agree over the gravity of alleged
infringements and the necessary response, and potential proliferators
may be more prepared to take the risk of international action
in the hope that disagreement would paralyse enforcement.
Keep the toys in the pram - abandon threats
Just as aggressive counter-proliferation threats can be counter-productive,
so too can threats of non-cooperation with developing non-proliferation
mechanisms, whether in the hope that hold-out states can be
pressured into joining the NPT regime or to accept inspections,
or that NWS would be persuaded to take disarmament responsibilities
more seriously. Non-cooperation will play into the hands of
sceptics believing that international agreement is impossible,
and will give the impression that resistant states lacks any
interest in the intrinsic benefit of non-proliferation mechanisms
beyond what they can extract from their strategic competitors.
Key steps in the disarmament process also involve fundamentally
the NNSW. Iran, Egypt and Indonesia need to unconditionally
ratify the CTBT and engage with the monitoring network - the
problem is not exclusively with the United States and China.
There is a strong and honourable history behind the establishment
of nuclear weapon free zones - but it is not just the refusal
of recognition by NWS that hampers their operation. Several
African states have yet to ratify the African NWFZ for it
to come into force.
Conclusion
The stages of adult development are more complex than we
realise. But if we are to rise above the earlier stages of
opportunism and self-interest, realise our full potential
as human beings, and survive, we are going to need to abandon
the finger-pointing of blame and focus more credibly on our
shared interests and responsibilities.
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